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Summary 
This thesis was initially motivated and guided by a general interest in tax revenue 
mobilisation in Malawi, with a bias towards believing that levels of revenue collection 
were too low, and a tentative focus on the question of how they could be increased. As 
the research progressed, and particularly as more attention was paid to comparisons 
between Malawi and other African countries, my primary interests shifted. It became 
increasingly clear that Malawi is, in some respects, relatively successful in terms of the 
amount of tax revenue collected, and how it is collected. The thesis aims to answer three 
interrelated questions regarding this success: 
• Why did the ratio of tax-to-GDP in Malawi increase significantly between 2005-
2011, from 10% to 17.5% of GDP? (Note, it has remained high since 2011) 
• Why, in recent years (since 2009), has the tax-to-GDP ratio been significantly 
higher in Malawi than in comparable sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries? 
• Why and how, since 1964 – the first year for which relevant data is available – 
have the Malawian tax authorities been able to raise an unusually high proportion 
of total tax revenue (and total revenue) from direct taxes, i.e., taxes on income  
(especially Pay As You Earn and not corporate tax). These figures are high for 
Malawi compared to most SSA countries, and indeed to low-income countries 
generally. 
I used a range of methods and approaches to address these questions. The most notable 
of which are as follows: 
• A study of historical documents relating to taxation in Malawi. 
• Cross-country intra-Africa comparisons of ‘tax morale’ using Afrobarometer 
data. 
• A survey of business people in Malawi, aimed at understanding their tax morale. 
• A series of interviews with staff of the Malawi Revenue Authority and other 
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specialists to try to understand how taxes are collected and processed by the 
Authority in practice. 
• Statistical analysis to extend and update an influential paper by Mkandawire 
(2010) that suggests that differences in national tax performance in contemporary 
Africa, to a large extent, reflect the character of the colonial economy. 
It was difficult to reach clear answers to the three main research questions. The 
conclusions of the study are as follows: 
• The drastic increase in tax-to-GDP ratio between 2005-2011 in Malawi was 
significantly influenced by the introduction of value added tax (VAT) in 2005, 
which resulted in improvements in the collection of both direct and indirect taxes. 
• The higher tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi compared to other SSA countries since 
2009 can be partially explained by the ability of the Malawi Revenue Authority 
to collect significant revenue from large companies and their employees, despite 
the use of tax collection methods that appear to be lagging behind technological 
frontiers. 
• The ability of the Malawi Revenue Authority (and previous tax administrations) 
to collect significant revenue from large companies and their employees also 
explains the high reliance on direct tax in Malawi. This ability is facilitated by 
Malawi’s economic structure, where income has been concentrated in the hands 
of a few businesses and individuals, during both the colonial and the post-colonial 
eras.  
The thesis contributes to the debate on tax revenue mobilisation in SSA countries by 
providing evidence from Malawi on how a low-income country with a pattern of tax 
administration that by normal measures is considered ineffective, is effective in practice. 
In addition, it contributes to the meagre evidence on the role of the post-colonial political 
and economic structure in Malawi in making it possible for the government to continue 
to collect significant revenue, especially through taxing income. 
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Glossary 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT): Income tax on the profits of companies.  
Customs Duties: Taxes on goods imported into a country.   
Direct Tax: Taxes imposed on income, capital gains, and net worth (gift tax, death duties, 
and property tax are also considered direct taxes).  
Hut Tax: Type of poll tax levied on inhabited dwellings or huts generally introduced at 
an early stage in the development of an economy when it is not feasible to introduce an 
income tax.   
Income Tax: A tax levied on the income of individuals and/or corporations; may be 
applied to gross (total) income or net income (gross income less deductions for certain 
expenses).  
Indirect Tax: Tax imposed on certain transactions, goods or events. Examples include 
value added tax (VAT), sales tax, excise duties, and stamp duty. 
Input Tax: Term used in connection with VAT to denote the tax embodied in purchases 
made by a trader or entrepreneur who will usually be able to obtain credit for the tax that 
their suppliers have paid on the goods supplied to them, which form their ‘input’. 
Non-Taxes: Recurring income earned by the government from sources other than taxes. 
Output Tax: Term used in connection with VAT to denote the tax payable on the sales 
of goods or services by those who are subject to the tax and in contrast to the input tax, 
for which credit will be available.  
Personal Income Tax (PIT): A tax paid by people on the money they earn, as opposed 
to a tax that a company pays on its profits. 
Poll Tax: A tax levied as a fixed sum on every liable individual. 
Process Performance: A measure of how efficient or effective a process is.  
Sales Tax: Tax imposed as a percentage of the price of goods (and sometimes services). 
The tax is generally paid by the buyer but the seller is responsible for collecting and 
remitting the tax to the tax authority.   
Surtax: An additional tax rate added onto the rate of an existing tax.  
Taxable Capacity: Refers to the predicted tax-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio 
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that can be estimated with the regression, taking into account a country’s specific 
macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional features.  
Tax Compliance: The degree to which a taxpayer complies (or fails to comply) with the 
tax rules of their country, for example by declaring income, filing a return, and paying 
tax in a timely manner.  
Tax Effort: An index of the ratio between the share of the actual tax collection in gross 
domestic product (GDP) and the predicted taxable capacity.  
Tax Evasion: Generally means illegal arrangements where tax liability is hidden or 
ignored, i.e., the taxpayer pays less than they are legally obliged to pay, hiding income or 
information from the tax authority. 
Tax Morale: Taxpayers’ perceptions of and attitudes towards paying and evading taxes. 
Taxpayer: An individual who pays taxes. 
Tax-to-GDP Ratio: A ratio of a nation's tax revenue relative to its gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
Value Added Tax (VAT): a specific type of turnover tax levied at each stage in the 
production and distribution process. Although VAT ultimately applies to the individual 
consumption of goods or services, liability for VAT is with the supplier of the goods or 
service. VAT normally utilises a system of tax credit to place the ultimate and real burden 
of the tax on the final consumption and to relive the intermediary of any final tax cost.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Thesis Overview 
1.1 Introduction  
I began the research for this thesis with a general interest in tax revenue 
mobilisation in Malawi, with a bias towards believing that levels of revenue collection 
were too low, and a tentative focus on the question of how they could be increased. As I 
progressed in the research, and particularly as I paid more attention to comparisons 
between Malawi and other African countries, my interests shifted. I came increasingly to 
appreciate that Malawi is, in some respects, a relative success in terms of the amount of 
tax revenue collected, and how it is collected. Accordingly, the thesis examines the issue 
of tax revenue mobilisation in Malawi by seeking to answer three interrelated questions 
about this relative success: 
• Why did the ratio of tax-to-GDP (measured as total central government revenues 
divided by gross domestic product) in Malawi increase significantly between 
2005-2011, from 10% to 17.5% of GDP? (Note, it has remained high since 2011) 
• Why, in recent years (since 2009), has the tax-to-GDP ratio been significantly 
higher in Malawi than in comparable sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries? 
• Why and how, since 1964 – the first year for which relevant data is available – 
have the Malawian tax authorities been able to raise an unusually high proportion 
of total tax revenue (and total revenue) from direct taxes, i.e., taxes on income 
(especially Pay As You Earn and not corporate tax).  These figures are high for 
Malawi compared to most SSA countries, and indeed to low-income countries 
generally. 
The literature (Gupta, 2007; Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 1997; Fjeldstad & Rakner, 
2003; Keen & Mansour, 2010; Mkandawire, 2010, Moore & Wilson, 2017) suggests that 
some of the major factors that determine the level and structure of tax collection in SSA 
include: tax policy; the efficiency and effectiveness of the tax administration; the 
willingness of taxpayers; colonial legacy; and the introduction of value added tax (VAT).  
Accordingly, to answer the three main research questions of this thesis, I explore four 
hypotheses: 
• The introduction of value added tax (VAT) in 2005 led to an increase in the 
collection of all taxes.   
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• Malawians are exceptionally good and willing taxpayers (i.e., tax morale is high) 
relative to the populations in other SSA countries.  
• Malawi has an effective tax administration. 
•  Malawi’s colonial history may have steered the country towards a relatively 
higher tax revenue performance. 
1.2 Malawi Overview  
Malawi is a low-income landlocked country in Southern Africa, bordered by 
Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania. It has an estimated population of 18.6 million 
people as of 2017 (NSO, 2019). The country had been colonised by the British since 1891 
and gained its independence in 1964 (Thomas, 1975). Between 1964–1994, it was a one-
party nation-state under the rule of Dr. Kamuzu Banda. In 1994, the country become a 
multiparty state; a total of six presidential elections have been held since the dawn of the 
multiparty era.  
Malawi’s economy is largely centred around rain-fed agriculture, which accounts 
for 80% of livelihoods, 64% of the country’s formal work force, and 28% of its GDP 
(Government of Malawi, 2017;World Bank, 2018). The reliance on agriculture in Malawi 
dates back to the colonial era. During the colonial period, as the country did not have 
minerals and other natural resources (McCracken, 2012), few Europeans (settlers) settled 
there. The small community of settlers who, prior to 1891, were involved in ivory trade, 
turned to commercial farming (mainly coffee, cotton, tobacco, and tea) (McCracken, 
2012). McCracken (2012) further notes that vast tracts of land were appropriated by the 
few settlers and turned into estates. The extant African population was then forced to 
work in the estates and not allowed to grow commercial crops. In addition, a hut/poll tax 
(see Chapter 6) was introduced to force the Africans to work on the estates, as they needed 
to find money to pay the taxes levied by the colonial state. Thus, the colonial state was 
politically oppressive and economically exploitative which resulted in continuous conflict 
between the settlers and the Africans.  
After independence, President Banda's rule deepened political oppression and 
economic exploitation through a system of patronage, terror, and the promise of social 
and economic development (Kaunda, 1995). Kamuzu encouraged estate farming at the 
expense of the smallholder agriculture and promoted few private businesses owned by 
himself or his close allies (see Chapter 6). As of 2018, the private sector in Malawi was 
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still underdeveloped and mostly defined by parastatals (state-owned companies with 
political connections) and family businesses (such as Mulli Brothers, Siku Transport, OG 
Group of companies, and Crossroads Hotels). The agricultural sector has remained highly 
dualistic, with smallholder farmers growing mainly subsistence crops and the estates 
concentrating on producing tobacco, tea, and sugar for export. Another characteristic of 
the economy its perpetual indebtedness, indicated by the tendency of the government to 
rely on domestic and foreign borrowing to finance its expenditures (Khomba & Trew, 
2018) 
Between 1964–1980, Malawi’s economic performance was good, with its average 
real GDP growth being 5% (Chipeta, 1998). However, in the 1980s, Malawi was affected 
by exogenous economic shocks and geopolitical events in the SSA region (oil shock, war 
in Mozambique, and droughts) (see Chapter 2), which led to a deterioration in Malawi’s 
development-oriented performance (Chipeta, 1998). In response, the country started 
pursuing the “good governance” agenda (putting in place policies to fight corruption, 
market liberalization, and democratic reforms) (Anders, 2009), with the aim of ensuring 
that the available resources would be well managed in order to achieve maximum 
economic development. Between 1994–2002, the country implemented far-reaching 
reform programmes under the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF. The reforms 
focused on privatisation, deregulation, and liberalisation (Anders, 2009). These reforms 
included the following: the establishment of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) (the MTEF enabled the government to plan and prioritise expenditure in line 
with the available financial resources over a period of three to five years); the introduction 
of institutional development projects which aimed to eliminate “ghost workers” (fictitious 
employees existing only on the payroll); public expenditure reviews; institutional 
reviews; the privatisation of statutory corporations; the introduction of meritocracy and a 
retrenchment exercise; the introduction of the Malawi Revenue Authority, a semi-
autonomous revenue collecting institution (Anders, 2009).  
Thus, this thesis focuses on a country which is low-income, highly reliant on 
agriculture, where income concentrated in few businesses and individuals, and has been 
implementing various reforms to ensure good governance.  
1.3 Background to the Research 
When I began conducting my research for this thesis, my aim was to investigate 
the reasons for low tax collection in Malawi. I am employed by the Ministry of Finance 
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in Malawi in their Revenue Policy Division (RPD). The perception within the Ministry 
of Finance is that the country can collect more tax revenue than it currently does. Indeed, 
several studies have suggested that tax collection in SSA countries, such as Malawi, is 
lower than it should be (Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 1997; Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003; Keen 
& Mansour, 2010; Moore & Wilson, 2017). Two problems related to tax collection in 
SSA are widely cited in the literature: 
1. Low tax compliance due to problems including corruption and the large, hard-to-
tax informal sector.  
2. The tax administration is generally weak.  
I initially aimed to understand these problems in more depth and find ways of 
overcoming them. However, in the course of writing this thesis, the perspective that tax 
collection in low-income countries in general and SSA in particular is low was found to 
be an exaggeration and simplification. Upon scrutinising this issue of tax collection in 
SSA, I found that tax collection performance in Malawi and other SSA countries is not 
as low as cited in the literature. Moreover, there are three positive factors relating to tax 
collection in SSA in general, and Malawi in particular:  
1. The tax revenue as a share of GDP in SSA has been increasing steadily since 1996 
(ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2017) despite the fact that economic growth in SSA has 
primarily been focused on hard-to-tax activities that are small-scale, informal, and 
agricultural in nature (Jayne, Chamberlin & Benfica, 2018). The increase in tax 
collection in SSA within this context suggests that African tax administrations are 
gradually learning to raise significant amounts of revenue despite the pervasive 
informality of their economies. In Malawi, the increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio 
has been greater than the average increase in other SSA countries. From 1996-
2011, the tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi more than doubled, from 8% to 17.5% (see 
Chapter 2). 
2. Relative to other African countries, Malawi’s tax effort is high. Tax effort is 
defined as an index of the ratio between the actual tax collection and the taxable 
capacity (the predicted tax-to-GDP ratio that can be estimated using regression 
analyses, taking into account a country’s specific macroeconomic, demographic, 
and institutional features) (Le et al., 2012). The estimated tax effort for Malawi is 
usually 1 or higher (Gupta, 2007; Mkandawire, 2010; Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 
1997; Langford & Ohlenburg, 2015). By contrast, most countries in SSA have tax 
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effort estimates of less than 1 (Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013; Mkandawire, 2010; 
Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 1997; Langford & Ohlenburg, 2015).  
3. As will be shown in Chapter 2, relative to other SSA countries and low-income 
countries in general, the share of total tax revenues accounted for by direct tax in 
Malawi (mainly PAYE) is high. Direct taxes in Malawi contribute approximately 
44% of the total central government revenue, compared to the average of 32% for 
SSA (ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2017). A high reliance on direct tax is normally 
difficult to achieve in low-income countries such as Malawi, due to factors such 
as low per capita income, the administrative challenges of administering direct 
taxes, and the political hurdles of taxing the rich and local elites (Aizenman & 
Jinjarak, 2009; Junquera-Varela et al., 2017).  
These examples show that tax revenue collection performance in SSA generally, 
and in Malawi specifically, is relatively good. However, the initial assumption that there 
are many problems associated with tax collection in Malawi remains valid for various 
reasons, including: (a) estimated taxes equivalent to 12% of GDP in Malawi are not 
collected due to tax non-compliance (Yikona et al., 2011), and (b) the performance of the 
tax administration in Malawi, the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA), was found to be 
below international best practices in almost all the areas assessed by the Tax 
Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT)  in 2015 (TADAT Secretariat, 
2015a) (see Chapter 6).  
Given these factors, the main aim of this thesis is to understand the commonly 
cited problems related to tax collection in Malawi in more detail and suggest ways of 
overcoming them. However, it is also recognised that the system has positive 
components, and the objectives for tax policy in Malawi (and hence, this thesis) should 
include finding ways of sustaining these.  
1.4 Motivation  
Since 2011, the Ministry of Finance has been under pressure to find alternative 
sources of revenue following a drastic reduction in budget support from international 
donors. Prior to 2011, the international budgetary support accounted for 40% of the 
national budget; after 2011, this decreased to 15% (Khomba & Trew, 2018). The drastic 
reduction in budget support provided to Malawi was the result of donor concerns 
regarding governance (Cammack, 2017) and ‘Cashgate’, the systematic looting of 
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government funds by a syndicate involving  government officials and the private sector 
(Kayuni, 2016; Majanga, 2015). 
To compensate for the drastic reduction in aid, the Malawian Government relies 
on borrowing. However, Malawi’s debt has increased from 30% of GDP in 2011 to 54.3% 
in 2017 (IMF, 2017). Clearly, the current means of augmenting government finances 
through borrowing is not sustainable, and longer-term methods of financing government 
expenditure must be identified. The most reliable alternative is to increase tax revenue 
collection (Akitoby, 2018). Accordingly, I was motivated to conduct research on tax 
revenue mobilisation in Malawi with the aim of exploring some of the measures the 
Malawian Government may implement to increase tax revenue collection, or at least to 
sustain the current levels of tax collection.   
1.5 Significance of the Study  
The study of tax revenue mobilisation in Malawi is important for three reasons: 
1. Following the reduction in international budgetary support provided to Malawi, 
taxation is the only option available for reliable and sustainable government 
financing. Thus, any factor that undermines the efforts to collect more tax revenue 
also undermines the capability of the government to meet its financing needs.  
2. There is a growing range of literature that supports the idea that states that rely 
heavily on taxation to fund their activities, as opposed to relying on natural 
resources, wealth, or foreign aid, are more likely to build strong state structures 
and be accountable to their taxpayer-citizens (Prichard, 2010; Moore, 2015). 
Malawi has been reliant on donor aid since it gained independence in 1964 
(Khomba & Trew, 2018). However, in Malawi, government accountability to its 
citizens is low (Tambulasi, 2011; McNeil & Male, 2010). Thus, by encouraging 
domestic tax collection, the state may become more accountable to its citizens. 
3. Some studies have suggested that the current level of tax collection and tax 
structure for most countries in SSA is affected by their colonial legacy 
(Mkandawire, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Austin, 2008; Bolt & Bezemer, 2009; 
Bowden et al., 2008; Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005; Grier, 1999; Lange, 2004.; 
Moradi, 2008). This study provides an opportunity to trace the mechanism 
through which the colonial legacy works to affect tax collection, drawing on the 
experience of Malawi.  
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1.6 Structure and Overview of the Thesis  
This thesis is structured into five substantive chapters, Chapters 2 to 6. Then, 
Chapter 7 draws some broad conclusions.  
The research begins, in Chapter 2, with a broad overview of the tax system in 
Malawi in terms of its structure and revenue performance since the country gained 
independence in 1964, and a comparative analysis of tax revenue performance in Malawi 
and other SSA countries between 1980-2015. In addition, this chapter explores whether 
the introduction of value added tax (VAT) had any impact on tax revenue collection in 
Malawi. The main contribution of this chapter to the literature is in providing a history of 
tax collection in Malawi, covering policy, trends, and the drivers of those trends. This 
information has not previously been available for the period considered. I have identified 
four distinct periods in tax revenue performance in Malawi: 
1. From 1964 to 1989. During this time, tax revenue as a share of GDP remained 
relatively stable at 10%, despite many tax policy changes. 
2. From 1990 to 1995. In this period, tax revenue as a share of GDP declined due to 
a combination of three factors: a reduction in all major tax rates; a prolonged 
drought that affected the key cash crop, tobacco, thereby affecting the profitability 
of most major companies; and political tension, as citizens demanded a move from 
a one-party state to a multiparty democracy.  
3. From 1996 to 2005. This was a recovery phase, during which the tax-to-GDP ratio 
increased from 8% to 10%. The recovery was driven by favourable weather 
conditions and a stable political environment (see Chapter 6).  
4. From 2005 to 2011. During these years, the tax-to-GDP ratio for Malawi 
increased drastically, from 10% to 17.5%. The main tax policy change for this 
period was the introduction of value added tax (VAT) in 2005. Considering that 
the introduction of VAT was the only significant policy change during this period, 
it seems likely that the increase in tax-to-GDP ratio during this period was due to 
the introduction of VAT.  
I also find, in this chapter, that direct tax as a share of total revenue and tax effort 
in Malawi were considerably higher throughout the period under study (1964-2015) 
compared to the average for SSA countries. The reasons why Malawi performs better 
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than other SSA countries are explored throughout this thesis.  
Having gained insights relating to the trends, structure, and level of revenue 
collection in Malawi relative to other SSA countries between 1964-2015, the subsequent 
chapters explore, in detail, the peculiarities of the Malawian tax system, specifically: the 
significant increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio between 2005-2011; the high tax revenue 
collection in Malawi compared to other SSA countries since 2009; and the high reliance 
on direct tax in Malawi since 1964.  
Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature on tax morale. I focus on tax morale 
because the good tax revenue performance in Malawi relative to other SSA countries 
between 2009-2015 may be due to its high tax morale, which maybe translating into high 
tax compliance. The key research questions addressed in this chapter are: 1) what factors 
shape tax morale? 2) What methods can be used to study tax morale? 3) What do we 
know about tax morale in SSA? The literature shows that there are three main methods 
that can be used to study tax morale: surveys, simulation exercises, and field experiments. 
Each of these methods has particular strengths and weaknesses. In terms of factors 
affecting tax morale, the literature highlights several types of factors, including 
reciprocity motivation, peer influence, and economic factors. In addition, socio-
demographic factors, such as age, gender, education, and income level also influence tax 
morale. Furthermore, the literature indicates that the factors that affect tax morale vary 
based on place (or country). The key gap in the tax morale literature is that the majority 
of existing studies focus on less pragmatic factors, such as the social-psychological or 
social-demographic factors influencing tax morale. However, for more practical or 
policy-oriented research, there is a need to focus more on more pragmatic factors, such 
as the differences in tax morale among different categories of taxpayers, as this would 
provide policymakers with a clear picture of which category of taxpayers they need to 
concentrate on to improve tax morale where it is low.   
Chapter 4 is an empirical investigation of tax morale in Malawi and other SSA 
countries. To this end, two different pieces of analysis are presented in this chapter. The 
first compares Malawi’s tax morale with the average tax morale for SSA countries.1 I 
used survey data collected by the Afrobarometer to conduct a multivariate regression 
analysis to try to determine whether Malawians are any more or less willing taxpayers 
 
1 Only those countries that are included in Afrobarometer surveys are included in the analysis.  
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than the population in other countries, and what may explain the differences in tax morale 
(if there are any) between Malawi and the other SSA countries. Tax morale is measured 
as follows: people’s views about whether it is “wrong and punishable,” “wrong but 
understandable,” or “not wrong at all” to not pay taxes owed to the government. The tax 
morale model that I developed as part of this study is tested using Afrobarometer survey 
data; Round 5 (R5) (conducted in 2012/13), Round 6 (R6) (conducted in 2014/15), and 
the merged R5 and R6 data. I used Afrobarometer data from R5 and R6 as well as the 
merged data because, while evaluating the Afrobarometer data for suitability for this 
analysis, I discovered that responses to both R5 and R6 surveys in Malawi and 
Madagascar were heavily influenced by the prevailing political and economic situation at 
the time the two surveys were conducted, such that there is significant variation in tax 
morale between the two rounds in these two countries. The huge variation in tax morale 
in these two countries during these rounds occurred because R5 surveys were conducted 
in the midst of political unrest, economic slowdown, and corruption scandals in both 
countries. This resulted in lower than normal tax morale in R5. By contrast, the R6 survey 
was conducted following a change in government in both Malawi and Madagascar, the 
economic challenges were being addressed, and the prosecution of most of the individuals 
involved in corruption was underway. This resulted in higher than normal tax morale in 
Malawi and Madagascar in R6. This finding suggests that the true level of tax morale 
(given a relatively stable economic and political environment in the country, as is usually 
the case) is somewhere in between the results for R5 and R6 for both Malawi and 
Madagascar. Accordingly, the merged data for R5 and R6 serves as an appropriate proxy 
for tax morale when the two countries (Malawi and Madagascar) are stable. The main 
finding from the regression analysis is that tax morale in Malawi is within the average for 
countries in SSA. This result suggests that Malawians are not any more or any less willing 
taxpayers than the populations in other SSA countries. 
The second piece of analysis explores the potential differences in tax morale 
among business people in Malawi. It seemed plausible that, although the overall tax 
morale is not notably higher in Malawi compared to the average tax morale for SSA 
countries, it might be sufficiently high among certain business taxpayers within Malawi 
to at least partially explain the relatively high overall tax revenue performance. To test 
this hypothesis, I conducted a survey of businesses people operating in Lilongwe and 
Blantyre, the two largest cities in Malawi. Similar to the comparative analysis, I estimated 
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a regression equation with tax morale as the dependent variable and various factors, such 
as corruption and tax knowledge, as the independent variables. In addition, variables were 
included that would help identify variances in tax morale among the surveyed business 
people, such as the size of the business, where the business is located, whether the 
business is registered with the revenue authority or not, and the sector in which the 
business operates. The results showed that business people operating in Blantyre have a 
higher tax morale than those operating in Lilongwe; large businesses have a higher tax 
morale than small businesses; and businesses in the construction sector have a lower tax 
morale than businesses in other sectors. These results suggest that, while tax morale in 
Malawi is not significantly different from the average tax morale for countries in SSA, 
there are certain business people in Malawi who have a higher tax morale. While a higher 
tax morale (attitude) does not necessarily translate to tax compliance (behaviour), it is 
more likely that the taxpayers with high tax morale in Malawi (those operating in 
Blantyre, and taxpayers classified as large) may be partly contributing to the good tax 
revenue performance in Malawi.  
      Chapter 5 explores the question: to what extent do the tax administration processes 
followed by the Malawi Revenue Authority affect the level of tax revenue collection and 
tax structure in Malawi?  This question emanates from the apparent paradox of the poor 
performance of the MRA even by the standards of low-income countries on the one hand, 
and the institution’s effectiveness at capturing a relatively high proportion of taxes in 
GDP and the collection of a high proportion of direct taxes through corporate income tax 
(CIT) and personal income tax (PIT), on the other. The analysis is based on the Tax 
Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT) priority outcome areas (POA). 
However, due to data access limitations, only four out of the nine POAs are assessed, 
namely: taxpayer registration and data management; detection and prosecution of tax 
fraud through tax audit; handling of administrative appeals and complaints through a 
dispute resolution process; and provision of services and assistance to taxpayers, such as 
taxpayer education. The analyses presented in this chapter were based on qualitative data 
collected through semi-structured interviews with MRA officials, analysis of MRA 
documents (such as annual reports, strategic frameworks, and management reports), the 
TADAT report for Malawi, and information collected through a survey of business people 
in Malawi. The main finding of this analysis is that the paradox described above is largely 
explained by the relative efficiency of the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU). The LTU is 
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responsible for only 2% of total taxpayers, yet collect 70% of total tax revenue. However, 
the LTU itself is not well-equipped from a technological perspective. It relies heavily on 
some very basic software for recording taxpayer information. However, the LTU staff 
interact closely with the staff of large companies, and understand their clients’ businesses 
quite well, hence the success in collecting significant revenues from the small number of 
taxpayers. This brings me to a set of issues explored further in Chapter 6: the long-
standing economic dominance in the Malawi economy of a few large firms; and the fact 
that, unlike in many countries, these firms have been unable to use their economic 
dominance to avoid taxes on a large scale.  
Chapter 6 explores the hypothesis that Malawi’s high reliance on direct tax 
relative to other SSA countries is due to its colonial legacy. The main question addressed 
in this chapter is how Malawi, a low-income country with weak tax administration, is 
able to collect more revenue from direct taxes than other countries in SSA.  
A review of the literature shows that Malawi is not the only country in southern 
Africa that collects a high proportion of its revenue from direct tax, but part of a cluster. 
Other such countries include Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Africa. There are 
a number of explanations for the differences in tax collection and tax structure among 
African countries, including: influence of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); 
size of the mining sector; institutional spill-over; and colonial legacy. The most plausible 
explanation among these is the colonial legacy theory, well-articulated by Mkandawire 
(2010). Mkandawire (2010) classified countries of Africa according to structures of 
colonial economic exploitation, with three categories: labour reserve economies, cash 
crop economies, and concessional companies. Of these, labour reserve economies are 
better able to raise revenue and more reliant on direct taxes. Mkandawire (2010) then 
carried out a statistical analysis for the period 1984-2004, using two categories, labour 
reserve economies and non-labour reserve economies (cash crop and concessional 
companies) for comparison, and found that the colonial-era difference in economic 
structure and consequent revenue potential endured into the post-colonial era. 
Mkandawire (2010) classified Malawi as a labour reserve economy, which 
suggests that the high dependence on direct tax in Malawi stems from its colonial legacy. 
To determine whether this argument is valid in this regard, I explored and extended 
Mkandawire’s theory in various ways. First, I looked deeper (1910-1960) into records of 
revenue-raising in Malawi and seven other countries in SSA and found that Mkandawire’s 
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argument holds. Then, I looked at comparative revenue performance for 25 countries in 
Africa for a more recent period (2000-2015), and again found that Mkandawire’s pattern 
holds, but is generally weakening. However, it holds more strongly for Malawi. The 
explanation for why that might be appears to lie in unusual pattern of ownership of major 
economic assets in Malawi after independence, where most assets were owned by either 
Dr Banda, the first president of independent Malawi, or his close allies. Broadly speaking, 
this was a continuation of a colonial-type economy. The ownership of assets by a few 
individuals created a situation where it was (and still is) possible for tax collectors to 
closely ‘manage’ the few large firms and collect a lot of direct tax from both their profits 
and from ‘Pay As You Earn’ (PAYE) on their employees. Thus, Malawi’s history and its 
economic structure contribute significantly to explaining the high ratio of direct tax in 
total revenue.  
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a summary of the findings, policy 
implications, contributions to the body of knowledge, and areas for further research. After 
exploring the four hypotheses, the main conclusions are that: 1) the introduction of VAT 
in 2005 significantly contributed to the drastic increase in tax-to-GDP ratio between 
2005-2011 in Malawi; 2) the higher tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi compared to other sub-
Saharan African countries since 2009 can be partially explained by the ability of the 
Malawi Revenue Authority to collect significant revenue from large companies and their 
employees, despite the use of tax collection methods that appear to be lagging behind 
technological frontiers; and 3) the ability of the Malawi Revenue Authority (and previous 
tax administrations) to collect significant revenue from large companies and their 
employees also explains the high reliance on direct tax in Malawi. This ability is 
facilitated by Malawi’s economic structure, where income has been concentrated in the 
hands of a few businesses and individuals during both the colonial and the post-colonial 
eras.   
Other than providing the main conclusions from the various analyses conducted 
in this thesis, I also highlight one key issue that emerges from this thesis. The thesis raises 
a much broader question about revenue collection in low-income countries. It is shown 
in the thesis that a low-income country, namely Malawi, collects significant amount of 
tax revenue and is highly reliant on direct taxes even through its tax administration is 
weak and it has a large informal sector. This suggests that low-income countries with 
weak tax administrations can still collect significant amount of revenue from direct taxes 
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provided the government is committed and able to tax the sectors with the greatest 
potential for revenue generation, typically large businesses and individuals with a high 
income.  
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Chapter 2: Taxation in Malawi: A Comparative Perspective 
2.1 Introduction 
Taxes are conventionally divided into two categories: direct tax, a tax which is 
levied on the income or profits of the person who pays it, rather than on goods or services;  
and indirect tax, a tax on goods and services collected by an intermediary (such as a retail 
store) from the person who bears the ultimate economic burden of the tax (Obwona & 
Muwonge, 2002). In Malawi, the major direct taxes are corporate income tax (CIT) and 
personal income tax (PIT). Other direct taxes in Malawi include withholding tax (WHT)2, 
rental income tax, tax on interest from banks, and turnover (presumptive)3 tax. The major 
indirect taxes in Malawi are value added tax (VAT), excise taxes (which are applied to 
selected items such as alcohol, cigarettes, and motor vehicles) and taxes on international 
trade transactions (i.e., import duty, import VAT, and import excise duties).   
This chapter provides a historical overview of tax collection in Malawi, focusing 
on trends and policy changes made to both direct and indirect taxes since Malawi gained 
independence in 1964, and a comparative analysis of tax collection performance between 
Malawi and other SSA countries for the period 1980-2015. The main questions driving 
this chapter are:  
• What are the major tax policy and administrative policy reforms that have been 
implemented by the Malawi Government since the country gained independence 
in 1964? 
• How different is the tax revenue performance in Malawi from that of other sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries for the period 1980-2015? 
There are four key findings:  
• First, throughout the years following independence, direct and indirect taxes each 
accounted for approximately 50% of total tax revenue. By contrast, most SSA 
countries, and low-income countries in general, have a higher reliance on indirect 
 
2 A withholding tax (WHT) is an income tax to be paid to the government by the payer of the income 
rather than the recipient of the income. The tax is thus withheld or deducted from the income due to 
the recipient.  
3 This refers to the income tax paid by businesses whose annual turnover is less than MK10 million 
(£10,000) in Malawi. The turnover tax rate is 3% of gross income while the standard income tax rate for 
businesses is 30% of profits.  
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taxes (Figure 2.3). However, Malawi is not the only country in SSA with this 
unusual characteristic; South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Namibia are other 
countries in SSA with a higher reliance on direct tax relative to the average for 
SSA countries.  
• Second, the tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi from the time of independence until the 
mid-1980s was relatively stable, at around 10%. It fluctuated between 10% and 
12% in the mid-1980s despite the dramatic increases in tax rates during this 
period, which indicates significant inefficiencies in the tax system. This was 
followed by a decline in the 1990s, when the tax-to-GDP ratio decreased to 8% 
due to political tension and a reduction of tax rates under the structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs). Between 1995 and 2005, the tax-to-GDP ratio recovered to 
10% and continued to increase thereafter, reaching 17.5% by 2011, due possibly 
to the introduction of VAT in 2005 and the establishment of the Large Taxpayer 
Unit within the Malawi Revenue Authority in 2007. The significant increase in 
tax-to-GDP ratio between 2005-2011 is unusual and provides an interesting 
insight, since most sharp increases in tax-to-GDP ratio are short-lived and 
unsustainable (Shalizi & Thirsk, 1990; Bird, 2013; Gaspar et al., 2016). 
• Third, when compared to other SSA countries, Malawi has a slightly higher tax-
to-GDP ratio, which has been higher than the average for both low- and lower-
middle-income countries since 2009 (Figure 2.4).   
• Fourth, Malawi’s tax effort, the ratio between the share of the actual collected tax 
in GDP and the predicted taxable capacity – the predicted tax-to-GDP ratio that 
can be estimated with regression, taking into account a country’s specific 
macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional features (Le et al., 2012) – is 
usually estimated to be close to 1 or above 1, when most SSA countries have a tax 
effort significantly below 1. This implies that Malawi utilises well its tax base to 
increase tax revenues (Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 1997). 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section is a 
discussion of tax policy reforms undertaken in Malawi between 1964-2015. Malawi’s tax 
structure and tax revenue performance are then compared to those of other SSA countries. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the peculiarities of tax collection in Malawi.  
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2.2 Tax Policy Reform Between 1964-2015 
Malawi gained independence from Britain on 6 July, 1964 (Thomas, 1975). At 
the time of independence, direct (mainly CIT and PIT) taxes accounted for 50% of total 
tax revenue (Shalizi & Thirsk, 1990). Most of the PIT revenue came from workers in the 
public sector and large companies, while the CIT revenue came from a few large private 
firms in primary processing and distribution (Shalizi & Thirsk, 1990). However, between 
1964-1979, the country was able to meet its revenue needs, as domestic revenues were 
supplemented by grants and concessional loans4 (Chipeta, 1998). Consequently, between 
1964-1980, very few changes were made to the tax policy and tax administration 
(Chipeta, 1998). The main tax policy changes included an increase in CIT rate from 35% 
to 40% in 1970; an increase in excise tax rate on alcohol from 5% to 8% in 1971; the 
introduction of a sales tax (known as surtax) at 5% in 1971; an increase of surtax from 
5% to 10% in 1972; and, an increase in CIT and PIT rates from 40% to 45% in 1978 
(Chipeta, 1998). 
More frequent tax policy changes commenced in 1979-1990 in response to a 
number of internal and external stressors. These stressors included: first, the drought of 
1979-1980, which reduced food production and led to increased public expenditure on 
food imports (Chipeta, 1998). Second, the Mozambique Civil War, which was fought 
between 1977-1992 (Hanlon, 2003). During this war, the direct railway line between 
Malawi and Mozambique, which was used to conduct foreign trade, was destroyed. 
Consequently, Malawi had to use longer trade routes, such as through South Africa and 
Tanzania, which inevitably raised transport costs (Chipeta, 1998). The war in 
Mozambique also increased the spending on defence, as it was feared that the war may 
overflow to Malawi (Chipeta, 1998). Third, there was a global economic recession 
between 1973-1975, and again between 1980-1981 (Chamley et al., 1985). These periods 
of recession resulted in reduced availability of grants and concessional loans, such that 
the Malawian Government had to focus on domestic revenue mobilisation to meet its 
expenditure needs (Chipeta, 1998). In response, the Malawian Government began to 
increase all tax rates and introduce new taxes. Between 1980-1985, the surtax (or sales 
tax) rate increased from 15% to 25%, both CIT and PIT increased from 40% to 50% 
 
4 This refers to the loans that are extended on terms substantially more generous than market loans. 
This concession is achieved in the form of either through interest rates below those available on the 
market, grace periods, or a combination of both. 
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(Table 2.1), and trade taxes increased from an average of 40% to 85%. New taxes that 
were introduced included a temporary import levy and accommodation and refreshment 
tax in 1982, an export levy in 1984, and withholding taxes on non-wage incomes, which 
was levied on temporary workers, in 1985 (Chipeta, 2002).   
Despite these changes, the tax-to-GDP ratio was volatile, increasing from 10% to 
12% in 1985 and 1986, then reducing to 10% in 1987 and 1988, before rising again to 
12% in 1989 (Table 2.4). In light of the volatility of tax collection in the 1980s it became 
clear to the Malawian Government that the tax system had several weaknesses that needed 
to be rectified (Chamley et al., 1985). The government therefore requested the assistance 
of the IMF and the World Bank (WB), who conducted studies on how to improve the tax 
system in Malawi (Chamley et al., 1985). Some of the main observations from the IMF 
and WB studies were that: 
1. all tax rates were too high, which limited investment and consumption; 
2. the tax system did not adhere to one of the important tenets of a good tax system 
of equity, whereby the rich should pay a higher rate of income tax than the poor; 
3. the tax administration was weak because of, among other things, lack of a unique 
taxpayer identification system, no computerisation of certain processes, and a 
high number of unskilled officers.  
Following these observations, in 1989, the Malawian Government, with 
assistance from the IMF and the WB, began reforming the tax system under the structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) (Shalizi & Thirsk, 1990).  
The first phase of the reform programme involved the reduction of tax rates. Over 
a period of three years (1990-1993), the maximum marginal rates for all major taxes (PIT, 
CIT, surtax) were reduced by almost 50% (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2. 1: Evolution of rates of major taxes in Malawi (1970-2015) 
 
Data source: Chafuwa, Kenani, & Kaunda (2017) and Chipeta (1998)  
 
Figure 2.1 shows the movement in VAT, CIT, and PIT rates between 1969-2015. 
All the major taxes increased between 1970-1989. The surtax increased from 5% in 1971 
to 55% in the late 1980s, before it was reduced significantly to 20% in 1991. Similarly, 
both CIT and PIT rates were increased in the 1980s from 40% to 50%, before being 
reduced to 35% in 1990.  
Between 1995-2015, there were few tax policy changes. The most significant was 
the introduction of VAT in 2005 (Chafuwa, Kenani, & Kaunda, 2017). The type of VAT 
system introduced in Malawi is called invoice-based credit (Le, 2003). Under this 
method, a company at any stage of the production–distribution chain charges its 
customers the VAT on its output, submits the tax to the MRA, and then makes a claim 
for the VAT already paid on its input purchase. For example, if t1 and t2 are the tax rates 
on output and input VAT, respectively, then the tax liability is the difference between 
(t1*output) and (t2*input). In principle, invoice-based credit VAT is supposed to be self-
enforcing, as a taxable business can claim for a refund on the input VAT only if the claim 
is supported by purchase invoices (Le, 2003). To a large extent, this mechanism provides 
strong incentives for firms to keep invoices of their transactions and is an efficient means 
for tax authorities to check and cross-check to facilitate enforcement (Le, 2003). 
However, in practice, it has been found that the tax is not fully self-enforcing: officers in 
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the MRA claim that they sometimes discover “ghost”5 invoices and false refund claims,6 
indicating that either not all the VAT due has been paid, or the taxpayer may have over 
claimed the input VAT.  
Until 1993, the focus of the reforms was tax policy and not tax administration. 
Thus, only minor changes were made to tax administration. These changes included the 
introduction of a withholding tax on wages and salaries called ‘Pay As You Earn’ (PAYE) 
in 1983, the computerisation of some activities (such as taxpayer registration) in 1990, 
and the establishment of a Tax Policy Unit in the Ministry of Finance in 1996 (Chafuwa, 
Kenani, & Kaunda, 2017). As a result, the second phase of the tax system reform 
programme, which began in 1995, focused on tax administration (Chipeta, 1998). The 
main tax administration reform was the creation of the semi-autonomous revenue 
authority, the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA). The MRA Act was passed in 1998 and 
the institution started operating in 2000 (Chafuwa, Kenani, & Kaunda, 2017). 
Since its inception, the MRA has continued the reform process, and has 
implemented the following:  
1. The introduction of the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) in 
2002, for better management of customs data. 
2. The introduction of the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) in 2007 to ensure that large 
taxpayers7 receive special attention tailored to their needs. 
3. The merging of the Income Tax and VAT divisions in 2010 to form the Domestic 
Tax Division (DTD) to streamline functions.  
4. The introduction of electronic fiscal devices (EFDs) in 2014 to enhance VAT 
collection. 
5. The introduction of cargo scanners in 2014 to address smuggling and under-
declaration of values of imported goods.  
6. The introduction of e-payments in 2016 to reduce compliance costs by allowing 
online tax payments.  
7. The interface of the domestic tax system and the Road Traffic Directorate in 2017 
 
5 Fake invoices  
6 The checking of VAT invoices is done randomly, as the process is manual. It is therefore very likely that 
not all “ghost” invoices are discovered.  
7 See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion regarding the classification of taxpayers according to the MRA  
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to address vehicle smuggling challenges. 
Despite the various tax administration reforms, tax administration in Malawi is 
still considered weak (IMF, 2015). Indeed, a study conducted by the TADAT Secretariat 
found that MRA performance, in almost all of the 25 areas assessed, was below 
international standards (TADAT Secretariat, 2015a).8 
2.3 Tax Structure and Tax Revenue Performance in Malawi 
2.3.1 Tax Structure 
Taxes are the main source of domestic revenue in Malawi, the other source being 
non-taxes. By definition, non-taxes are recurring income earned by the government from 
sources other than taxes (Keen & Baunsgaard, 2005). Examples of non-taxes include 
police fees and fines, sale of government property, and fees for the processing of passports 
and driving licences. Between 2000-2015, taxes have contributed 92% of total domestic 
revenue in Malawi. During this period, the contribution of direct and indirect tax to total 
tax revenue was 44% and 48%, respectively. The remaining 8% was collected from non-
taxes. Figure 2.2 shows the trends for total tax, direct tax, indirect tax, and non-taxes as a 
share of GDP between 1980-2015, and the various policy and administrative changes that 
occurred during this period. It should be noted that between 1964-1994, Malawi was 
under one-party rule by Dr Kamuzu Banda. From 1994 onwards, Malawi became a 
multiparty state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Chapter 6 evaluates the performance of the MRA.  
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Figure 2. 2: Timeline of the changes in total tax, direct tax, indirect tax, and non-
taxes in Malawi between 1980-2015 (all presented as share of GDP) and major 
political, tax policy, and tax administration changes that occurred during this 
period. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using ICTD/UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset 
(2017) 
Figure 2.2 shows that, between 1980-1990, both direct and indirect taxes as a 
share of GDP were slightly below 4%. They both declined between 1990-1995 to 
approximately 2% of GDP, before gradually increasing between 1996-2004 to reach 5%, 
then significantly increased between 2005-2011 to reach 7.5%. Trade taxes, however, 
have been declining since 1990. As a share of GDP, trade taxes accounted for 2% of GDP 
prior to 1990, but declined thereafter to reach 1.6% of GDP in 2015. Similarly, the share 
of non-taxes in GDP declined from 2% prior to 1985, to 1.6% in 2015.  
Introduction of VAT 
SAPs Multiparty era   
Creation of MRA  
Dr Banda era 
Creation of LTU 
within MRA 
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2.3.2 Tax Revenue Performance 
One commonly used measure of a country’s (tax) revenue performance is the tax-
to-GDP ratio. To calculate the tax-to-GDP ratio, total tax revenue of a country is divided 
by its GDP (as highlighted in Chapter 1, in this thesis, tax-to-GDP ratio refers to the ratio 
of total central government revenue to GDP). Accordingly, when a country's tax revenues 
grow at a slower rate than its GDP, the tax-to-GDP ratio drops. By contrast, if tax revenue 
grows quicker than the GDP, the ratio increases. Figure 2.2 shows the trends in tax-to-
GDP ratio in Malawi between 1980-2015, and the major drivers of changes in the tax-to-
GDP ratio. The figure shows that Malawi’s tax-to-GDP ratio has been volatile. Although 
the tax-to-GDP ratio averaged 10% between 1969-1985, it fluctuated between 10% and 
12% between 1985-1990, before gradually declining to 8% between 1990-1995. From 
1996 onwards, tax-to-GDP ratio increased, peaking at 17.5% in 2011.  
The decline in tax-to-GDP ratio between 1990-1995 seems to have been driven 
by three factors:  
1. Tax reform: As discussed in Section 2.2, Malawi began implementing SAPs in the 
late 1980s, and between 1990-1993, all major tax rates were halved. This sudden 
decrease in tax rates may have contributed to the decline in tax-to-GDP ratio. 
2. Drought: In 1990 and 1991, Malawi experienced severe drought (Pauw et al., 2010); 
this affected agriculture, the key economic sector in Malawi. Agriculture and 
agricultural processing generate almost half of the GDP and 80% of total export 
earnings and employment in Malawi (Pauw et al., 2010). However, this sector is 
highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture (Nhamo et al., 2016), such that droughts 
affect agriculture productivity, which in turn affects the profitability of agro-based 
industries and, hence, tax collection.    
3. Political tension: After independence in 1964, Malawi was a one-party state under the 
leadership of Dr Kamuzu Banda. However, in the late 1980s, a majority of the people 
were dissatisfied with Dr Banda’s leadership; this dissatisfaction was attributed to his 
autocratic leadership (Moto, 1998). Moto (1998) observes that the judicial system was 
not independent, there were countless arrests and detentions without trial, and there 
was a lack of freedom of expression and association. It was estimated that, between 
the late 1960s and 1992, more than 2,000 Malawians were imprisoned in various parts 
of the country for political reasons (Moto, 1998). Dr Banda’s autocratic behaviour, 
coupled with Malawi’s poor economic performance throughout the 1980s, culminated 
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in political tension in the early 1990s (Chirwa, 2004). Citizens wanted the government 
to call a referendum so that they could choose to either remain in the one-party state 
under Dr Banda or move to a multiparty democracy. University students, urban 
workers, and political activists led frequent demonstrations and urban riots (Newell, 
1995). The prolonged violence and riots between 1990-1994 affected the productivity 
of industries and revenue collection (Chirwa, 2004). 
 The years between 1995-2004 were a period of recovery in terms of revenue 
collection. Political stability returned, and the weather conditions were favourable 
(Chipeta, 1998; Chafuwa, Kenani, & Kaunda, 2017). The creation of the Tax Policy Unit 
within the Ministry of Finance in 1996, and the creation of the Malawi Revenue Authority 
which started operating in 2000, may also have helped the recovery by improving tax 
administration. However, no records on tax administration performance are available for 
this period (1995-2004) to support or dispute this theory.  
The period between 2005-2011 was a turning point in the history of tax collection 
in Malawi. As shown in Figure 2.2, between 1964-2004, tax revenue as a share of GDP 
had only deviated by 2% from the average of 10%. However, since 2005, tax revenues as 
a share of GDP increased steadily by an average of 1% per year, reaching 17.5% in 2011. 
The ratio has remained relatively stable at 17.5% thereafter.  
The drastic increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi between 2005-2011 does 
not correspond to the rate of around 10% as was the case between 1964-2004. As Moore 
(2014) observed, not a single African revenue authority has exhibited a continually 
improving revenue performance for as long as a decade. It has also been noted that tax 
collection generally involves short periods of growth followed by a long period of inertia, 
and increases in tax-to-GDP ratio are achieved only in very small steps (Bird, 2013). Two 
other studies also point out that increases in tax-to-GDP ratio greater than 3% over 
relatively short periods (of less than five years) are usually difficult to sustain in the long 
term (Shalizi & Thirsk, 1990; Gaspar et al., 2016). Thus, the 7.5% increase in tax-to-GDP 
ratio in Malawi within six years, and its sustained stability, thereafter, is unusual. The 
most likely explanation for the drastic increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio during this period 
is the introduction of VAT in 2005 (Chafuwa, Kenani, & Kaunda, 2017). There are four 
avenues through which this may have been achieved:  
• As already discussed, to a larger extent, the invoice-based VAT introduced in 
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Malawi is self-enforcing. This is because taxpayers have an added incentive to 
file a return to the revenue authority so that they can claim the input VAT. In 
addition, taxpayers are more likely to pay taxes other than just VAT once they 
start remitting VAT to the MRA.  
• The possibility of crosschecking VAT documents to identify errors. On the 25th 
of every month, taxpayers who operate VAT in Malawi are supposed to submit a 
VAT return to the MRA. The VAT return shows all the transactions that the 
taxpayer has processed during that month and the amount of VAT to be remitted 
to the MRA. The MRA claims that the VAT returns are usually checked to ensure 
that the correct amount of VAT is remitted, and errors reported to the taxpayer for 
correction (MRA, 2016). The frequent checking of VAT returns may, therefore, 
be driving high tax compliance since taxpayers know that their VAT documents 
are frequently checked for errors, which may motivate them to ensure declarations 
of all their transactions, not just VAT, are correct.   
• VAT generates more data to cross-check against other returns, such as corporate 
income tax. The VAT return contains additional information, such as the quantity 
of goods bought and sold in a month by a business. It is this information that the 
tax authority, the MRA claims to use (Chafuwa, Kenani, & Kaunda, 2017) to 
produce a rough estimate of profits, and hence the income tax to be paid by a 
taxpayer.  
• When VAT refund claims exceed MK2 million (£2,000), the accounts are 
automatically flagged for audit before the claim is paid. However, in many 
instances, the audits are programmed to cover other taxes, not just VAT. Thus, 
enforcement of VAT indirectly leads to enforcement of other taxes, such as direct 
taxes. 
The positive impact of VAT on revenue collection is not limited to Malawi. In an 
empirical micro study by Keen and Lockwood (2010) involving 143 countries over the 
period 1975-2000, it was also found that the VAT is a “money machine”: it had helped 
countries generate more revenues than they would had without the VAT in place. 
Accordingly, the significant increase in tax-to-GDP ratio between 2005-2011 is mainly 
attributed to the introduction of VAT.  
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2.4 Comparative Analysis of Revenue Performance in Malawi and Other SSA 
Countries 
In this section, the Malawian tax system is compared with those of other low-
income SSA countries, focusing on three aspects: tax structure, the tax-to-GDP ratio, and 
tax effort.  
2.4.1 Tax Structure  
In general, low-income and middle-income countries rely more on indirect taxes 
than direct taxes compared to high-income or OECD countries which have a balanced 
reliance on direct and indirect taxes (Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2. 3: Proportion of direct tax and indirect tax in total tax revenue by decade 
and income group 
 
Source: Author’s calculation, using  ICTD/UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset 
(2017) 
Figure 2.3 shows that in low and middle-income countries, on average, direct tax 
collection averaged approximately 30% of total tax revenue between 1980-2015. By 
contrast, in Malawi, the contribution of direct taxes to total revenue was 40% in the 1980s, 
increasing to 48% in 1990, before declining to 44% during the 2000s. The level of direct 
tax collection in Malawi is well above that of low and middle-income countries but 
slightly below that of high-income and OECD countries, which collect a little over 50% 
of their tax revenue from direct taxes.  
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The literature suggests that the main reasons for low-income countries having low 
reliance on direct taxes are as follows: 
1. In low-income countries, agriculture contributes a large share of GDP, and 
industry and manufacturing only a small share (Morrissey et al., 2016). The larger 
agricultural sector reduces taxable capacity, as agriculture is mainly a subsistence 
activity in low-income countries and is difficult to tax directly. On the other hand, 
a large industrial sector is easier to monitor and tax, and a larger share of 
manufacturing in GDP indicates economic development and a larger formal 
(taxable) sector. Thus, a low-income country with a high reliance on direct tax 
indicates that the tax administration is able to collect more direct taxes from a 
small-industry sector, i.e. the manufacturing sector, or the agricultural sector. 
2. Low-income countries have low per capita income. Accordingly, income tax 
collection is low because the income tax base is small (ATAF, 2018). 
3. There are a number of administrative challenges that hinder the effective 
enforcement and collection of income taxes, such as the political hurdles 
associated with taxing the rich or local elites (Junquera-Varela et al., 2017). 
Focusing on countries in SSA, Table 2.1 shows the average proportion of direct, 
indirect, trade, and non-taxes in GDP for 30 African countries9 between 1980-2015. The 
countries are arranged in descending order based on their reliance on direct taxes (refer 
to column seven). Notably, only four countries (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and 
Zambia) source more than 30% of their revenue from direct taxes. The other countries 
have a high reliance on either indirect taxes or non-taxes. Resource-rich countries, such 
as Botswana, Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria, collect over 80% of their revenue from non-
taxes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Countries were chosen according to the availability of the data; the countries included in this analysis 
had at least 27 years of data available.  
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Table 2. 1: Total revenue, direct tax, indirect tax, trade tax, and non-taxes as a 
share of GDP in various African countries (1980-2015 average) 
Country  
Total 
revenue 
/GDP 
(%) 
Direct 
tax 
/GDP 
(%) 
 
Indirect 
tax 
/GDP 
(%) 
Trade 
taxes 
/GDP 
(%)  
 Non-
tax 
/GDP 
(%) 
Direct 
tax/tot
al 
reven
ue 
(%)  
South Africa 30.68 14.99 9.27 0.98 5.44 49 
Zimbabwe 22.87 10.68 7.37 3.21 1.61 47 
Malawi  11.15 4.21 4.14 1.58 1.22 38 
Zambia 15.98 5.93 4.34 3.09 2.62 37 
Namibia 31.03 8.95 7.22 10.32 4.53 29 
Tanzania 11.32 3.12 6.07 1.13 0.99 28 
Rwanda 11.81 3.22 4.69 2.75 1.15 27 
Swaziland 23.17 6.26 2.4 13.31 1.2 27 
Sierra Leone 7.62 2.01 2.17 2.64 0.8 26 
Mozambique 13.07 3.36 6.07 1.68 1.96 26 
Burundi 15.13 3.82 6.66 3.26 1.41 25 
Uganda 9.62 2.32 5.27 1.32 0.7 24 
Senegal 18.31 4.35 8.63 3.87 1.47 24 
Benin  13.66 3.23 5.61 3.4 1.41 24 
Togo 19.37 4.43 6.65 4.1 4.19 23 
Mali  15.28 3.43 5.91 1.99 3.94 22 
Central African Republic 10.06 2.24 3.6 3.05 1.17 22 
Burkina Faso  11.6 2.58 4.35 3.11 1.55 22 
Madagascar 10.24 2.16 2.77 4.84 0.48 21 
Côte d'Ivoire 19.73 4.14 7.29 4.85 3.45 21 
Gambia 15.43 3.17 5.1 4.68 2.48 21 
Mauritania 20.42 3.94 5.42 2.86 8.19 19 
Chad 9.6 1.82 1.92 1.54 4.32 19 
Lesotho 40.4 7.05 6.69 22.2 4.46 17 
Cameroon 16.39 2.62 5.6 2.15 6.02 16 
Gabon  28.44 3.31 3.28 5.08 16.77 12 
Guinea Bissau 8.66 1 1.82 2.66 3.19 12 
Botswana 41.81 4.81 2.55 8.23 26.22 12 
Nigeria 19.16 1.51 1.21 1.11 15.34 8 
Angola 36.45 1.92 2.52 2.07 29.95 5 
Average  18.75 4.34 4.96 4.23 5.22 24 
Source: Author’s calculation using data from the ICTD/UNU-WIDER Government 
Revenue Dataset (2017) 
Table 2.1 shows that the average proportion of direct tax to total revenue from 
1980-2015 for the countries under review was 24%. South Africa had the highest 
proportion of direct taxes in total revenue, followed by Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia. 
It was expected that South Africa would have a high proportion of direct tax collection in 
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total revenue as it is classified as an upper-middle-income country by the IMF,10 based 
on gross national income (GNI) per capita. However, Malawi and Zimbabwe are 
classified as low-income countries, and Zambia is classified as lower-middle-income 
country. Therefore, it would be expected that these three countries would collect much 
more tax revenue from indirect taxes or non-taxes than from direct taxes, as is the case 
now. In Chapter 6, this phenomenon is explored in further detail to determine why some 
low-income countries, such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, are highly reliant on 
direct tax when the majority of low-income countries are more reliant on indirect tax or 
non-taxes.  
2.4.2 Tax-to-GDP Ratio 
The tax-to-GDP ratio in many regions, including low-income countries, lower-
middle-income countries, and countries in SSA, has been increasing since the 1990s  
(IMF, 2011; Keen & Mansour, 2010). However, from a comparative perspective, the 
increase in tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi since 2009 has been above average for SSA,  low 
income and lower-middle income countries (Figure 2.4).  
Figure 2. 4: Tax-to-GDP Ratio in low-income countries (low), lower-middle-
income countries (lower-middle), SSA, and Malawi (MW) (1990-2015) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using ICTD/UNU-WIDER government revenue dataset, 2017 
Note: I define the abbreviations in Figure 2.4 as follows: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; Low = low-income 
countries; lower-middle = lower-middle-income countries; MW=Malawi.  
Figure 2.4 shows that, prior to 1992, Malawi’s tax-to-GDP ratio was slightly 
 
10Refer to https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-
and-lending-groups  
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higher than the average for low-income countries but below the average for low, lower-
middle income countries, and SSA countries. Malawi’s tax-to-GDP ratio declined in the 
early 1990s, and by 1993 it had decreased to below the average for both low income, 
lower-middle income and SSA countries. However, the tax-to-GDP ratio began to 
increase in 1996. By 2005, it surpassed the average for low-income countries. In 2009, 
Malawi’s tax-to-GDP ratio was higher than the averages for SSA, low-income countries, 
and lower-middle-income countries. Thus, in recent years, Malawi’s tax revenue 
collection performance has been better than most countries in SSA, and better than low- 
and lower-middle-income countries.  
2.4.3 Tax Effort 
Tax effort is calculated and defined as actual tax collection as a share of expected 
tax collection, factoring in various features of the economy, such as level of development, 
share of agriculture in GDP, trade openness, and the share of GDP contributed by industry 
(Mkandawire, 2010). A tax effort greater than 1 indicates that the country is collecting 
more tax than the characteristics of the economy suggest it should. A tax effort of less 
than 1 indicates that, considering the prevailing characteristics of the economy, the 
country is collecting less tax than is potentially available.  
Estimating tax effort for countries in SSA, including Malawi, is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. However, a review of the literature on tax effort estimates shows that, 
relative to other SSA countries, Malawi’s tax effort is high. The estimated tax effort for 
Malawi is close to 1 or higher, whereas most countries in SSA have a tax effort estimate 
of less than 1. For instance, Fenochietto and Pessino (2013) estimated the tax effort for 
Malawi for 2012 to be 0.97, while the tax effort for other countries in SSA, specifically 
Madagascar, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia, were 0.62, 0.50, 0.64, and 0.62, 
respectively. Gupta (2007) on the other hand, estimated the tax effort of Malawi to be 
1.55, while the tax effort for other low-income countries, specifically Madagascar, 
Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, were 0.72, 0.77, and 0.79 respectively. 
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2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of the current tax system in Malawi and 
presented the historical factors that have contributed to its current state. It has highlighted 
that Malawi has undergone numerous tax policy and administration changes since gaining 
independence in 1964. Soon after independence, a period of few tax policy reforms was 
followed by a period of increasing tax rates in the early 1980s, mostly driven by the need 
for more tax revenue as a result of various economic stressors. The changes in the tax 
policy undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s under the auspices of the IMF and 
WB were aimed at creating a fairer and more efficient system, promoting industrial 
development, securing revenue sustainability, and creating stability in the tax system 
(Chipeta, 1998). This was achieved by reducing the rate of import duties and income 
taxes, and by broadening the tax base. From the mid-1990s, the focus of reforms shifted 
from tax policy changes to improving tax administration. Administrative changes 
included the formation of the Tax Policy Unit in the Ministry of Finance in 1996, and the 
introduction of the semi-autonomous revenue authority, the Malawi Revenue Authority, 
in 2000.  
The volatility of tax collection in Malawi over the years has also been noted. In 
general, the tax-to-GDP ratio averaged 10% between 1964-1990. This ratio declined to 
8% between 1990-1994 due to several factors, including a significant reduction in tax 
rates; drought, which affected agricultural productivity, which in turn affected the 
profitability of agricultural industries; and political tensions that resulted in riots, which 
negatively affected the productivity of businesses, as production decreased during a 
period of protests and instability. The tax-to-GDP ratio began to gradually rise in 1996 
due to greater political stability (when the one-party system changed to a multiparty 
democracy). Between 2005-2011, the tax-to-GDP ratio increased sharply, from 10% to 
17.5%. Unexpectedly, this high tax-to-GDP ratio has been sustained ever since. Both 
indirect and direct taxes drove the increase in tax revenue from 2005, driven mainly by 
the introduction of VAT in 2005.  
Aside from the dramatic increase in tax-to-GDP ratio between 2005-2011, the 
peculiarities of Malawi’s tax structure has also been noted. Specifically, the country 
collects a considerably high amount of tax from direct taxes, despite being classified as a 
low-income country. While this phenomenon is unusual, it is not exclusive to Malawi. 
Other low-income SSA countries, such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, also see a high 
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proportion of their tax revenue collected from direct taxes (explored in further detail in 
Chapter 6).  
This chapter has shown that Malawi’s tax-to-GDP ratio between 2009-2015, and 
its tax effort between 1980-2015, are better than in most other SSA countries. The tax-to-
GDP ratio is above average for countries in SSA, and for lower-income and middle-
income countries more widely. Tax effort in Malawi is also higher than would be 
expected for a low-income country in SSA; it has been estimated to be close to 1 or above 
by two separate researchers, whereas in SSA and other low-income countries this ratio is 
generally much lower.  
Overall, this chapter has highlighted and evidenced the following peculiarities in 
the Malawi tax system: a sharp increase in tax-to-GDP ratio between 2005-2011; a high 
tax effort, indicating that the majority of potential taxes are collected; and a tax structure 
with an unusually high dependence on direct tax for a low-income country. While the 
drastic increase in tax revenue is a more recent phenomenon, more likely a result of the 
introduction of VAT in 2005, the high reliance on direct tax has been present since 
Malawi gained independence in 1964.  
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Chapter 3: Understanding Tax Morale 
3.1 Introduction  
Four hypotheses are explored in this thesis, with the aim of finding answers to the 
main research questions. Chapter 2, while providing details about the peculiarities of the 
Malawian tax system, also explored how the introduction of VAT in 2005 may have 
significantly contributed to the increase in tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi. This chapter and 
the next explore the second hypothesis, that Malawians are more willing taxpayers (i.e., 
tax morale is high) than the populations in other SSA countries. This chapter is a literature 
review of tax morale, while the next is an empirical investigation of tax morale in Malawi 
and other SSA countries.  
It is first important to note that, as also highlighted by Kangave, Mascagni, and 
Moore (2018), researchers seeking to understand why some people pay taxes and others 
do not often use the phrase ‘tax morale’ interchangeably with the phrase ‘tax compliance’, 
yet these are distinct concepts. Tax non-compliance refers to the failure to freely and 
completely fulfil all tax obligations as per the law (James & Alley, 1999). Thus, tax 
compliance relates to the behaviour of taxpayers. Tax morale, on the other hand, refers to 
peoples willingness (or perceived moral obligation) to pay tax (Frey, 1997; Torgler, 2006; 
Alasfour et al., 2016;  Kangave, Mascagni & Moore, 2018). Thus, tax morale relates to 
people’s attitudes. The relationship between tax morale and tax compliance is that high 
tax morale has been noted to be one of the key determinants of tax compliance (Torgler, 
2006; Alm and Torgler, 2011; Luttmer & Singhal, 2014) 
Tax non-compliance is a significant problem for many counties, including 
Malawi. Yikona et al (2011) estimated that taxes equivalent to 12% of GDP in Malawi 
are not collected as a result of tax non-compliance. In attempting to explain why some 
people choose not to pay taxes, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) assumed that taxpayers 
are rational individuals who seek to maximise the utility of their taxable income. They 
weigh the benefits and the cost of compliance with those of non-compliance. Individuals 
are more likely to be non-compliant when the expected penalty and probability of being 
caught are low in comparison to the benefits gained by non-compliance. Accordingly, 
Williams and Horodnic (2017) suggest that to increase tax compliance, tax 
administrations must ensure that the benefits of non-compliance are outweighed by the 
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cost of non-compliance through increased penalties and a high probability of detection of 
non-compliant taxpayers.  
However, Slemrod (2007) found that reducing tax non-compliance is not a simple 
matter of applying higher penalties and/or increasing the probability of detection. This is 
because the percentage of taxpayers audited in a country is usually less than 1%, and the 
penalties for tax evasion11 are only a fraction of the price of unpaid taxes (Slemrod, 2007). 
Even for fraudulent evasion, the penalty seldom exceeds more than the amount of unpaid 
taxes, and these penalties are infrequently imposed. In addition, civil penalties on non-
fraudulent evasion are even smaller (Torgler, 2011).  Alm et al. (1992) and Torgler (2007) 
also point out that the main issue regarding tax compliance is not why so many people 
are cheating the system (i.e., why some people do not pay taxes); instead, they argue that 
the real puzzle seems to be how little evasion occurs (i.e., why so many people do pay 
taxes).  
The realisation that more people pay their taxes than is predicted by the Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) model prompted the search for alternative factors that consider the 
non-pecuniary (non-economic or non-monetary) factors that might have an impact on tax 
compliance decisions. Alm and Torgler (2011) refer to the non-pecuniary influences on 
the tax compliance decision as tax morale. In this thesis, I adopt the definition of tax 
morale used by Frey (1997), Torgler (2006), Alasfour et al. (2016) and Kangave, 
Mascagni, and Moore (2018): to mean people’s willingness to pay tax.  
A high tax morale in Malawi relative to other SSA countries would suggest that 
tax compliance is also high. I chose to focus on tax morale and not on tax non-compliance 
because, like any other illegal activitiy, such as prostitution, studying tax non-compliance 
is difficult. Studies that attempt to study tax non-compliance usually rely on audit data. 
However, it would not have been possible for me to gain access to audit data for most (if 
not all) SSA countries, considering that disagregated taxpayer data is normally 
confidential and only accessed in some instances by researchers after lengthy discussion 
with the revenue authority and the fufilment of certain legal requirements by the 
researcher (Mascagni, Nell, & Monkam, 2017). Therefore, due to the imposibility of 
 
11 Tax evasion consists of illegal and intentional actions taken by individuals and firms to reduce their 
legally due tax obligations, under-reporting incomes, sales, or wealth, by over-stating deductions, 
exemptions, or credits, or by failing to file appropriate tax returns (Alm, 2012). 
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studying tax non-compliance, due to its illegal nature and the challenge of accessing audit 
data, I chose to focus on tax morale.  
This review of tax morale will provide the foundation and framework for 
assessing tax morale in Malawi in the context of other SSA countries. Accordingly, the 
following literature review aims to answer the following questions: 
1. How can tax morale be studied (methods used to study tax morale)?  
2. What factors shape tax morale (the theoretical framework of tax morale)?  
3. What is known about tax morale in SSA (the empirical evidence)?  
Four main conclusions are drawn:  
1. There are three main methods of studying tax morale: survey, simulation 
experiments, and field experiments. 
2. Many factors impacting tax morale have been identified in the literature, and there 
is empirical evidence showing how the various factors impact tax morale.  
3. The extent to which a factor impacts tax morale in different countries is not always 
the same. 
4. Most of the studies of tax morale or compliance focus on the psychology of 
individual taxpayers (and hence assume that tax morale or compliance is an 
individual decision rather than an institutional decision), and on the personal 
attributes of taxpayers ( e.g age, gender, education) rather than on the features of 
their business or occupation that might impact tax morale and tax compliance.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section is a review 
of the methods used to study tax morale. This is followed by a review of the different 
factors that have an impact on tax morale, the empirical findings related to these factors, 
and the empirical findings of tax morale studies conducted in SSA. The key findings of 
the literature review on tax morale are summarised in the conclusion. 
3.2 Methods Used to Study Tax Morale  
As mentioned above, three main methods are used to study tax morale: surveys, 
simulation exercises, and field experiments (Kangave, Mascagni, & Moore, 2018). These 
are addressed in detail in the following subsections. 
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3.2.1 Surveys  
The use of surveys to investigate tax morale involves asking individuals about 
their experiences, perceptions, and attitudes towards the tax system, and can be conducted 
using questionnaires, interviews, observation, and content analysis (De Vaus, 2013). The 
main advantage of surveys in the study of tax morale is that they make it possible to obtain 
a wide range of information about respondents and examine whether and how a wide 
range of variables are correlated with the responses to questions. This allows researchers 
to investigate several hypotheses about the factors associated with tax morale (Torgler & 
Schneider, 2007). A critical limitation of surveys is that it is difficult to verify much of 
the information provided (Kelley et al., 2003), particularly when researching sensitive 
subjects, such as tax payments. Individuals may be cautious in their responses, wanting 
to avoid implicating themselves in any wrongdoing. Researchers studying tax morale 
have tried to circumvent this problem by using indirectly phrased questions about tax 
morale (Ali et al., 2013), which are more likely to elicit honest answers. Instead of asking 
respondents about their own tax behaviour, researchers ask questions about the behaviour 
of other people. For instance, the Afrobarometer (2014) used the question: “Why do some 
people choose not to pay taxes that they owe to the government?”  
3.2.2 Simulation Experiments 
In studies of tax morale that use simulation experiments, researchers place 
subjects in hypothetical situations and ask them to presume that they are taxpayers 
(Kangave, Mascagni, & Moore, 2018). They then observe subject’s behaviour when they 
are asked to make decisions related to paying taxes. Mascagni (2018) points out that the 
typical simulation experiment involves a group of students who are faced with the 
decision of how much income to report, based on a set of given variables including, for 
example, the tax rate, the probability of audit, and sanctions. The artificial setting allows 
the researcher to change these variables and to observe how the participants’ decisions 
vary in response. The key advantage of simulation experiments is that researchers can 
accurately detect actual behaviour because they have an idea of the (nominal) income and 
tax liability of each participant (Choo et al., 2014). In addition, behaviour is easier to 
observe in this artificial setting than in the real world because, in the real world, 
information about taxpayers’ assets, income, tax liabilities, and tax payments are often 
not observable (Franzoni, 1998). The main disadvantage of the simulated setting is 
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validation of the results, since the behaviour of participants in a simulated setting may 
not mirror their behaviour in reality (Torgler, 2003b). This is because, in the simulation 
experiment, the individuals involved know that they are part of a study and may behave 
differently than they would under the pressures of real life. As a result, behaviour in the 
artificial environment is likely to differ from actual decisions when faced with a real 
social context and real consequences of wrongdoing (Mascagni, 2018).  
3.2.3 Field Experiments 
Field experiments examine intervention in the real world (naturally occurring 
environments) rather than in artificial conditions, such as those used in simulation 
experiments (Mascagni, 2018). Field experiments on tax morale typically involve 
measuring the effects of interventions (such as messages sent to taxpayers) by the revenue 
authorities on actual taxpaying behaviour (Blumenthal et al., 1998; Hallsworth et al., 
2014; Castro & Scartascini, 2015). An example of such a field experiment is where a 
researcher, with the help of the revenue authority, sends messages to taxpayers appealing 
to their conscience by, for example, informing them how the taxes they paid were used 
to build a school or a health facility. Responses to such messages, in the form of the actual 
tax paid, are then evaluated against the responses of a control group that does not receive 
any messages, or receives neutral messages, such as information about tax rates.  
The advantage of using field experiments to study tax morale and taxpayer 
behaviour is that they are more likely to reflect real-life situations, due the natural setting 
(because the interface is the tax authority and not a researcher, the taxes indicate real 
money paid, and the consequences of wrongdoing are real sanctions and prosecution) 
(Mascagni, 2018). In addition, there is a lower likelihood of demand characteristics12 
affecting the results, as participants may not be aware that they are being studied 
(McCambridge, De Bruin & Witton, 2012). The main limitation of field experiments is 
that researchers can only experiment with a narrow range of variables that are under the 
control of the revenue authority and which it is willing to vary for research purposes 
(Mascagni, 2018). 
There is no ideal method to study tax morale, as each of these methods has 
advantages and disadvantages. The method a researcher uses depends on several factors, 
 
12 Demand characteristics refers to an experimental artefact whereby participants interpret the 
experiment's purpose and subconsciously change their behaviour to fit that interpretation.  
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including: 
1. The purpose of the research – to understand the drivers of tax morale and tax 
compliance, survey data may be more appropriate since survey responses reflect 
an individual’s attitude. However, to investigate taxpayer behaviour (what people 
do) rather than just tax morale (people’s attitudes), field experiments may be more 
suitable.   
2. The accessibility of information – field experiments require the tax authority to 
cooperate in the study. The tax authority may not be willing to undertake certain 
exercises, such as sending messages to taxpayers using different formats (letters, 
or email, or phone calls) for fear that the taxpayers may later not respond to 
communication from the revenue authority if they find out that they were part of 
an experiment. The tax authority may also decline to be involved in the field 
experiment altogether. In such a case, other methods, such as surveys, may be 
more appropriate. 
3. The available resources – field experiments and surveys are costly compared to 
simulation exercises, which can be conducted with, for instance, university 
students for a small or no fee at all. Thus, when there is a shortage of resources, 
simulation exercises may be the preferred method. In other cases, researchers may 
have access to secondary data from surveys, such as the World Value Survey 
(WVS)13 or the Afrobarometer data,14 which are freely available. In such cases, 
the researcher may opt to use the freely available data to save time and money. 
4. The tax type – respondents of surveys such as the WVS and the Afrobarometer, 
are selected by targeting all adults of voting age. However, some taxes (such as 
corporate tax or PAYE) are paid by small proportions of the population. Thus, 
asking specific tax questions to individuals who are not subject to that particular 
tax may result in misreading findings. Thus, if the target is to understand factors 
that affect tax morale relating to a specific tax, data sources other than the 
secondary survey data produced by WVS or Afrobarometer should be used.  
5. Time constraints – field experiments on tax morale or tax compliance take time, 
as they involve negotiating with the revenue authority. In addition, it typically 
takes at least 12 months to receive feedback once the experiment starts, as the 
 
13 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp  
14 http://afrobarometer.org/  
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filing period for income tax, for example, is one year, and the basic method in 
field experiments involves comparing tax filings/declared taxes for the year the 
survey is conducted (T) with the previous year (T-1). By contrast, when using 
simulation experiments, the results are obtained within a shorter period.  
3.3 Factors Affecting Tax Morale  
The majority of tax morale studies are those that attempt to test whether and how 
certain generic features of human psychology or behaviour affect tax morale. Several 
factors are studied under this class of tax morale studies.  The factors are usually 
categorised as: (1) economic deterrence; (2) fiscal exchange; (3) social influences; (4) 
comparative treatment; and (5) political accountability (Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg, & 
Hoem Sjursen, 2012).  
Due to the multiplicity of factors that affect tax morale, in this chapter, I will only 
review those that are commonly cited in the literature and that I evaluate for Malawi and 
other SSA countries in Chapter 4. These factors are: economic deterrence factors; fiscal 
exchange factors; social influence factors; comparative treatment factors; political 
accountability factors; corruption; democracy; and some demographic factors, such as 
age, gender, and highest education level.  
3.3.1 Economic Deterrence 
Factors that fall under the economic deterrence category are those related to the 
economic model of tax compliance developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). As 
highlighted in the introduction, the economic model assumes that taxpayers are rational 
actors who seek to maximise the utility of their taxable income by weighing the benefits 
and cost of compliance against the utility of tax non-compliance. As such, they will be 
non-compliant when they can reasonably expect a penalty, and/or the probability of being 
caught is small relative to the utility gained from non-compliance. Accordingly, factors 
such as people’s perception regarding tax rates, probability of audit, probability of being 
caught and punished for not paying taxes, and penalty rates fall within this category.   
A number of studies have analysed the impact of deterrence factors on tax morale. 
For example, a field experiment undertaken by Castro and Scartascini (2015) in Argentina 
involving 23,000 taxpayers showed that deterrence messages had a positive impact on tax 
reporting. The researchers, working with the revenue authority, identified taxpayers and 
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divided them into four groups: the first group received deterrence messages (that non-
payment of taxes would result in the tax authority taking action against them); the second 
group received messages pertaining to services that are provided by the municipality; the 
third group received messages asking taxpayers whether they were aware that only three 
out of ten taxpayers do not pay taxes; and the fourth group (control group) did not receive 
any messages. It was found that the group that received the deterrence message 
significantly increased their tax payments. These results are consistent with the findings 
of Fellner et al. (2013), who also conducted a large-scale field experiment to evaluate 
alternative strategies to enforce compliance in the payment of television licence fees in 
Australia. The researcher found a significant increase in tax compliance amongst 
individuals evading payment of television licence fees who received messages containing 
threats that indicated a high risk of detection. Several other studies have found a positive 
association between deterrence messages and tax compliance (Cummings et al., 2009; 
Ariel, 2012; Dwenger et al., 2016 ; Bott et al., 2017). 
3.3.2 Fiscal Exchange 
Factors that fall within the fiscal exchange category are those relating to the social 
contract between citizens and the government, where individuals are believed to pay taxes 
in exchange for the services they receive from the government (Ariel, 2012;Torgler, 
2007). According to this theory, positive actions of the government will lead to an 
increase in social commitment by the taxpayers and, consequently, higher tax morale 
(Horodnic, 2018). There are at least two variants of the fiscal exchange theory. The first 
variant is cross-sectional; that is, taxpayers receiving more benefits from the government 
are likely to have a higher tax morale. For example, farmers who receive free or 
subsidised farm inputs, such as seeds and fertiliser from the government, are more likely 
to have a high tax morale than those who do not. The second variant is time-based, where 
a prolonged provision of goods or services by the government, such as schools, health 
facilities, roads, and so on, over time, would lead to higher tax morale, as individuals are 
able to see what their taxes are being used for.  
Cummings et al. (2009) used survey data and simulation experiments to analyse 
the role of governance quality in influencing tax morale. The simulation experiments 
were carried out in Botswana and South Africa. These two countries have similar tax 
systems but different political histories and institutions, where Botswana is seen to have 
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a more accountable government and where the majority of citizens support their 
government, compared to South Africa (Mascagni, 2018). This means that the two 
countries offer a useful comparison for the investigation of the effects of tax morale 
stemming from perceptions of the government. Using the results from the simulation 
experiments and the survey data, the researchers found that perceptions of government 
fairness and efficacy were considerably higher in Botswana, and self-reported tax 
compliance also appeared to be higher than in South Africa. This confirmed the fiscal 
exchange theory that satisfaction with government provision of goods and services or 
governance leads to high tax morale.  
In general, the empirical evidence shows that there is a positive correlation 
between people’s satisfaction with the government’s provision of goods and services and 
tax morale (D’Arcy, 2011; Ali et al., 2013).  
3.3.3 Norms, Culture, and Social Influence  
Some studies have suggested that human behaviour in regard to taxation is 
influenced by social interactions in much the same way as other forms of behaviour 
(Grasmick & Green, 1980; Grasmick & Scott, 1982). Thus, attitudes towards the tax 
system may also be affected by the norms, culture, and social behaviour of an individual’s 
reference group, such as relatives, neighbours, business partners/acquaintances, and 
friends.  
Various studies have found a link between social behaviour and culture, and tax 
morale (Schwartz & Orleans, 1967; Bobek et al., 2007). One of the early experiments to 
show the impact of social appeal to personal conscience on tax compliance was carried 
out by Schwartz and Orleans (1967). The researchers conducted a field experiment to 
understand the impact of personal norms and social influence on tax morale in the United 
States of America (USA). Four experimental groups of approximately 90 taxpayers each 
were included in the experiment. Each group received a different message (a message 
about sanctions for non-payment of taxes; a message about why it is good to pay taxes, 
which was an appeal to conscience; a neutral message; and no message). Before the filing 
of taxes commenced, the group that received messages about sanctions and the group that 
received messages appealing to their conscience were asked questions that aimed to 
identify their motives for tax payment. The results showed that emphasising patriotic 
considerations (the importance of paying taxes and the high number of people who pay 
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taxes) had a positive influence on tax payment, especially for middle-income individuals. 
However, a conceptual replication of this study by McGraw and Scholz (1991) did not 
find an equivalent effect on actual tax return data (i.e., the appeal to conscience did not 
have a significant impact on tax payment). 
 In a simulation study by Bosco and Mittone (1997), messages were sent to 
taxpayers emphasising the redistributive purpose of tax collection and that tax evasion 
would be at the expense of poorer taxpayers; a positive correlation was found between 
moral appeals and tax compliance. 
A number of other studies based on survey data have also shown that general 
honesty (Porcano, 1988), ethical convictions regarding the payment of tax (Reckers et al., 
1994), and the anticipation of guilt over non-compliance (Reckers et al., 1994; Scott & 
Grasmick, 1981) are positively correlated with tax morale.  
3.3.4 Comparative Treatment 
It has been suggested that individuals comply with the law if they perceive the 
process of implementing the law to be generally fair (McKerchar & Evans, 2009). Factors 
under the comparative treatment are those related to the fairness of the tax system (Bello 
& Danjuma, 2014).  
Three types of fairness in taxation have been discussed by the OECD (2012):  
1. Distributive fairness, which relates to taxpayers’ perception that the government 
acts as a good custodian and wise spender of tax revenue. 
2. Procedural fairness, which relates to the perception that tax bodies adhere strictly 
to established procedures and are fair in dealing with taxpayers. 
3. Retributive fairness, which relates to the perception that tax authorities are fair in 
the application of punishments when tax rules or norms are violated. 
Distributive fairness relates more to the equity of the exchange between the 
government and taxpayers, and can thus be linked with fiscal exchange factors. Factors 
that fall under the comparative treatment category are more related to the procedural and 
retributive fairness and can be influenced by tax administrations by emphasising fairness 
and transparency in the handling of tax matters (Walsh, 2012).  
The importance of fairness in taxation is such that it is not significant whether the 
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outcome favours the individual taxpayer or not. Most taxpayers will still perceive a tax 
authority as fair and just even if it acts against them, provided it is in a fair manner (Bello 
& Danjuma, 2014). This predictably results in fewer complaints about the authority’s 
decisions. Equity and fairness in tax matters also builds mutual trust and cooperation 
between tax bodies and taxpayers, thereby increasing voluntary compliance (Kirchler et 
al., 2008; Braithwaite, 2003).  
A number of studies have examined the relationship between fairness and tax 
morale. For instance, using survey data collected from 2,292 taxpayers accused of tax 
avoidance in Australia, Rothstein (2011) found that the fairer the regulator’s actions, the 
more taxpayers trusted their authority. In another survey-based study, Murphy (2005) 
found that when taxpayers were treated procedurally unfairly by tax officials, they were 
more likely to be non-compliant. Similarly, Giray et al. (2015), using survey data 
collected from 481 taxpayers in Turkey, found that tax morale is high when the tax 
administration is perceived to be fair in its dealings, when the tax system is considered to 
be efficient, and when taxpayers are satisfied with public expenditure.  
3.3.5 Political Legitimacy  
Political legitimacy is defined as belief or trust in authorities, institutions, and 
social arrangements as being appropriate, just, and working for the common good 
(Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Ali et al., 2013). The more trustworthy and effective a state is in 
providing public goods, the more legitimate it will appear, and the greater potential it will 
have in eliciting high tax morale (Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Rothstein, 2011). Various 
researchers (Levi, 1997; Rothstein, 2009; Tyler, 1990; Hechter, 2013) have argued that 
tax morale is high among taxpayers if they perceive the state to be legitimate; that is, if 
they believe that the state has the right to impose taxes and that citizens have the 
responsibility to pay these taxes.   
Tyler (1997) proposed that if an organisation is perceived to be legitimate, people 
are generally more likely to follow and accept their decisions. In a study based on survey 
data for authorities in political, legal, managerial, educational, and family settings, Tyler 
(1997) found that authorities draw an important component of their legitimacy from their 
social relationships with group members. In another context, Tyler and Fagan (2008) 
found that legitimacy was important for encouraging cooperation with the police; using 
survey data collected from 830 New York residents, they found that the residents were 
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more likely to cooperate with law enforcement officials if they viewed the police as 
legitimate.  
3.3.6 Corruption 
Corruption in public authorities can severely harm tax morale (Jahnke & Weisser, 
2018). From a theoretical point of view, corruption can discourage people from 
complying because of the perceived unfairness in the exchange taking place between the 
taxpayers and the state (Feld & Frey, 2007). Torgler (2006) found that countries with high 
levels of corruption lack the social norm of paying taxes to the government. Torgler 
(2006) analysed the correlation between Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index and tax morale and found it to be negative. Other studies have also 
found that widespread corruption is associated with lower tax morale (Alasfour et al., 
2016; Gerstenbluth et al., 2012; Jahnke, 2015; Torgler, 2008; Williams & Krasniqi, 
2017). 
However, not all studies have found a negative correlation between corruption 
and tax morale. For instance, using Round 5 Afrobarometer survey data, Ali et al. (2013) 
analysed the impact of satisfaction with public services on the tax morale of individuals 
in Uganda, South Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania. The researchers used the perceived 
number of corrupt tax officials as a proxy for the citizens’ satisfaction with the tax 
administration and found significant negative effects on tax morale in Uganda and South 
Africa, but not in Kenya or Tanzania.  
3.3.7 Democracy  
Tax morale may also vary based on the type of institutional setting. For instance, 
Prinz (2002) suggested that institutions that respect the preferences of their citizens will 
have more support from the people than a state that acts as a leviathan. Torgler (2005a) 
reported that the more able taxpayers are to participate in political decision-making 
through popular rights (such as voting), the higher their tax morale.  
Empirical evidence also show a positive correlation between tax morale and 
democracy (Alm et al., 1999; Pommerehne & Weck-Hannemann, 1996;  Feld & Tyran, 
2002; Torgler, 2003; Torgler et al., 2003). Torgler (2005) analysed the impact of people’s 
perception of democracy on tax morale in Switzerland, a country where participation 
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rights vary significantly across different cantons,15 using survey data from the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 1998); the findings suggested that 
democratic rights have a significantly positive effect on tax morale. 
3.3.8 Tax Knowledge 
Tax knowledge refers to the level of awareness or sensitivity of taxpayers to tax 
legislation (Holland, John & Pernill, 2009). The knowledge base of individuals regarding 
the types of taxes they pay and their rights and responsibilities as taxpayers may also have 
an impact on an individual’s tax morale (Ali et al., 2013).  
Oladipupo and Obazee (2016) studied the effects of tax knowledge and tax 
penalties on tax morale among small and medium enterprises in Nigeria, using survey 
data collected from 277 small and medium taxpayers. Multiple regression analysis was 
performed to assess the relative predictive power of the independent variables (i.e., tax 
knowledge and tax penalty) on the dependent variable (i.e., tax morale). The results 
showed a positive and significant correlation between tax knowledge and tax morale, 
corroborating the findings of previous studies by Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar (2006) and 
Kirchler et al. (2008). 
3.3.9 Social Demographic Factors 
Various studies have identified a relationship between sociodemographic 
variables and tax morale (Hofmann et al., 2017; Torgler & Schneider, 2007; Devos, 
2008). Indeed, many studies of tax morale have integrated social and economic variables 
in models of tax morale (Alasfour et al., 2016; Ho et al., 2013; Devos, 2008). Commonly 
included sociodemographic variables include age, gender, education, employment status, 
and income level. 
1. Age – Empirical studies have yielded conflicting results regarding the 
influence of age on tax morale.  While some studies have found that older 
people have a higher tax morale compared to young people (Devos, 2008; 
Sipos, 2015; Torgler & Murphy, 2004), others have shown that young people 
have a higher tax morale than older people (Torgler & Schneider, 2007; 
Barone & Mocetti, 2011), or that there is no significant effect of age on tax 
 
15 Cantons in Switzerland refers to the 26 member states of the Swiss Confederation.  
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morale (Ho et al., 2013).  
2. Gender – There is no consensus on the relationship between gender and tax 
morale. Some studies, such as studies conducted in Pakistan (Marriott, 2017) 
and Russia (Alm et al., 2006) have found that women have a higher tax morale 
than men, whereas others find the opposite. Studies conducted in Romania 
(McGee & Preobragenskaya, 2006) and Turkey (McGee et al., 2011) have 
found a negative correlation between tax morale and gender (female), and a 
study conducted in Argentina (McGee & Rossi, 2008) found no correlation 
between gender and tax morale.  
3. Education – Most studies of the correlation between education and tax morale 
have identified a positive correlation (Gupta & McGee, 2010; Roth et al., 
1989).  
4. Employment – Empirical evidence shows that self-employed or part-time 
employed individuals have lower tax morale compared to full-time employed 
individuals (Devos, 2008; Torgler & Schneider, 2007; Marriott, 2017). 
Furthermore, pensioners/retired individuals have been found to have a higher 
tax morale than non-pensioners (Cyan et al., 2016; Doerrenberg & Peichl, 
2013; Feld et al., 2008; Sá et al., 2013). 
The literature review has shown that various factors affect tax morale, and studies 
on tax morale have been conducted in both high-income and low-income countries, 
including SSA countries. Regardless of where the studies are conducted, the same factors 
are found to affect tax morale. Accordingly, there is no reason to suspect that factors that 
have an impact on tax morale in SSA countries are different from those that have an 
impact on tax morale in other regions. However, in the next section, I take a closer look 
at studies undertaken in SSA with the aim of understanding the main drivers of tax morale 
in these countries.  
3.4 Tax Morale Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa  
A number of studies on tax morale have been conducted in SSA. However, most 
(Ali et al., 2013; Cummings et al., 2009; Yesegat & Fjeldstad, 2016) are based on data 
collected through surveys. For instance, Cummings et al. (2009) studied how tax morale 
affects tax compliance in South Africa and Botswana using simulation experiments and 
Afrobarometer survey data, and found that the observed differences in tax morale in South 
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Africa and Botswana could be explained by differences in the fairness of tax 
administration, in the perceived fiscal exchange, and in the overall attitude towards the 
respective governments (political legitimacy). Ali et al. (2013) analysed the factors 
affecting tax compliance attitudes in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa using 
Round 5 Afrobarometer data and found that tax morale is positively correlated with the 
provision of public services (such as health, education, and infrastructure). However, this 
correlation depends on the specific service in question and differs between countries. 
Finally, Yesegat and Fjeldstad (2016) examined factors that determine business people’s 
attitudes towards paying taxes in Ethiopia, using data collected from a survey conducted 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and found that dissatisfaction with the tax administration led 
to low tax morale. Furthermore, the authors found that most of the factors identified in 
the literature as being correlated with tax morale, such as satisfaction with the 
government’s provision of goods and services, and the impact of one’s reference group 
(such as friends), were positively correlated to tax morale. A summary of the findings 
from different studies conducted in Africa and other low-income countries is presented 
in Table 3.1.   
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eter)  
A
frica  
Levi and Sacks (2009)  
Fem
ale (-), personal belongs, 
television, car, radio (+) 
Satisfaction w
ith: local gov. (+), efforts to com
bat 
corruption (+), enforcem
ent of taxes (+) fair 
treatm
ent (+) 
Survey 
(A
frobarom
eter)  
A
frica  
D
aude and M
elguizo 
(2010)  
A
ge (+), fem
ale (-), econom
ic 
problem
 (-) education (+), 
religion (+) 
Satisfaction w
ith: dem
ocracy (+) and services (+), 
corruption (+) 
Survey 
(Latinobarom
eter) 
Latin A
m
erica 
G
aviria (2007)  
A
ge (+), fem
ale (+), savings (-), 
incom
e (-) 
Past m
obility (-), future m
obility (+), perception 
in m
eritocracy (-) 
Survey 
(Latinobarom
eter) 
Latin A
m
erica 
H
ug and Spörri (2011)  
A
ge (+), fem
ale (+) m
arried (+), 
self-em
ployed (-), retired (+) 
Political legitim
acy (satisfaction w
ith incum
bent 
(+)) confidence in the legal system
 (+) 
Survey (W
orld 
V
alue Survey)  
Eastern Europe 
Torgler (2003)  
A
ge (+), fem
ale (+) m
arried (+), 
self-em
ployed (-), retired (+) 
 Political legitim
acy (satisfaction w
ith 
governm
ent (+)) 
Survey (W
orld 
V
alue Survey)  
Eastern Europe 
Torgler (2004)  
A
ge (+), self-em
ployed (-), 
unem
ployed (-), upper class (-), 
financial satisfaction (+) India 
and Japan, sam
e as above, 
religion (+) 
Political legitim
acy: Trust in: governm
ent (+), in 
legal system
, (+), in dem
ocracy (+) 
Survey (W
orld 
V
alue Survey)  
A
sia (India and 
Japan) 
Torgler (2005)  
A
ge (+), fem
ale (+) m
arried (+), 
religion (+), Financial 
fastifaction (+) 
Satisfaction w
ith national office (+), Trust in: 
President (+), in dem
ocracy (+) 
Survey (W
orld 
V
alue Survey and 
Lationobarom
eter)  
Latin A
m
erica 
N
ote: (+) indicates a positive correlation betw
een the variable and tax m
orale; (-) indicates a negative correlation betw
een the variable and 
tax m
orale.
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Table 3.1 shows that the factors that affect tax morale in different countries are 
not always the same. For instance, Yesegat and Fjeldstad (2016) found a negative 
correlation between tax morale and corruption within the tax administration in Ethiopia, 
while Daude and Melguizo (2010) found a positive correlation between tax morale and 
corruption in Latin America. The finding that factors that correlate with tax morale impact 
differently on tax morale depending on location suggests that findings from one study on 
tax morale cannot generalised to another country. This is because knowing the factors 
that drive tax morale in one country does not provide knowledge of how the same factors 
will impact individuals’ tax morale in a different country.  
Table 3.1 also shows that most of the existing studies on tax morale focus on 
economic and social-psychological factors to understand tax morale. The researchers in 
these studies are mostly ignoring the effects of a wide range of other classes of variables, 
such as: the demographic characteristics of individual taxpayers; the type of tax in 
question; the type of business/enterprise; the structure of the tax system; or the behaviour 
of tax collectors. 
3.5 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to understand how best to study tax morale. I have 
analysed methods used to study tax morale as well as factors and evidence regarding the 
factors affecting tax morale.  
I find that there are three main methods of studying tax morale: surveys, 
simulation experiments, and field experiments. Each of these methods has strengths and 
weaknesses, and there is no ideal method. The literature also revealed that there are many 
factors that affect tax morale. There is empirical evidence supporting various factors that 
fall within fiscal exchange, economic deterrence, and peer influence. In addition, 
sociodemographic factors, such as age and education level, have also been found to have 
an impact on tax morale. In general, the empirical evidence shows that all the factors 
identified in the literature have an impact on tax morale. However, the impact of these 
factors differs according to place (or country). 
As well as providing an overview of tax morale issues, the literature review has 
also shown that it is difficult to research tax morale in a deep and insightful manner due 
to the fact that the attitudes of individuals change depending on place or country.   
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It was also noted in this chapter that most of the existing studies on tax morale 
focus on economic and social-psychological factors and not on more pragmatic factors, 
such as differences in tax morale among different categories of taxpayers. This gap in the 
literature is addressed in Chapter 4, where I undertake an analysis of tax morale in Malawi 
focusing on differences in tax morale among different groups of businesses people.    
Thus, in summary, this chapter has shown that: first, the tools to research tax 
morale/compliance are weak; second, and related, many different factors affect tax 
morale/compliance to some extent, but there is little knowledge on their importance 
relative to one another, either in same context or across contexts; third, much of the 
research on tax morale has focused on more variables derived from ‘big’ debates about 
what affects human behaviour, and not on more pragmatic concerns, such as informing 
tax collectors on how to better perform their role.  
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Chapter 4: What Can we Learn About Tax Morale in Malawi 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 explored the issue of tax morale, an umbrella term that captures the 
non-pecuniary motivations for tax compliance. This chapter is an empirical investigation 
of tax morale in Malawi and other SSA countries. The analyses presented in this chapter 
are based on the literature review in Chapter 3. 
Given that tax revenue performance (measured by tax-to-GDP ratio) in Malawi 
has been higher in comparison to most SSA countries since 2009 (Chapter 2), it seems 
reasonable to assume that its tax morale will also be higher. Accordingly, in this chapter, 
I explore whether or not Malawians are exceptionally good and willing taxpayers (i.e., if 
tax morale is high) relative to the populations in other SSA countries. I explore this issue 
by undertaking research that answers the following interrelated questions: 
• is tax morale in Malawi either higher than or in some other way significantly 
different from tax morale in other SSA countries?  
• what are some of the factors that correlate with tax morale for individuals in 
SSA countries? 
• are there significant differences in tax morale among different types of 
businesses in Malawi that might shed some light on the broader question of 
why tax collection, especially collection of direct taxes, is particularly high?  
To answer these questions, I conduct three separate pieces of analysis.   
            In the first piece of analysis, I use Afrobarometer survey data to calculate average 
tax morale for countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer. Tax morale is measured based 
on people’s views about whether it is “wrong and punishable,” “wrong but 
understandable,” or “not wrong at all” to not pay taxes owed to the government.  Based 
on Round 5 (R5) (conducted in 2011/12) and Round 6 (R6) (conducted in 2014/15) 
Afrobarometer data, I note that there is a big apparent change in tax morale (based on the 
percentage of people who answered “wrong and punishable” in each country) between 
the two rounds in Malawi and Madagascar. This raised the question of whether or not the 
Afrobarometer data is accurate and reliable considering that the two survey (R5 and R6) 
were conducted within two years of each other hence the tax morale between the two 
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rounds were expected to be close to each other. In an attempt to understand what might 
be the problem with the data, I conducted a plausibility check involving looking at all 
countries surveyed by Afrobarometer which led to the conclusion that the high variation 
between tax morale in R5 and R6 in Malawi and Madagascar  does not indicate a 
significant problem of the reliability of the Afrobarometer data, and that it was reasonable 
to use the merged data for R5 and R6  to calculate the “real” tax morale figure for Malawi. 
Based on the merged data for R5 and R6, I found that tax morale in Malawi is within the 
average for SSA countries. That is, Malawians are not any better, or more or less willing, 
taxpayers, when compared to people in other SSA countries.  
Given that I had access to the original Afrobarometer survey data for individuals, 
I decided to conduct a second piece of analysis to investigate in more detail the factors 
that correlate with tax morale for individuals in SSA countries to see whether there might 
or might not be something distinctive about Malawian taxpayers that will help to shed 
light on my broader research questions. This analysis also showed that there is nothing 
special about Malawian taxpayers.  
The third piece of analysis explored the differences in tax morale among different 
groups of business people in Malawi. I assumed that although the overall tax morale is 
not particularly high in Malawi compared with the average tax morale for SSA countries 
(based on the findings from the first analysis), it might be sufficiently high among certain 
groups of business people within Malawi to shed light on the good tax revenue 
performance in the country. This analysis is based on the survey data that I collected from 
business people in Malawi in January and February of 2017. Only one category of 
taxpayers (business people) was included in the survey due to time limitations meaning 
it was not possible to conduct a survey covering different taxpayer categories. However, 
business people in Malawi constitute a majority of taxpayers in terms of number as well 
as their contribution to revenues (see Chapter 5) hence they are a good representation of 
all taxpayers in Malawi.   
A regression equation was estimated with tax morale as the dependent variable, 
and various factors, such as deterrence, fiscal exchange, corruption, and the following 
business taxpayer groups as independent variables:  businesses operating in Lilongwe and 
Blantyre; formal and informal businesses; small/medium  and large businesses (size based 
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on MRA classification of businesses)16; and businesses in different sectors 
(accommodation, manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail, and  transport).  
The results of this analysis showed that business people operating in Blantyre had 
higher tax morale than those operating in Lilongwe; large businesses had higher tax 
morale than small businesses; and businesses in the construction sector had lower tax 
morale than businesses in other sectors. No variation in tax morale was found between 
formal and informal businesses; between businesses in manufacturing and other sectors; 
between businesses in retail and wholesale and other sectors; and between businesses in 
transport and other sectors. In addition, similar to the second piece of analysis presented 
in this chapter, I found that corruption, fiscal exchange, and deterrence factors are the 
main drivers of tax morale in Malawi.  
The results from the three pieces of analysis suggest that, while tax morale in 
Malawi is not significantly different from the average tax morale for SSA counties, 
certain groups of business people in Malawi have a higher tax morale. Accordingly, the 
taxpayer groups with high tax morale (those operating in Blantyre, and taxpayers 
classified as large) may be partly contributing to the good tax revenue performance in 
Malawi as they may be more tax compliant. However, the extent to which the high tax 
morale among the groups of business people with high tax morale is translating into high 
tax compliance is unknown. This is because, as discussed in Chapter 3, tax morale only 
pertains to people’s attitudes and not their behaviour. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. I present the three pieces of 
analysis starting with the comparison of average tax morale of Malawi and other SSA 
countries, then the investigation of factors that correlate with tax morale in SSA based on 
the Afrobarometer data, and then the investigation of differences in tax morale among 
different business groups in Malawi. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the results 
from the three analyses. 
4.2 First Analysis: Comparative Analysis of Tax Morale Between Malawi and 
Other SSA Countries 
In this analysis, I use Afrobarometer survey data to explore variation in tax morale 
 
16 Two groups were created. The first group was for businesses with annual turnover of MK150 million 
(£150,000) which are classified as large. The rest were in the second group (hence comprised of small 
and medium taxpayers)   
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between Malawi and other countries in SSA based on country averages of tax morale. 
Afrobarometer is an organisation that conducts public attitude surveys on 
democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues, in 37 SSA countries.17 
The organisation has conducted seven rounds of surveys in the following years:18 1999-
2001 (Round 1); 2002-03 (Round 2); 2005-06 (Round 3); 2008-09, (Round 4); 2011-13 
(Round 5); 2014-15 (Round 6); and 2017-18 (Round 7). The Afrobarometer data is cross-
sectional and the rounds are not connectable in a panel19 since the respondents cannot be 
uniquely identified on the grounds of their being randomly selected from the whole 
population for each round. Afrobarometer surveys use national probability samples, 
which are designed to generate a sample that is a cross-sectional representation of all 
citizens of voting age in a given country. Every adult citizen has an equal chance of being 
selected for an interview. This is achieved by using random selection methods with a 
probability proportionate to the population size, to ensure that individuals in larger (i.e., 
more populated) geographic units have a proportionally greater probability of being 
chosen for the sample. A total of between 1,400 and 2,400 people in each country 
participate in these surveys, which are conducted using a structured questionnaire. The 
Afrobarometer survey data is freely available on the Afrobarometer website.  
The question I use for tax morale is where the respondents were told: “I am now 
going to ask you about a range of different actions that some people take. For the 
following, please tell me whether you think the action is not wrong at all, wrong but 
understandable, or wrong and punishable: not paying taxes owed to the government.” Of 
all the rounds of Afrobarometer data, only the Round 5 (R5) and Round 6 (R6) surveys 
included this exact question. Given that only two years separated the R5 and R6 surveys, 
I expected to find that the level of tax morale (based on the percentage of people who 
answered “wrong and punishable” in a country) in Malawi and all the other countries 
within these two rounds to be either comparable, or that it would be slightly higher for 
R6 than for R5. This is because the two surveys were conducted at a time of relatively 
fast economic growth, considerable growth in tax revenues, and less political turmoil and 
 
17See http://www.afrobarometer.org  
18 Important to note that the years when the survey is conducted usually overlap in a country hence a 
range of years shown. This does not mean the surveys take more than 1 year. Also, a survey round, such 
a R5 surveys, are not always conducted in the same year in different countries. Accordingly, 
Afrobarometer include all the years that they took to complete a round in all countries included in their 
surveys.  
19I was unable to create time series data by connecting different rounds. 
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conflict than in earlier decades, for most of the countries involved (Hong, 2015; World 
Bank, 2013). What I found was that the variation in tax morale (calculated as the 
percentage of people who answered “wrong and punishable” in R6 minus the percentage 
of people who answered “wrong and punishable in R5) in most countries between R5 and 
R6 ranged from -7% to +14% (Figure 4.1). However, in Malawi and Madagascar, the 
variation was 34% and 25% respectively. Figure 4.1 shows the absolute variation in tax 
morale between the two periods for each country.  
Figure 4. 1: Absolute percentage change in tax morale between R5 and R6 in 
different African countries  
 
Source: R5 and R6 Afrobarometer survey data, author’s own calculations  
 
Figure 4.1 shows that the increase in tax morale in Malawi and Madagascar was 
34% and 25% respectively, more than twice that of most countries. For instance, the value 
for Madagascar alone is almost twice that for the next country down in this scale 
(Tanzania).  
This huge variation in tax morale between R5 and R6 in Malawi and Madagascar 
raised the question of whether or not the Afrobarometer data is accurate and reliable 
considering that the two survey (R5 and R6) were conducted within two years of each 
hence the tax morale between the two rounds for each country was expected to be close 
to each other. In an attempt to understand what the problem with the data might be, I 
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conducted a plausibility check involving a review of the economic and political 
developments in all the countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer in R5 and R6 (Appendix 
4.1).  The results showed that the dramatic increase in tax morale in Malawi and 
Madagascar between R5 and R6 mirrored the prevailing economic and political situation 
at the time the surveys were conducted. In both Malawi and Madagascar, the R5 survey 
was conducted at a time of political and economic instabilities. In both countries, these 
instabilities included citizens protesting against the government and demanding the 
resignation of the president due to widespread corruption and poor governance; the 
withdrawal of donor support, which resulted in a shortage of various key products, such 
as fuel and food stuffs; and deterioration of government services, especially in health and 
education (Jackson, 2013; Ploch & Cook, 2012; Cammack, 2017; Dionne & Dulani, 
2013; Gabay, 2014). By contrast, in both Malawi and Madagascar, the R6 survey was 
conducted when the government had just changed (with a change in president) and the 
new administration was addressing most of the economic problems, such as shortage of 
fuel and food stuffs, and a large injection of international donor funds, which allowed the 
government to address most of the challenges it was facing, especially in health and 
education (Jackson, 2013; Ploch & Cook, 2012; Cammack, 2017; Dionne & Dulani, 
2013; Gabay, 2014). In general, during R6, there was jubilation in both Malawi and 
Madagascar as the political and economic situation was improving for the better.  It is, 
therefore, very likely that it is these two extremely different political and economic 
environments in which the R5 and R6 surveys were conducted that resulted in the tax 
morale being very low in R5 and very high in R6, thereby resulting in a significant 
variation in tax morale between the two surveys in Malawi and Madagascar. No other 
country included in the R5 and R6 Afrobarometer survey had such different political and 
economic environments when the two surveys were conducted.  
Considering that tax morale in R5 in Malawi and Madagascar was most likely  
abnormally low due to the prevailing political situation when the survey was conducted, 
and tax morale during R6 was most likely abnormally high due to the drastic change in 
the political environment, I found it reasonable to assume that the “real” tax morale for 
Malawi and Madagascar lies within the tax morale for R5 and R6. Accordingly, the 
merged data for R5 and R6 represents the “real” tax morale in the two countries in a stable 
environment. Accordingly, the comparison of tax morale for Malawi and other African 
countries was based on the merged data for R5 and R6.  
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The average tax morale value for all countries included in the survey was 47%, 
53%, and 51% for R5, R6 and the merged data respectively. However, the average tax 
morale values for Malawi for R5, R6, and the merged data were 28%, 62%, and 48% 
respectively. While the average tax morale values for Madagascar for R5, R6, and the 
merged data were 36%, 60%, and 51% respectively. Thus, based on the merged data, the 
tax morale for Malawi (which was 48%) is within the average range of tax morale for 
SSA countries (which was 51%). This finding suggests that Malawians are not any better, 
or more or less willing, taxpayers, when compared to people in other SSA countries. 
4.3 Second Analysis: Exploring Factors that Correlate with Tax Morale in Malawi 
and Other SSA Countries 
Given that I had access to original Afrobarometer survey data for individuals, it 
seemed worthwhile to investigate factors that correlate with that morale for individuals 
across all countries covered by Afrobarometer. The aim of this exercise was to find out 
whether there might or might not be something distinctive about Malawi taxpayers that 
will help to shed light on my broader research question of why tax revenue performance 
in Malawi is better than in most countries in SSA.  
4.3.1 Data 
The analysis is based on the merged Afrobarometer data for R5 and R6. However, for 
comparison purposes, R5 and R6 data was also used.  
4.3.2 Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable, tax morale, is based on the question: “I am now going 
to ask you about a range of different actions that some people take. For the following, 
please tell me whether you think the action is not wrong at all, wrong but understandable, 
or wrong and punishable: not paying taxes owed to the government.” 
Similar to other studies on tax morale (Fjeldstad, 2016; Ali, Fjeldstad & Sjursen, 
2013; Yesegat & Fjeldstad, 2016), an individual was considered to have a higher tax 
morale if their response was “wrong and punishable,” and a lower tax morale if their 
response was either “not wrong at all,” or “wrong but understandable.” I created a 
dummy variable, tax morale, where a value of “1” was given to those who answered 
“wrong and punishable,” and “0” otherwise. This binary classification of the responses 
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reflecting high and low tax morale is consistent with how other researchers in similar 
studies have analysed survey responses (Yesegat & Fjeldstad, 2016). In addition, the 
binary classification of responses makes it easy to visually compare the results in a table 
when data from different rounds (R5, R6, and the merged data for R5 and R6) is used. 
However, to test the robustness of this classification, an analysis of tax morale based on 
each of the three responses (“wrong and punishable,” “wrong but understandable,” and 
“not wrong at all”) was also undertaken. 
4.3.3 Independent Variables 
A number of factors that have an impact on tax morale have been identified in the 
literature (see Chapter 3). However, in this study, only those factors that data was 
available for were tested. Table 4.1 provides descriptions of the independent 
(explanatory) variables, used in the analysis.  
Table 4. 1: Description and measurement of independent variables  
Variable  Description  Measurement  
Deterrence 
(DETER) 
The factors relevant to the economic 
deterrence theory of tax morale. 
Respondents were asked a question about 
their perceptions of how easy or difficult it 
is to avoid paying income or property taxes 
that they owe the government.  
Responses ranged from 
0 = “not applicable” to 
4 = “very difficult.” 
Fiscal 
exchange 
(FISCAL) 
This captures people’s satisfaction with the 
government’s provision of goods and 
services. Respondents were asked about 
their satisfaction with the government’s 
Responses ranged from 
1 = “very satisfied” to 4 
= “not satisfied at all.” 
To prevent the problem 
of multicollinearity,20 
 
20 Multicollinearity is a phenomenon in which one independent variable, in a multiple regression model, 
can be linearly predicted from the others, with a substantial degree of accuracy. In this situation, the 
coefficient estimate of the multiple regression may change erratically in response to small changes in 
the model or the data. Multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model 
as a whole, at least within the sample data set; it only affects calculations regarding individual, 
independent variables. That is, a multivariate regression model with collinear, independent variables 
can indicate how well the entire bundle of independent variables predicts the outcome variable, but 
may not provide valid results about any individual predictor, or about which predictors are redundant 
(Chong and Jun, 2005) 
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Variable  Description  Measurement  
handling of health, education, and 
maintenance of roads and bridges. 
responses to these three 
questions were merged 
by taking a simple 
average to create a 
composite variable. 
Comparative 
treatment 
(COMP) 
This represents factors related to 
comparative treatment theory. Respondents 
were asked about how often people within 
their ethnic group were treated unfairly 
under the law. 
Responses ranged from 
1 = “never” to 4 = 
“always.” 
Trust 
(TRUST) 
This variable captures the degree of trust 
the respondent has in the tax 
administration. Respondents were asked 
about their perception of the 
trustworthiness of the tax administration. 
Responses ranged from 
0= “don’t trust at 
all” to 4 = “trust 
a lot.”  
 
Corruption 
(CORR) 
This represents the perception of 
corruption in the tax administration. 
Responses ranged from 
1 = “widespread” to 4 = 
“no corruption.” 
Democracy 
(DEMOC) 
Respondents were asked about their 
perception of how democratic their country 
is.  
Responses ranged from 
1= “very 
satisfied” to 5= 
“there is no 
democracy in 
this country.” 
Tax 
knowledge 
(TKNOW) 
Respondents were asked whether it is easy 
or difficult to know the taxes that they 
must pay. 
The responses ranged 
from 1 = “Very difficult” 
to 4 = “Very easy.” 
Age Age of respondent.  Age ranged from 18 to 
108. 
Female  Gender of respondent.  Dummy variable 
“FEMALE” was used, 
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Variable  Description  Measurement  
where a value of 1 if 
respondent is a woman, 
0 otherwise. 
Education 
(EDU) 
The highest level of education attained by 
the respondent. 
EDU ranges from 0 = 
“No formal education” 
to 9 = “Tertiary 
education.” 
Employment 
(EMP) 
Respondents were asked about their 
employment status.  
Dummy variable was 
created where “1” was 
given for respondents in 
full-time employment 
and “0” otherwise. 
Urban 
(URBAN) 
Where respondent lives; urban or rural 
area. 
Dummy variable taking 
a value of “1” for those 
who live in urban areas 
and “0” otherwise. 
Malawi  Malawi.  Dummy variable, 
taking a value of “1” if 
the country is Malawi, 
“0” otherwise. 
 
4.3.4 Method 
I used logit regression analysis to find the determinants of tax morale in Malawi 
and SSA, and the factors that drive it in that country. Logit regression analysis was used 
because the dependent variable, Tax Morale, takes only two values, “0” or “1”. Since the 
coefficients from the logit regression cannot be interpreted directly, marginal effects are 
presented. Marginal effects were interpreted just as is done under ordinal least squares 
regression (Wooldridge, 2003; Williams, 2006; Wolfe & Gould, 1998). The equation 
used in the analysis is presented below: 
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TMi = E0 + E1DETERi + E2FISCALi + E3COMPi + E4TRUSTi + E5CORRi + E6DEMOCi 
+ E7TKNOWi + E8FEMALEi + E11EDUi + E12AGEi + E13EMPi + E14URBANi +E15MW 
+ E16DETERiMW + E17FISCALi MW + E18TREATi MW + E19TRUSTiMW + 
E20CORRi MW + E21DEMOCi MW + E22TKNOWiMW + E23FEMALEi MW + 
E24EDUiMW + E25AGEi MW + E26EMPiMW + E27URBANi MW + Hi                                                                                 
(1) 
In Equation 1: TMi is the score for tax morale for a country; E is a vector of 
regression coefficients; H is the error term; DETER is deterrence factors; FISCAL is fiscal 
exchange factors; COMP is perception about the treatment of one’s ethnic group by the 
revenue authority; TRUST is level of trust in the revenue authority; CORR is perception 
of level of corruption in the revenue authority; DEMOC is level of democracy in the 
country; TKNOW is level of tax knowledge of the respondent; FEMALE is a dummy 
variable representing female; EDU is the highest education level attained by the 
respondent; AGE is the age of the respondent; EMP is the respondent’s employment 
status; URBAN is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for respondents in urban areas 
and 0 otherwise; MW is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for Malawi and 0 otherwise; 
DETERMW is an interaction term used to find the impact of DETER on tax morale in 
Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; FISCALMW is an interaction term used to 
find the impact of FISCAL on tax morale in Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; 
TREATMW is an interaction term used to find the impact of TREAT on tax morale in 
Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; TRUSTMW is an interaction term used to 
find the impact of TRUST on tax morale in Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; 
CORRMW is an interaction term used to find the impact of CORR on tax morale in 
Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; DEMOCMW is an interaction term used to 
find the impact of DEMOC on tax morale in Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; 
TKNOWMW is an interaction term used to find the impact of TKNOW on tax morale in 
Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; FEMALEMW is an interaction term used 
to find the impact of FEMALE on tax morale in Malawi compared to other countries in 
SSA; EDUMW is an interaction term used to find the impact of EDU on tax morale in 
Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; AGEMW is an interaction term used to find 
the impact of AGE on tax morale in Malawi compared to other countries in SSA; 
EMPMW is an interaction term used to find the impact of EMP on tax morale in Malawi 
compared to other countries in SSA; and URBANMW is an interaction term used to find 
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the impact of URBAN on tax morale in Malawi compared to other countries in SSA. The 
analysis is based on merged data for R5 and R6. However, R5 and R6 data was also used 
for comparative purposes.   
4.3.5 Empirical Results and Analysis  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
The descriptive statistics for the variables in Equation 1, for 34 SSA countries21 
(based on the merged data for R5 and R6) are presented in Appendix 4.4. The Pearson 
pairwise correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables used in this 
analysis are summarised in Table 4.2. Table 4.2 shows significant correlations (p < 0.01) 
between tax morale and all the independent variables included in Equation 1, with a 
stronger negative correlation between corruption and tax morale at -14 percentage points 
(i.e., a unit increase in corruption lowers tax morale by 14 percentage points).  
 
21 The countries included in the analyses are: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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T
able 4. 2: Pearson C
orrelation for D
ependent and Independent V
ariables  
V
ariable 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
TM
 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
D
ETER
 
0.14*** 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
FISC
A
L 
0.05*** 
0.07*** 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
O
M
P 
-0.03*** 
-0.07*** 
-0.19*** 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
TR
U
ST 
0.2*** 
0 
0.19*** 
-0.12** 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
O
R
R 
-0.14*** 
-0.03*** 
-0.05*** 
0.05*** 
-0.36*** 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
D
EM
O
C 
0.02*** 
0.02*** 
0.23*** 
-0.28*** 
0.14*** 
-0.12*** 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
TK
N
O
W
 
-0.03*** 
-0.43*** 
0.01* 
0.09*** 
0.11*** 
-0.02*** 
0.02*** 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
FEM
A
LE 
-0.02*** 
-0.02*** 
-0.06*** 
0.16*** 
0 
-0.08*** 
-0.13*** 
0.04*** 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
ED
U
 
-0.02*** 
0.05*** 
0.02*** 
0.03*** 
0 
-0.01*** 
-0.05*** 
-0.02*** 
0 
1 
  
  
  
  
A
G
E 
0.07*** 
0.05*** 
0.03*** 
0 
0.09*** 
0 
0.05*** 
0.07*** 
-0.08*** 
-0.15*** 
1 
  
  
  
U
R
BA
N
 
-0.05*** 
-0.23*** 
-0.09*** 
0.08*** 
-0.07*** 
0.06*** 
-0.02*** 
0.23*** 
0 
-0.05*** 
-0.07*** 
1 
  
  
EM
P 
-0.01*** 
0.04*** 
0.01*** 
0 
0.01** 
0.01 
0 
-0.06*** 
0 
0.29*** 
0 
-0.06*** 
1 
  
M
A
LA
W
I  
-0.12*** 
-0.32*** 
-0.10*** 
0.17 
0.00*** 
0.09*** 
-0.19*** 
0.2*** 
0.09*** 
-0.08*** 
-0.03*** 
0.21*** 
-0.01* 
1 
 N
otes: 
1. 
 TM
i  is the score for tax m
orale for a country; D
ETER
 is deterrence factors; FISC
A
L is fiscal exchange factors; C
O
M
P is perception about the treatm
ent of 
one’s ethnic group by the revenue authority; T
R
U
S
T
 is level of trust in the revenue authority; C
O
R
R
 is perception of level of corruption in the revenue 
authority; D
EM
O
C
 is level of dem
ocracy in the country; TK
N
O
W
 is level of tax know
ledge of the respondent; FEM
A
LE is a dum
m
y variable representing 
fem
ale; ED
U
 is highest education level attained by the respondent; A
G
E
 is the age of the respondent; E
M
P is the respondent’s em
ploym
ent status; U
R
B
A
N
 is 
a dum
m
y variable taking a value of 1 for respondents in urban areas and 0 otherw
ise.  
2. 
N
 = 61,300 for all variables. 
3. 
*Significant at .10 level; **Significant at .05 level; ***Significant at .01 level. 
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Logit Regression Results 
Equation l was estimated in STATA. Table 4.3 presents a summary of the binary 
logit estimation results for Equation 1, using data from R5, R6, and the merged data for 
the two. The standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
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Table 4. 3: Binary Logit Regression Results with Marginal Effects 
Variable R5 R6 Merged (R5+R6) 
Fiscal exchange (FISCAL) 0.012 0.008 0.021 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Deterrence (DETER) 0.026 0.029 0.046 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Comparative (COMP) -0.012 -0.008 0.015 
 (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Tax knowledge (TKNOW) 0.032 0.02 0.009 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Democracy (DEMOC) 0.025 0.021 -0.0399 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** 
Trust (TRUST) 0.021 0.04 0.085 
 (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** 
Corruption (CORR) -0.017 -0.012 -0.037 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Education  (EDU) 0.007 0.031 -0.033 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
Age (AGE) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Female (FEMALE) -0.018 -0.002 0.029 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** 
Urban (URBAN) 0.056 0.027 -0.016 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** 
Malawi (MW) -0.43 0.7 0.175 
 (0.095)*** (0.298)** -0.124 
FiscalMW 0.064 0.007 0.022 
 (0.014)*** -0.019 -0.021 
DeterrenceMW 0.024 -0.001 0.098 
 (0.015)* -0.021 (0.018)*** 
ComparativeMW -0.057 0.019 -0.092 
 (0.016)*** -0.018 (0.018)*** 
TaxknowMW 0.021 0.003 -0.117 
 -0.014 -0.022 (0.018)*** 
DemocracyMW 0.004 -0.033 0.096 
 -0.015 -0.022 (0.02)*** 
TrustMW -0.031 -0.025 0.132 
 (0.014)** -0.017 (0.016)*** 
CorruptionMW -0.029 0.028 -0.031 
 (0.016)* -0.019 (0.019)* 
EducationMW 0.025 -0.083 -0.004 
 (0.009)*** (0.023)** -0.022 
AgeMW 0 0 0 
 0 -0.001 (0.022)*** 
FemaleMW 0.049 -0.014 -0.184 
 (0.025)** -0.031 (0.028)*** 
UrbanMW -0.035 0.075 0.069 
 0.026 0.039* 0.038* 
Obs. 27,139 33,086 40,226 
 
Notes: 
1. * Significant at 0.1 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level, and *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
2. Dependent variable: tax morale; dummy taking the value of 1 if the individual thinks it is wrong 
and punishable not to pay taxes, 0 otherwise.  
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The results in Table 4.3 show that: 
1. When R5 data is used (second column) the coefficient for the Malawi dummy 
(MW) is significant and negatively correlated with tax morale. This indicates that 
tax morale in Malawi in R5 was lower than the average for SSA countries by 3.5 
percentage points. By contrast, the results of the regression when the R6 data is 
used (third column) show that MW is positively correlated with tax morale. This 
indicates that tax morale in Malawi in R6 was 7.5 percentage points higher than 
the average for SSA countries. However, when the merged data for R5 and R6 is 
used, the results show that MW is not significant. This indicates that tax morale 
in Malawi falls within the average range for countries in SSA. The statistical 
results from the merged data are in line with findings from the first analysis which 
was based on country average of tax morale, confirming that tax morale in Malawi 
is within the average for countries in SSA.  
2. It is also noted that when the coefficient for the Malawi dummy (MW) is 
significant and negative (R5, column two), the coefficients for four interaction 
terms –comparativeMW, trustMW, corruptionMW, and urbanMW – are also 
significant and negatively correlated with tax morale. Specifically, the average 
impact in SSA countries of a unit change in the perception that one’s ethnic group 
is not treated fairly is a six-percentage point reduction in tax morale. However, in 
Malawi the impact is a seven-percentage point reduction in tax morale (-0.012+(-
0.057)) (coefficient for comparative + coefficient for comparativeMW). The 
average impact in SSA of a unit change in trust in the tax authority in SSA is a 
two-percentage point increase in tax morale, whereas, in Malawi, it is a one 
percentage point decrease in tax morale (0.021+(-0.031)). The average impact in 
SSA of a unit change in perception about corruption among tax officials is a two-
percentage point reduction in tax morale in SSA, while the impact in Malawi is a 
one percentage point reduction (0.017+(-0.029)). These results suggest that the 
lower tax morale in Malawi during R5 was driven by a higher perception that 
one’s ethnic group is not treated fairly, a higher perception of corruption among 
tax officials, low trust in the tax administration, and low tax morale among 
individuals in urban areas. By contrast, when the coefficient for the Malawi 
dummy is significant and positive (when R6 data is used), the coefficient for two 
interaction terms – EducationMW and UrbanMW – are also significant. However, 
EducationMW has a negative coefficient, indicating that the impact of an increase 
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in the level of education on tax morale is lower in Malawi than the average for 
countries in SSA. In addition, people living in urban areas in Malawi had a higher 
tax morale compared to those living in rural areas, and their tax morale was higher 
than in the urban populations in other SSA countries. This suggests that the 
relatively high tax morale in Malawi in R6 was mainly driven by the high tax 
morale among the urban population.  
3. The results also show that all the independent variables included in the analysis 
are significant and the direction of the correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables is consistent with findings in other tax morale studies (as 
discussed in Chapter 3). For example, the results of the regression analysis using 
R6 data (third column), reveals the following: 
a. Positive correlation between tax morale and fiscal exchange. A unit 
increase in satisfaction with the government’s provision of education, 
health services, roads, and bridges increases tax morale by one percentage 
point. This is in line with the fiscal exchange theory. 
b. Positive correlation between tax morale and deterrence. A unit increase in 
a person’s perception that it is difficult to avoid paying income or property 
taxes that one owes to the government increases tax morale by three 
percentage points. This is in line with the deterrence theory of tax morale.  
c. Positive correlation between tax morale and comparative theory. A unit 
increase in a person’s perception that their ethnic group is unfairly treated 
by the government reduces the person’s tax morale by one percentage 
point. This is in line with the comparative treatment theory. 
d. Positive correlation between tax morale and tax knowledge. A unit 
increase in a person’s tax knowledge (TKNOW) increases tax morale by 
two percentage points. 
e. Positive correlation between tax morale and democracy. A unit increase in 
a person’s perception that the country is very democratic (DEMOC) 
increases tax morale by two percentage points. 
f. Positive correlation between tax morale and trust. A unit increase in a 
person’s trust in tax officials (TRUST) increases tax morale by four 
percentage points. 
g. Negative correlation between tax morale and corruption. A unit increase 
in a person’s perception that corruption is high among tax officials 
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(CORR) reduces tax morale by one percentage point.  
h. Positive correlation between tax morale and education. A unit increase in 
respondents’ highest level of education (EDU) increases tax morale by 
three percentage points. 
i. Positive correlation between tax morale and age. A unit increase in a 
person’s age (AGE) increases tax morale by less than one percentage 
point. 
j. Negative correlation between tax morale and female gender. Being female 
(FEMALE) reduces a person’s tax morale by three percentage points. 
k. Positive correlation between tax morale and urban location. Living in an 
urban area (URBAN) increases tax morale by three percentage points. 
In general, these findings are consistent with the findings of similar studies 
conducted in low-income and high-income countries (Yesegat & Fjeldstad, 2016; Alm, 
Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, 2006; Frey, 2003). These results are also consistent with 
the univariate findings reported in Table 4.2.  
Post-estimation Tests  
Once Model 1 had been estimated, the Wald test and the Hosmer–Lemeshow 
Goodness of Fit post-estimation tests were conducted.  
The Wald test is used to test the statistical significance of each coefficient (β) in 
a model (jointly or independently). If the coefficients are not significant, this suggests 
that removing them from the model will not substantially reduce the fit of the model 
(Agresti, 2003). The results of the Wald test on whether all the regressing coefficients are 
jointly zero (when R5, R6, and the merged data are used) show that the null hypothesis is 
rejected at a 1% level of significance (p-value = 0.000 in all regressions) (see Appendix 
4.5-4.7). This implies that all the variables included in the regression create a statistically 
significant improvement in the fit of the model.  
The Hosmer–Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test is similar to a chi-square test. It 
indicates the extent to which the model fits the data. The test compares observed and 
fitted frequencies using Pearson’s formula, and the Pearson chi-square is reported. If this 
test result is not statistically significant, then the null hypothesis – that there is no 
difference between the observed and model predicted values – cannot be rejected. The 
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results of the Hosmer–Lemeshow test showed that all the regressions have good fit (p-
value = 0.15, 0.44, and 0.18, respectively) (Appendix 4.8-4.10). 
Robustness Check 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the binary logit regression, where tax morale takes 
a value of “1” for individuals who responded that not paying taxes owed to the 
government is “wrong and punishable,” and “0” for those who responded “not wrong at 
all” or “wrong but understandable.” However, it is possible that individuals in the latter 
group might also have a high tax morale. Accordingly, another regression was estimated 
where the dependent variable, Tax Morale, took one of three possible values: 1 = “wrong 
and punishable,” 2 = “wrong but understandable,” or 3 = “not wrong at all.” The 
independent variables remained unchanged. Since the dependent variable has more than 
two responses, an ordered logit regression was used. The ordered logit model allows the 
analysis of responses to each category to be carried out separately (Williams, 2006; Wolfe 
& Gould, 1998). 
Appendix 4.11 shows the results of the ordered logit regression using the merged 
data for R5 and R6. The results are consistent with the findings of the binary logit 
regression presented in Table 4.3. Specifically, Appendix 4.11 shows that there is a 
positive correlation between tax morale and: fiscal exchange; deterrence; comparative 
theory; tax knowledge; democracy; trust; education; age; and urban. There is a negative 
correlation between tax morale and: corruption; and female. This shows that the results 
from the binary logit regression are robust.  
4.4. Third Analysis: Tax Morale Among Business People in Malawi 
4.4.1 Data 
This analysis draws on survey data that I collected from business people in 
Malawi. I conducted my own survey to capture additional variables not included in the 
Afrobarometer surveys. These were variables that would allow an exploration of the 
differences in tax morale among different groups of business people, such as businesses 
in different sectors, small and large businesses, formal and informal businesses, and 
businesses operating in different districts. In addition, I conducted my own survey 
because it was anticipated that this would reveal information about the relationship 
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between tax collectors and taxpayers that might be relevant to answering the main 
research questions of this thesis. In particular, I aimed to determine how often officers 
from the tax administration visit (for audit or other reasons) different taxpayers (small, 
medium, and large) and how these interactions impact the individual’s taxpaying attitudes 
and behaviour with regards to taxation in Malawi. I made use of the insights gained from 
conducting my own survey in my review of the tax administration in Malawi (see Chapter 
5).  
The survey was conducted in Lilongwe and Blantyre – the two major cities in 
Malawi. Both businesses that are registered with the tax administration, the Malawi 
Revenue Authority (referred to as ‘formal’ businesses) and those that are not registered 
with the tax administration (referred to as ‘informal’ businesses) participated in the 
survey. Informal businesses operate illegally in terms of tax payments, as all businesses 
in Malawi are required to register with the revenue authority if their annual return exceeds 
MK3 million (£3,000). Over 90% of the informal businesses have annual turnover in 
excess of MK3 million (£3,000). A structured questionnaire was used (Appendix 4.10). 
The questionnaire was developed based on standard questionnaires used in the literature 
(those used by the Afrobarometer and the World Value Surveys). The survey was 
conducted with the assistance of two officers from the Centre for Social Research (CSR)22 
and ten enumerators. All the enumerators were graduates of the University of Malawi, 
and some had conducted similar surveys for the CSR. The enumerators were trained for 
two days in all aspects of the survey, including project overview, review of survey 
objectives, interviewing techniques, field procedures, and all sections of the tax morale 
questionnaire. A pilot study was conducted, involving 40 formal and 20 informal 
businesses. Feedback on the pilot study informed the final questionnaire, and led to 
alterations (such as rephrasing, restructuring the format, deleting some questions, and 
introducing new questions) in 13 out of 32 questions. Preparation for the survey 
(including the development of the questionnaire, obtaining the taxpayer registry from the 
MRA, recruiting enumerators, training enumerators, and the pilot study) began in October 
2016. The final survey was conducted between 3 January and 7 February 2017. 
To sample businesses from the formal sector, taxpayer registration data obtained 
 
22A research institute based at the University of Malawi. Officers from CSR were specifically requested 
to assist in conducting the survey because they also conduct the Afrobarometer surveys in Malawi. 
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from the MRA was used.23 As of October 2016, the MRA taxpayer registry had 32,000 
taxpayers that had made a tax payment within the previous three years. These were the 
taxpayers that were targeted. Using the random function (RAND) in Excel, I randomly 
selected 300 businesses in each of the two districts (Blantyre and Lilongwe). Whenever 
a taxpayer refused to participate, additional taxpayers were randomly sampled. A total of 
178 taxpayers did not participate for various reasons (including the outright refusal to 
participate or giving an excuse as to why they could not participate). Consequently, 50 
taxpayers were additionally sampled, out of which 34 participated. The total number of 
formal taxpayers who participated in the survey was 456 from a sample of 650, 
representing a 70% participation rate. 
To sample informal businesses, I used clustered random sampling in which the 
two districts were subdivided into clusters. Lilongwe was subdivided into 36 clusters, and 
Blantyre was subdivided into 19 clusters. I then randomly selected 10 clusters in each 
district (using the RAND function in Excel) from which informal businesses were 
interviewed. Additionally, the enumerators randomly interviewed participants in the 
selected clusters, interviewing every seventh informal business that they came across on 
the predetermined path within a cluster. The target was to interview representatives of 15 
informal businesses in each cluster and 150 informal business in each district. I did not 
keep a record of the informal taxpayers who refused to participate, as enumerators simply 
moved to the next informal businesses without recording those who refused to participate. 
A total of 267 informal businesses participated in the survey. Appendix 4.11 provides 
more detail on the sampling method, how the survey was conducted, and data 
management procedures. 
Eighteen questionnaires were excluded from the analysis because they were 
incomplete (for example, the participant may have decided to stop the interview before 
completion, or the participant skipped many questions). Thus, 705 completed survey 
questionnaires remained, representing 254 informal and 451 formal businesses. 
4.4.2 Dependent Variables  
Similar to the first piece of analysis, in the survey, I asked respondents the 
question: “Please tell me whether you think the action taken by some business people is 
 
23  The MRA has details such as the name of the business owner, the trading name, business size, and 
contact details. 
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not wrong at all, wrong but understandable, or wrong and punishable: not paying taxes 
owed to the government.” An individual was considered to have a higher tax morale if 
their response was “wrong and punishable,” and lower if their response was either “not 
wrong at all,” or “wrong but understandable.” I created a dummy variable, tax morale, 
where a value of “1” was given to those who answered “wrong and punishable,” and “0” 
otherwise. Similarly, as with the second analysis, to test the robustness of this 
classification, an analysis of tax morale based on each of the three responses (“wrong 
and punishable,” “wrong but understandable,” and “not wrong at all”) was also 
undertaken. 
4.4.3 Independent Variables 
Table 4.4 provides details of the independent variables used in this analysis.  
Table 4. 4: Description and measurement of independent variables for the third 
piece of analysis  
Variable  Description  Measurement  
Deterrence 
(DETER) 
The respondents were asked to rank 
their agreement with the following 
statement: “The consequences of not 
paying taxes, such as penalties and 
garnishment imposed by the tax 
administration, are harsh enough to 
deter the non-payment of taxes.” 
Responses ranged from 
0 = “not applicable” to 
4 = “very difficult.” 
Fiscal exchange 
(FISCAL) 
Respondents were asked to rate their 
agreement with the statement: “I am 
satisfied with the level of goods (e.g., 
roads and bridges) and services (e.g., 
health and security) that I receive from 
the government.” 
Responses ranged from 
1 “Completely 
disagree” to 5 
“Completely agree.” 
 
Trust (TRUST) Respondent were asked to rate their 
agreement with the statement: “the 
Malawi Revenue Authority is 
trustworthy in its operations.” 
Responses ranged from 
1 “Completely 
disagree” to 5 
“Completely agree.”  
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Variable  Description  Measurement  
Corruption 
(CORR) 
Respondents were asked about the 
extent to which they agreed with the 
statement: “Most tax officials are not 
corrupt.” 
Responses ranged from 
1 = “Completely 
disagree” to 5 = 
“Completely agree.” 
Tax knowledge 
(TKNOW) 
There were four questions relating to 
business people’s knowledge of the tax 
system. The respondents were asked to 
state their level of agreement with the 
following statements: 
• “I am aware of my rights against 
unlawful search and seizure by 
the tax authority.”  
• “It is my right to claim a tax 
refund (if any) within specified 
timeframe.”  
• “It is my right to know the basis 
for assessment of my tax 
liability.”  
• “I am aware that I have certain 
rights if I have a problem with the 
tax office.” 
 
Responses ranged from 
1 = “Completely 
disagree” to 5 = 
“Completely agree.” To 
avoid multicollinearity 
in the statistical 
analyses, responses to 
these questions were 
merged (a simple 
average) to create a 
composite variable. 
Female  Gender of respondent.  Dummy variable 
“FEMALE” was used, 
where a value of 1 
represents female, 0 
otherwise. 
Large 
businesses 
(LARGE) 
Business size. Only two groups were 
created.  Large, being those with 
turnover of more than MK150 million 
(£150,000), and others (small and 
Dummy variable taking 
a value of “1” for large 
businesses and “0” for 
otherwise. 
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Variable  Description  Measurement  
medium where turnover is less than 
MK150 million).  
Formal 
(FORMAL)  
Registration status of respondent. Where 
formal means registered with the 
revenue authority and informal means 
not registered with the revenue 
authority.  
This is a dummy 
variable, taking the 
value of “1” for formal 
businesses, and “0” for 
informal. 
Blantyre (BT) The survey was conducted in Lilongwe 
and Blantyre.  
This is a dummy 
variable. It takes a 
value of “1” for 
respondents who live in 
Blantyre and “0” for 
those who live in  
Lilongwe. 
Blantyre (BT) The survey was conducted in Lilongwe 
and Blantyre.  
This is a dummy 
variable. It takes a 
value of “1” for 
respondents who live in 
Blantyre and “0” for 
those who live in  
Lilongwe. 
Accommodation 
(ACCOM) 
Classification of the business of the 
respondent.   
Dummy variable 
Taking a value of “1” 
for businesses in the 
food and 
accommodation 
industry, “0” otherwise. 
Construction 
(CONST) 
Classification of the business of the 
respondent.   
Taking a value of “1” 
for businesses in the 
food and 
accommodation 
industry, “0” otherwise. 
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Variable  Description  Measurement  
Transport 
(TRANS) 
Classification of the business of the 
respondent.   
Taking a value of “1” 
for businesses in the 
food and 
accommodation 
industry, “0” otherwise. 
Retail and 
wholesale 
(RETAIL) 
Classification of the business of the 
respondent.   
Taking a value of “1” 
for businesses in the 
food and 
accommodation 
industry, “0” otherwise. 
Manufacturing 
(MANUF) 
Classification of the business of the 
respondent.   
Taking a value of “1” 
for businesses in the 
food and 
accommodation 
industry, “0” otherwise. 
 
4.4.4 Method 
Similar to the second piece of analysis, I used logit regression analysis to find the 
determinants of tax morale among business people in Malawi.  The equation used in the 
analysis is presented below:  
TMy=E0 + E1DETER + E2FISCAL + E3CORR + E4TKNOW + E5FEMALE + E6BT + 
E7LARGE + E8FORMAL+ E9ACCOM + E10CONST + E11MANUF + E12RETAIL + H
 (2) 
In Equation 2, TMy is the score for tax morale for individual y,  E is a vector of 
regression coefficients, and H is the error term. TMi is the score for tax morale for an 
individual, E is a vector of regression coefficients, and H is the error term. DETER refers 
to deterrence factors; FISCAL refers to fiscal exchange factors; CORR is perception of 
level of corruption in the revenue authority; TKNOW is the respondent’s level of tax 
knowledge; FEMALE is a dummy variable representing female; BT is a dummy variable 
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taking a value of 1 if the respondent conducts their business in Blantyre, and 0 otherwise; 
LARGE is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the business is large; FORMAL is a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the business is registered with the revenue authority, 
0 otherwise; ACCOM is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the business is in 
accommodation services; CONST is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the business 
is in construction, 0 otherwise; MANUF is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
business is in manufacturing, 0 otherwise; RETAIL is a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 if the business is in wholesale and retail, 0 otherwise. My own survey data was used 
to estimate this equation. 
4.4.5 Empirical Results and Analysis  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation  
Appendix 4.12 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
analysis. The Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent 
variables in this analysis are summarised in Table 4.5. Table 4.5 shows that there are 
correlations between TM and some independent variables. Specifically: TM and DETER; 
TM and FISCAL; TM and CORR; TM and LARGE; and, TM and BT. However, no 
correlation was found between TM and TKNOW, or between TM and any of the various 
sectors of the economy (retail, manufacturing, construction, transport, and 
accommodation).  
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T
able 4. 5: Pearson C
orrelations for D
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1. 
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ST, construction. 
2. 
N
 = 704 for all variables 
3. 
*Significant at .10 level; **Significant at .05 level; ***Significant at .01 level.
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Logit Regression Results  
Logit regression was used to estimate Equation 2, using my own survey data. 
Table 4.6 presents a summary of the binary logit estimation.  
Table 4. 6: Binary Logistic Regression with Marginal Effects 
Variable  Model 1A Model 1B Model 2 
DETER 0.077 0.032 0.083 
 (0.019)*** (0.06)** (0.023)*** 
FISCAL 0.018 0.135 0.001 
 -0.012 0.044*** -0.013 
TKNOW -0.048 -0.048 -0.029 
 (0.024)** (0.063)** (0.021)*** 
CORR -0.032 -0.011 -0.041 
 (0.023)*** (0.06)*** (0.014)*** 
FEMALE 0.056 0.101 0.108 
 (0.046) (0.099) (0.056)* 
BT 0.12 0.203 0.17 
 (0.025)*** (0.122)* (0.048)*** 
LARGE 
  
0.07 
   (0.035)** 
FORMAL  
  
0.018 
   -0.064 
RETAIL  
  
0.051 
   -0.103 
MANUF 
  
0.082 
   -0.131 
ACCOM  
  
0.052 
   -0.103 
CONST 
  
-0.269 
   (0.123)** 
TRANS 
  
-0.051 
    -0.095 
Notes: 
1. Variable definitions: TC, tax compliance; DETER, economic deterrence; FISCAL, fiscal 
exchange; TKNOW, tax knowledge; FEMALE, female; URBAN, urban; LL, Lilongwe; 
CORR, corruption; BSIZE, business size; BT, Blantyre, REGIST, business registration status, 
RETAIL, retail; MANUF, manufacturing; ACCOM, food and accommodation; CONST, 
construction. 
2. *Significant at .10 level; ** Significant at .05 level; *** Significant at .01 level. 
3. Dependent variable= dummy taking a value of 1 if individual thinks it is wrong and punishable 
not to pay taxes, 0 otherwise. 
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In Table 4.6, Model 1A is an estimation of tax morale, using my own survey 
data. For comparative purposes, Model 1B is similar to 1A, but was estimated using the 
average of R5 and R6 Afrobarometer data for Malawi. Model 2 is an estimation of 
Equation 2, as presented in Section 4.4.4, using my own survey data. 
The results from Model 1A and 1B are broadly similar. The only difference is in 
the impact of fiscal exchange on tax morale, where FISCAL is not significant in Model 
1A, but positive and significant in Model 1B. In both models (1A and 1B), DETER is 
positively correlated with tax morale, TKNOW is negatively correlated with tax morale, 
corruption is negatively correlated with tax morale, and Blantyre is positively correlated 
with tax morale. These results suggest that DETER, CORR, TKNOW, and BT 
businesses are some of the key factors driving business people’s tax morale in Malawi. 
It can also be noted from Model 1A that DETER has the greatest impact on tax morale: 
a unit increase in DETER increases tax morale by eight percentage points, while a unit 
increase in tax knowledge and corruption decreases tax morale by five and three 
percentage points, respectively.  
In Model 2, in addition to the variables included in Model 1A (or 1B), variables 
capturing the perceptions of business people in various groups were also included. The 
results were as follows: 
a. Tax morale among large businesses (LARGE) is seven percentage points higher 
than tax morale among small or medium businesses. 
b. Businesses operating in Blantyre (BT) have a 17-percentage point higher tax 
morale than businesses operating in Lilongwe. 
c. Businesses in the construction sector (CONST) have a 27-percentage point 
lower tax morale than businesses operating in other sectors. 
d. No variation in tax morale was found between businesses in formal (FORMAL) 
and informal, retail (RETAIL) and other sectors, manufacturing (MANUF) and 
other sectors, accommodation (ACCOM) and other sectors, and transport 
(TRANS) and other sectors. 
Post-estimation Tests for Model 2 Regression  
As was the case with the first analysis, once Model 2 had been estimated, the 
 
 
 
79 
Wald test and the Hosmer–Lemeshow Goodness of Fit post-estimation tests were 
conducted. The results of the Wald test – all the regressing coefficients are jointly zero 
– show that the null hypothesis is rejected at a 1% level of significance (p-value = 0.000) 
(see Appendix 4.13). This implies that all the variables included in the regression create 
a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model. Similarly, the Hosmer–
Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test showed that the model has good fit (p-value = 0.1834) 
(see Appendix 4.14). 
Robustness Check 
Similar to the comparative analysis, to check the robustness of the binary results, 
the ordered logit regression was estimated to separately determine the tax morale of 
people who answered, “wrong and punishable,” “wrong but understandable,” and “not 
wrong at all.” Appendix 4.15 shows the results of the ordered logit regression. The 
results are consistent with the findings of the binary logit regression presented in Table 
4.5. Specifically, business people who perceive that they will be caught and punished 
for non-compliance were more likely to respond “wrong and punishable” than “wrong 
but understandable” or “not wrong at all.” Similarly, business people were less likely to 
respond “wrong and punishable” if they perceived that more tax officials are corrupt 
(more corrupt tax officials) than those who responded “wrong but understandable” or 
“not wrong at all.” 
4.5. Discussion  
Based on the country averages of tax morale, the first piece of analysis has 
shown that tax morale in Malawi is within the range for countries in SSA when the 
merged data for R5 and R6 is used.  
Similarly, the results of the second piece of analysis using R5, R6, and the 
merged data for R5 and R6, showed that when R5 data was used, tax morale in Malawi 
is significantly lower than the average for SSA countries. The results of the regression 
when R6 data was used showed that tax morale in Malawi is significantly higher than 
the average for SSA countries. The results of the regression when the merged data for 
R5 and R6 was used showed that tax morale in Malawi is within the range for SSA 
countries. Based on the understanding that it is reasonable to believe that the results of 
the regression when the merged data was used are closer to representing the tax morale 
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in Malawi during a stable economic and political environment, these results show that 
tax morale in Malawi is within the range for SSA countries.  Another important finding 
from the second piece of analysis was the various factors included in the model have an 
impact on tax morale in SSA. However, people’s perception of corruption in the revenue 
authority, people’s perception of being found and punished for non-compliance 
(DETER), and people’s knowledge of the tax system (TKNOW) have a bigger impact 
on tax morale in Malawi compared to other SSA countries. 
The results of the third piece of analysis, the analysis of business people’s tax 
morale in Malawi, showed that the tax morale in Malawi is significantly higher among 
large businesses compared to small or medium-size businesses, and is higher for 
businesses operating in Blantyre compared to business operating in Lilongwe. However, 
businesses in the construction sector showed a lower tax morale compared to those in 
other sectors. The fact that large businesses in Malawi have a higher tax morale than 
small or medium-size businesses suggests that, although tax morale in Malawi is not 
higher than the average for SSA countries, the high tax morale among large taxpayers 
in Malawi and businesses operating in Blantyre may be translating to higher tax 
payments. This may partly explain the good tax revenue collection in Malawi.  
It is surprising to find that business people operating in the district of Lilongwe 
have different levels of tax morale to those operating in Blantyre, considering that 
businesses in both areas are subject to a similar tax system. A possible explanation for 
the difference in tax morale between Lilongwe and Blantyre business people may be 
political affiliation and/or the lower visibility of MRA officers in Lilongwe compared 
to Blantyre. In terms of political affiliation, Malawi has two dominant political parties, 
the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The 
MCP is the most popular party in the central region, where Lilongwe is located, and the 
DPP is the most popular party in the southern region, where Blantyre is located. The 
DPP is currently the ruling party, winning the 2014 presidential election by a narrow 
margin (Patel & Wahman, 2015). Thus, it is possible that a large proportion of people 
in Lilongwe, who are mostly strong supporters of the MCP, have lower tax morale as a 
form of protest against a DPP government. In terms of higher visibility of MRA officers 
in Blantyre, the MRA headquarters are located in Blantyre, which may account for the 
difference in visibility of its officers compared to Lilongwe. The high number of officers 
in Blantyre may create a perception that taxpayers are being watched more closely. 
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Alternatively, due to the high number of officers in Blantyre, there may be more frequent 
interaction between MRA officers and taxpayers through random taxpayer visits or tax 
audits, which may also increase tax morale.  
It is also surprising to find that businesses in the construction sector have lower 
tax morale than those in other sectors, considering that there is no variation in the level 
of tax morale between businesses in retail or manufacturing and other sectors. One 
possible explanation for this is that businesses in the construction sector are not closely 
monitored by the revenue authority, as is the case with retailers and manufacturers. 
Although all businesses in Malawi with an annual turnover of MK10 million (£10,000) 
operate electronic fiscal devices (EFDs) to account for VAT sales, businesses in retail 
and manufacturing are closely monitored (e.g., with random checks and mystery 
shopper programmes) to check if these EFD devices are being used with each customer. 
By contrast, businesses in the construction sector are not closely monitored because their 
sales transactions are less frequent. 
4.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has presented the results of three pieces of analyses conducted to 
explore tax morale in Malawi. The aims of this chapter were to: determine if Malawians 
are any more or less willing taxpayers than the people in other SSA countries; determine 
the drives of Malawians willingness to pay taxes; and to explore tax morale among 
business people in Malawi in order to shed light on which of the different business 
groups are contributing to the good tax revenue performance in Malawi. 
The three analyses conducted in this chapter were based on perception survey 
data from the R5 and R6 Afrobarometer surveys, and my own survey data. Both the 
Afrobarometer surveys and my survey included a series of theoretically rooted questions 
centred around individuals’ and business people’s attitudes towards taxation and tax 
morale. The key conclusions drawn from the three analyses presented in this chapter are 
as follows:  
First, Malawians are not any more or less willing taxpayers than the populations 
in other SSA countries.  
Second, the second and third pieces of analyses provide robust results supporting 
the following theoretically grounded determinants of tax morale: 
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1. Deterrence and enforcement: taxpayers have higher tax morale when they 
perceive that they will be caught and punished for evading taxes. This is in line 
with the deterrence theory of tax morale. 
2. Fiscal exchange: there is also evidence supporting the idea that individuals and 
businesses that are more satisfied with public service provisions, such as health 
and education, have higher tax morale.  
3. Comparative treatment: it was found that when individuals perceive that they are 
treated fairly, tax morale increases. 
4. Corruption: the analyses revealed evidence that an increase in the perception that 
there is high corruption among tax officials reduces tax morale among 
individuals and businesses. 
5. Tax knowledge: evidence suggested that individuals and businesses that are 
knowledgeable about tax issues have lower tax morale. 
Third, this chapter has shown that, despite the fact that tax morale in Malawi 
does not differ significantly from other SSA countries, within the business community, 
there are certain groups of taxpayers with a higher tax morale. Specifically, businesses 
operating in Blantyre have higher tax morale than businesses operating in Lilongwe, 
and large businesses have higher tax morale than small or medium-size businesses. 
These groups of taxpayers may be partly contributing to the overall good tax revenue 
performance in Malawi. This conclusion is drawn while being mindful of the fact that 
tax morale relates to people’s attitudes and not their behaviour. Thus, while studying tax 
morale can reveal factors that may improve an individual’s morale, the extent to which 
that morale (attitude) translates into tax compliance (behaviour) remains unknown. 
Finally, this chapter has shown that it is difficult to study tax morale in any 
meaningful way when using survey data. This is because survey data is cross-sectional 
(i.e., it measures individuals’ attitudes at a given point in time). However, an 
individual’s attitude at any given time is influenced by several factors and may not be 
reflective of their attitude over time. For example, had the first and second piece of 
analysis been based solely on the R5 Afrobarometer survey, the conclusion would have 
been that tax morale in Malawi is lower than the average for other SSA countries. On 
the other hand, had the analysis been based solely on the R6 Afrobarometer survey, the 
conclusion would have been the opposite. It was only because data from both periods 
(R5 and R6) was used, and further investigation was carried out on why the tax morale 
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for these two periods differed significantly, that I was able to determine whether the R5 
and R6 results reflected the actual tax morale in Malawi under normal circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
Chapter 5: Assessing the Performance of the Malawi 
Revenue Authority 
5.1 Introduction  
Tax administration plays an important role in ensuring that there is sufficient 
revenue for the smooth operation of the government. Tax administration involves the 
management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execution and application of a 
country’s tax law, tax legislation, and related statutes (Devas, Delay, & Hubbard, 2001). 
The core functions of a tax administration include, inter alia (Alink & Van Kommer, 
2016; Kidd, 2010): 
1. registration of taxpayers, including detection of non-registration and false 
registration;  
2. assessment, billing and collection of taxes; 
3. processing of tax returns, withholdings, and third-party information; 
4. verification or examination of the correctness and completeness of the received 
information (including audit activities);  
5. the process of enforced debt collection;  
6. handling of administrative appeals and complaints; 
7. provision of services and assistance to taxpayers; 
8. detection and prosecution of tax fraud; and  
9. internal anti-corruption.  
As highlighted in Chapter 2, tax administration in Malawi is the responsibility 
of the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA). Specifically, the MRA is responsible for the 
assessment, collection, enforcement, and accounting of tax revenues. It is governed by 
a board of directors and supervised by the Ministry of Finance. A Commissioner General 
heads the institution and is assisted by a management team comprising a Deputy 
Commissioner General, two commissioners (who are responsible for domestic taxes and 
customs and excise), seven directors, and three deputy directors (see Appendix 2.1 for 
an MRA organogram). When the MRA was formed in 2000, it was internally structured 
according to the tax type. However, this resulted in the duplication of work. 
Accordingly, in 2009, the structural arrangement was changed subsequently being based 
on function and taxpayer segment. At the beginning of the 2017/2018 fiscal year, the 
 
 
 
85 
MRA had 1,450 staff members and an operating budget of MK27 billion (£27 million) 
(3% of the MRA’s annual tax revenue collection).  
Mascagni, Moore and McCluskey (2014) suggest that the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a tax administration in undertaking its functions (i.e., process 
performance) is one of the contributing factors to low revenue collection in low-income 
countries compared to high-income countries. However, when judged by the standard 
criteria for effective tax administration, as done under the Tax Administration 
Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT) (TADAT Secretariat, 2015a), the MRA appears 
to perform very poorly, even by the standards of low-income countries. These 
observations are in tension with the facts that the Malawi Revenue Authority (a) is rather 
effective at capturing a relatively high proportion of GDP in tax (Chapter 2), and (b) 
collects a high proportion of that through what is normally seen as a very challenging 
channel, i.e. direct taxes on corporate profits (CIT) and on employment income (PIT) 
(Chapter 6). Accordingly, the question explored in this chapter is: to what extent do the 
tax administration processes followed by the Malawi Revenue Authority affect the level 
of tax revenue collection and structure of the tax system in Malawi? I explore this issue 
by examining the MRA’s process performance in four out of the nine areas assessed 
under TADAT, namely:  
1. Taxpayer registration and data management 
2. Detection and prosecution of tax fraud through tax audit 
3. Handling of administrative appeals and complaints through a dispute resolution 
process 
4. Provision of services and assistance to taxpayers, such as taxpayer education 
     The analysis is based on qualitative data collected through semi-structured 
interviews conducted with MRA officials, analysis of MRA documents (such as Annual 
Reports, Strategic Frameworks, and Management Reports), the TADAT report for 
Malawi, and information that I collected from carrying out a survey of business people 
in Malawi (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
      The main finding of this analysis is that the apparent paradox – the poor 
performance of the MRA even by the standards of low-income countries on one side, 
and the institution’s effectiveness at capturing a relatively high proportion of GDP in 
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tax and collection of a high proportion of direct taxes on CIT and PIT on the other – is 
largely explained by the relative efficiency of the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU). The LTU 
is responsible for administrating only 2% of total taxpayers yet collects 70% of total tax 
revenues. However, the LTU itself is not well-equipped from a technological 
perspective. It relies heavily on some very basic software for recording taxpayer 
information. However, the LTU staff interact closely with the staff of large companies 
and understand their clients’ businesses well. This has enabled the LTU to collect 
significant revenues from the large taxpayers. This brings me to a set of issues explored 
further in Chapter 6: the long-standing economic dominance in the Malawian economy 
of a few large firms; and the fact that, unlike in many countries, those firms have been 
unable to use their economic dominance to avoid taxes on a large scale.  
       The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 is a literature 
review focusing on the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT), the 
main tool used to evaluate tax administration performance in low income countries. 
Section 3 covers the methodology and analysis of the study findings. This section 
explains how the data used in the analysis was collected, and the findings for each of 
the four areas the MRA was assessed on. Section 4 is a discussion of the findings, and 
Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Assessing Tax Administration Performance in Low-Income Countries   
In many countries, performance measurement has become one of the symbols of 
the transformation of governance (Le Galès, 2016). Davis, Fisher, Kingsbury, and 
Merry (2012) point out that there has been a proliferation in the use of indicators as 
policy instruments with various institutions (international development agencies such 
as the World Bank and the UN, national governmental aid agencies such as US 
governments Millennium challenge corporation, and global businesses and investors). 
One area in which there has been a development of performance measures is on tax 
administration. Since 2015, the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool 
(TADAT) has been widely used as a tax administration performance measurement tool, 
especially in low-income countries. TADAT is not public and has no simple aggregate 
measure attached to it. However, there are other public and simple tools which are used 
to assess the tax administration performance. These include the following: 
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1. The public expenditure and finance accountability (PEFA) on which the 
TADAT was based. Using PEFA, a tax administration is assessed on the 
following aspects: the aggregate revenue outturn, which captures only negative 
variations and measures forecasting accuracy but does not identify the reasons 
why the forecasts might be inaccurate; the clarity and comprehensiveness of 
legislation and procedures; taxpayers’ access to information, existence and 
functioning of an appeal mechanism; taxpayer registration, penalties for non-
registration and non-filing, and planning and monitoring for audits and 
investigations; arrears and the collection ratio, the effectiveness of transfers to 
the treasury, and the frequency of reconciliations. 
2. The OECD’s comparative information series, which covers the following: 
institutional and organizational arrangements for tax administration operations; 
the description of management practices; a comparison of the tax filing and 
payment obligations for the major taxes (PIT, CIT and VAT); a summary of 
selected administrative powers given to revenue bodies to carry out their 
mandate; a comparison of the country’s tax burdens.  
3. The International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA), which is an 
extension of the OECD’s comparative information series. It comprises a survey 
to collect tax administration data from national or federal tax administrations. It 
surveys tax administration operations and other characteristics based on 
common questions and definitions agreed by four partner organizations: The 
Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT), the IMF, the Intra-
European Organisation of Tax Administrations (IOTA), and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The survey collects 
information in three areas of tax administration: (1) performance-related data, 
(2) profile data, and (3) data on administrative and operational practices. A 
country’s participation in this survey is voluntary. One key limitation of ISORA 
is that it uses an online data collection platform. No verification regarding the 
accuracy of the available information is conducted.  
The pioneering efforts of the TADAT Secretariat to collect comparative 
information about tax administrations in low-income countries has already started to 
bring positive change (Adam Smith International, 2018), and recent empirical studies 
on tax administration process performance in low-income countries are already drawing 
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on this new database (Moore & Wilson, 2017; Bogere, 2018). As it is the most 
comprehensive and widely used tool to assess tax administration performance in low-
income countries, this review of tax administration performance in low-income 
countries will focus on TADAT.   
5.2.1 TADAT Overview 
TADAT is a standardised approach to diagnosing tax administration 
performance that pinpoints the relative strengths and weaknesses of a country’s tax 
administration (TADAT Secretariat, 2015b). TADAT focuses on nine key performance 
outcome areas (POAs), which cover most of the functions, processes, and institutions 
of tax administration (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5. 1: TADAT Performance Outcome Areas 
 
Source: TADAT Secretariat (2015) 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the nine POAs are: integrity of registered taxpayer base, 
effective risk management, supporting voluntary compliance, timely filing of tax 
declarations, timely payment of taxes, accurate reporting in declaration, effective tax 
dispute resolution, efficient revenue management, and accountability and transparency. 
The TADAT framework has a hierarchical, pyramid-style format (Figure 5.2): 
Figure 5. 2: TADAT Framework 
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Source: Author’s own depiction 
Figure 5.2 shows that at the apex of the TADAT framework are the nine POAs. 
Based on these outcomes, the level of maturity of a tax administration system, in the 
context of international good practice, is ascertained. The POAs are linked (at the 
second level) to 28 high-level ‘indicators’ that are critical to tax administration 
performance. The 28 indicators are then linked to 47 measurable dimensions (third 
level), with detailed assessment criteria, that form the basis of evaluating the 
performance of the system of tax administration (see Appendix 5.1 for detailed 
information on the high-level indicators and the dimensions). A four-point ABCD scale 
is used to score each dimension and indicator, and scores are consolidated from the 
dimension to the indicator level. The POAs themselves are not scored. The scoring 
criteria for each indicator, and the methodology used to calculate the dimension scores, 
are detailed in the TADAT Field Guide (TADAT Secretariat, 2015b), as follows:  
A- Denotes performance that meets or exceeds international good practice. For 
TADAT purposes, good practice is taken to be a tested and proven approach 
applied by a majority of leading tax administrations. It should be noted, however, 
that a process does not need to be at the forefront of technological advancement 
to be considered good practice. Given the dynamic nature of tax administration, 
good practice – described throughout the field guide – can be expected to evolve 
over time, as technological advances and innovative approaches are tested and 
gain wider acceptance. 
B- Represents sound performance (i.e., a healthy performance but below the level 
of international good practice). 
C- Denotes weak performance, relative to good practice.  
D- Denotes inadequate performance and is applied when the requirements for a C 
POA 
(9 in 
total )
High level 
indicator
(28 in total) 
Measurable dimenstions 
(47 in total) 
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rating or higher are not met. Furthermore, a D score is given in certain situations 
where there is insufficient information available to assessors to determine and 
score the level of performance (e.g., in areas of filing, payment, and refund 
processing). The underlying rationale is that the inability of the tax 
administration to provide the required data is indicative of deficiencies in its 
information management system and performance monitoring practices. 
5.2.2 TADAT Assessment Procedure  
 
The TADAT manual (TADAT Secretariat, 2019) states that TADAT 
assessments are usually initiated by either a country’s Ministry of Finance or tax 
administration, or by international/regional agencies (e.g. African Development Bank, 
African Tax Administration Forum, Asian Development Bank, European Commission, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Inter-American Development Bank, and World 
Bank). The TADAT assessments are conducted by an assessment team typically 
comprising 3–4 trained assessors. The analysis is conducted in four (4) phases. The first 
phase is when a formal request from the country authorities is made to the sponsoring 
organisation (e.g. IMF, World Bank), or directly to the TADAT secretariat. The letter 
indicates the desired timing of the assessment. The second phase is the assessment 
team’s planning and preparation phase. The third phase constitutes the in-country 
assessment. The critical work of a TADAT assessment occurs during the third phase, 
which typically takes 2–3 weeks before the preliminary report is produced. The key 
tasks conducted during this phase include the following: 
1. An opening meeting with the minister (if appropriate) and the head and senior 
management team of the tax administration. The aim of this meeting is to (1) 
acquaint the senior officials with the objectives, processes, and outputs of the 
TADAT diagnostic approach (this may entail a short presentation of the TADAT 
framework), (2) discuss the assessment team’s work program; and (3) respond 
to questions and issues raised.  
2. A series of meetings with tax officials. The aim of these meetings is to gather 
information and evidence regarding each indicator and measurement dimension. 
In conducting these meetings, the assessors use the checklists of questions and 
examples of evidence set out in the field guide. Follow-up meetings, including 
the validation of evidence, may also be conducted. 
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3. A walkthrough of the work processes of operational/field offices, including the 
large taxpayer office. 
4. Scoring each dimension and indicator based on an analysis of the evidence 
gathered. Each dimension is scored based on the following key questions: 
a. What is the TADAT’s good practice standard or criterion?  
b. Who, at the tax administration’s head office, is accountable for 
communicating the good practice standard, its implementation, and the 
related monitoring of performance?  
c. Are the tax administration’s documented and approved standard 
operating rules, instructions, processes or procedures consistent with the 
good practice standard?  
d. Is the good practice standard implemented uniformly across the tax 
administration as a whole, and not selectively or in a fragmented 
manner? 
e. Did the tax administration provide or allow access to the good practice 
standard monitoring and impact analysis reports?  
The fourth phase is the post-assessment phase. The TADAT report produced in 
phase three is finalised during this phase. 
5.2.3 Summary of the TADAT Assessment Results 
As of January 2019, 63 assessments had been conducted using TADAT. Out of 
the 63 assessments, 14 assessment reports are freely available on the TADAT Secretariat 
website.24  The TADAT reports are confidential and are only published on the TADAT 
Secretariat website with consent from the government concerned.25 Appendix 5.2 is a 
summary of the results of the 14 published and available TADAT assessment reports. 
As Moore and Prichard (2017) observe, if one assumes that the available reports cover 
a representative sample of countries, the results of the assessments, overall, show the 
following: 
1. Tax administration performance in many low-income countries is poor, as the 
 
24 http://www.tadat.org  
25 Countries with their TADAT assessment report published on the TADAT website are: Alagoas (State 
of Alagoas, Brazil), Armenia, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Guatemala, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Peru, 
Reo de Jeneiro, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, and Zambia. A TADAT assessment was also conducted in 
Malawi. 
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scores given by assessors are generally low. Overall, the score allocation is as 
follows: A – 15%; B – 15%; C – 32%; and D – 38%. Peru has the strongest 
performance, receiving an A for 15 of the 28 items. No other country, out of the 
14 available reports, received an A rating for more than six items. Liberia, 
Trinidad, Tobago, and Burkina Faso show the poorest scores, receiving a D for 
19, 18, and 18 of the 28 items, respectively. Malawi was assessed on 25 items 
(instead of 28) and received Ds for 19 of the items assessed (see Appendix 5.2). 
2. The digital management and accounting tools that are available to tax authorities 
are often underutilised.  Comparing the scores for ‘use of electronic filing 
facilities’ and ‘use of electronic payment methods’ with the scores for ‘adequacy 
of the tax revenue accounting system’ for the 14 countries, out of the 28 scores 
for ‘use of electronic filing facilities’ and ‘use of electronic payment methods’: 
50% are As; 7% are Bs; 21% are Cs; and 21% are Ds. By contrast, out of the 14 
scores for ‘adequacy of the tax revenue accounting system’: 7% are As; 0% are 
Bs; 57% are Cs; and 36% are Ds.  
Malawi had a TADAT assessment in 2015. Although the authorities have not 
consented for the assessment report to be published on the TADAT website, the recently 
published Development Finance Assessment for Malawi (Besharati & Loga, 2018) 
contains the results of the assessment. The results show that the MRA’s performance is 
very poor. The MRA scored a D in 19 out of the 25 indicators on which it was assessed. 
This result is surprising considering that the tax-to-GDP ratio for Malawi has been 
increasing since the MRA started operating in 2000. Since tax administration plays a 
key role in tax revenue collection performance, as argued by Bird et al. (2008), one 
would expect the increase in tax revenue in Malawi, especially that between 2005 and 
2011, to be associated with good tax administration process performance. Based on the 
TADAT results, this does not appear to be the case for Malawi. Thus, this chapter will 
attempt to understand why Malawi has a high tax revenue performance compared to 
other SSA countries despite the lack of efficiency and effectiveness in its tax 
administration.   
5.2.4 Benefits and Limitations of TADAT 
I note that the key benefits of TADAT are that:  
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1. It provides a benchmark from which a revenue authority can set targets for 
improvement. 
2. The results of the assessment can be used to facilitate a shared view on the 
condition of the system of tax administration among stakeholders (country 
authorities, international organisations, donor countries, and technical assistance 
providers). 
3. It can help to monitor and evaluate reform progress by way of subsequent repeat 
assessments. 
TADAT has at least three limitations: 
1. TADAT does not offer solutions to challenges or weaknesses it identifies. The 
TADAT approach only provides an indication of how the country’s 
administration deviates from what seems to be best practice, but does not provide 
ways of solving those problems.  
2. TADAT assessments are standardised, which means all tax administrations are 
assessed using similar criteria. The challenge with the standardised approach is 
that how a tax administration performs in practice largely reflects several 
underlying determinant factors. These include the context of tax administration 
within the public sector, the economic environment (e.g., the size of the informal 
sector), the political environment (e.g., the degree of support for effective 
enforcement), the legal and regulatory framework, and the managerial system of 
the tax administration. Thus, simply assessing performance in specified 
institutional activities, and then comparing that performance to some 
subjectively established goal, does not provide a meaningful basis for diagnosing 
the problems with any particular administration, unless one also considers the 
environment in which the administration functions.  
3. In some cases (as is the case of Malawi), high or low TADAT indicator scores 
do not correlate closely with tax revenue collection outcomes. Out of the 14 
published TADAT reports, Malawi has the lowest scores for all indicators, yet 
its tax revenue collection performance is relatively good.  
These limitations do not mean that TADAT is not a useful tool. Rather, they 
indicate that TADAT assessment reports must be interpreted with these limitations in 
mind.  
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5.3 Methodology  
As indicated in the introduction, this analysis assesses the MRA’s performance 
in four areas (taxpayer registration and data management, detection and prosecution of 
tax fraud, handling of administrative appeals and complaints, and provision of services 
and assistance to taxpayers). Only four of the nine POAs assessed in TADAT are 
assessed in this study, due to limited access to taxpayer information from the MRA. I 
was only granted access to aggregate taxpayer data (such as how much tax is collected 
from taxpayers classified as large) and not disaggregated taxpayer data (such as how 
much each of the taxpayers classified as large pays in a year). Under Malawian law, 
only tax officers have access to disaggregated taxpayer data (Section 6 (2), Malawi 
Taxation Act, 2006). I was therefore unable to have access to data related to some POAs, 
such as timely filing of tax returns, timely payment of taxes, and accurate reporting in 
declaration. Assessing the MRA’s performance in fulfilling these functions would have 
required accessing individual taxpayer details. Nevertheless, the four functions analysed 
have been identified in the literature as being among the most important activities 
undertaken by a tax administration, if it is to be effective in raising revenue (Kidd, 2010; 
Ter-Minassian, 1997). 
The analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of the MRA in carrying out its 
functions is based on both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected 
between October 2016 and April 2017 using semi-structured interviews (17 in total) 
with MRA officers, and a survey of business people that I conducted (see Chapter 5). 
From the MRA, interviews were conducted with the Commissioner General, the 
Commissioner for Domestic Taxes, the Deputy Commissioner for Domestic Taxes, 
technical staff in the Domestic Taxes Division (Technical Unit, Modernisation Unit, 
Large Taxpayer Unit, and Audit Unit), staff in the Policy Planning and Research 
Department, and staff in Taxpayer Education Services. Information from taxpayers was 
used to cross-check the information provided by MRA officers, as well as the 
information in various documents. Secondary data was obtained from the MRA’s 
corporate plan, Acts (Taxation Act, Customs and Excise Act, Value Added Act, and 
MRA Act), and MRA documents (Annual Reports, Strategic Plans). This information 
was used as a reference to verify whether what happens on the ground is in line with 
what is specified in law.  
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5.4 Findings   
5.4.1 Tax Registration and Data Management 
Registration of taxpayers and management of the taxpayer registry underpins 
key administrative processes, such as filing, payment, assessment, and collection of 
taxes (Brondolo & Zhang, 2016). Thus, one of the most important functions of any 
revenue administration is to identify potential taxpayers, register them, and properly 
manage the collected information for easy access and use. 
Registration 
Anyone operating a business in Malawi is required to register with the MRA for 
tax purposes, either under the standard income tax regime26 or the turnover tax regime.27 
Businesses whose annual gross income is below MK10 million (£10,000) are registered 
under the turnover tax regime, while those whose annual gross income exceeds MK10 
million are registered under the standard scheme.28 Taxpayers in the standard regime 
are further classified as either small, medium, or large.29 A special department known 
as the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) within the Domestic Revenue Department manages 
large taxpayers. Initially, a business chooses the type of taxes to register for. Individuals 
operating a business that is not incorporated register for personal income tax (PIT) and 
‘Pay As You Earn’ (PAYE) for their employees. Unincorporated businesses may also 
register for withholding tax (WHT),30 value added tax (VAT), or excise tax, depending 
 
26 Businesses registered under the standard income tax regime are required to keep books of 
accounts, submit tax returns, and pay income tax at the rate of 30% on profits.  
27 Businesses registered under the turnover regime pay 2% income tax on their gross income. They are 
not required to submit detailed books of accounts.  
28 In principle, business registered under the turnover tax regime are graduated to the standard 
regime by the MRA once their annual turnover exceeds the threshold.  
29 The MRA classifies taxpayers as large, medium, and small. To qualify as a large taxpayer, either of 
the following conditions have to be met: a) have annual turnover of at least MK750 million (£750,000), 
b) paying cumulative taxes (Excise Tax, PAYE, Corporate Tax, VAT, etc.) of over MK450 million 
(£450,000) or above per annum, c) importing goods valued at MK750 million or above per annum, d) 
operating in a financial or mining sector, e) being an operator of Excise Tax, f) being an associated or 
related company whose parent company is a large taxpayer. Medium taxpayers are businesses whose 
annual turnover is between MK150 million (£150,000) and MK750 million (£750,000), while small 
taxpayers are those whose annual turnover is less than MK150 million.  
30 Withholding tax is an advance payment of income tax that is deducted from specified payments. 
The person making the payment deducts the tax. Any individual, partnership, trust, association, 
company, club, statutory body, council, government ministry or department, or any religious 
organisation, as long as it makes payments to any person, is eligible to register with the MRA and 
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on their turnover and the type of business they undertake.31 Incorporated businesses are 
registered for corporate income tax (CIT), PAYE, WHT, and VAT. They may also 
register for excise tax if they are supplying excisable goods.  
In 2010, the MRA embarked on a project to register as many taxpayers as 
possible under the turnover tax regime. Over 200 temporary officers were hired to 
identify and register potential taxpayers. The MRA database shows that taxpayers 
registered under the turnover tax regime make up 35% of all registered taxpayers but 
account for just 1% of total tax revenue collected by the institution. Regardless, the 
MRA continues to register taxpayers under the turnover tax regime due to their senior 
officers’ contract renewal being performance-based, where one measure of good 
performance is the number of new taxpayers that they register.  
In total, more than 70,000 taxpayers are registered with the MRA. However, in 
the 2015/16 fiscal year, only 32,000 were classified as active. Taxpayers classified as 
active are those that have filed a tax return or made a tax payment within the past three 
years. MRA officers have suggested that some taxpayers register with the MRA so that 
they receive a registration certificate and a taxpayer identification number (TIN),32 
which enables them to deal with government and other registered traders.33 Once 
taxpayers have the MRA registration certificate, most do not pay the turnover tax. The 
MRA does not follow up with inactive registered taxpayers to determine whether they 
have stopped operating or whether they have just stopped paying taxes. One way of 
establishing whether taxpayers who do not file tax returns, or make any tax payment, 
are still economically active is by using third-party information, such as WHT receipts.34 
WHT receipts show details of taxpayers from whom the money is withheld, and the type 
 
operate withholding tax. Withholding tax is deducted using specified rates. The rates are specified in 
the 14th Schedule to the Malawi Taxation Act. 
31Only business whose turnover is in excess of MK10 million (£10,000) are required to register for VAT. 
32 Instead of using names to identify taxpayers, the MRA issues a unique number to each taxpayer on 
registration called the Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN).  
33 By law, the Malawi Government deals only with suppliers that have an MRA registration certificate. 
Private companies, on the other hand, are not governed by similar laws. However, most registered 
private companies also require an MRA registration certificate to deal with them, as a social 
responsibility to ensure that other businesses also pay tax. The MRA further indicates that dealing with 
other registered taxpayers also helps a company to easily quality for a withholding tax exemption 
certificate, which allows the company to deduct withholding tax when they supply other registered 
companies.  
34 All registered taxpayers are required to withhold a specified percentage of money (depending on 
the goods or transaction being purchased) on payments made to suppliers and remit the money to the 
MRA. The supplier is issued with a Withholding Tax receipt showing the amount deducted, a copy of 
which is given to the MRA when the buyer is remitting the withheld money to the MRA.   
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of transaction involved.    
Data Management  
A capable tax administration must deal systematically with a high volume of 
information. Practitioners thus regard the use of information technology (IT) as a crucial 
feature of successful tax administration reform projects (Berman & Tettey, 2001).  
Officially, the MRA uses four IT systems to manage taxpayer data for domestic 
taxes. However, in practice, five IT systems are in use. Below is a list of IT systems 
used by the MRA to manage taxpayer data:  
1.  The Centralised Self-Assessment System-2 (SAS2), which was introduced in 
2014. This system is mainly used to generate TIN and record income tax (PAYE, 
CIT, WHT) payments. SAS2 is supposed to be the only system generating TINs; 
however, other systems (such as TACS) are also used to issue TINs.  
2. The Tax Administration Computer System (TACS) was introduced in 1989. 
SAS2 was introduced as a replacement for TACS. However, the migration to 
SAS2 from TACS was never completed, after it was realised that some functions 
could not be performed in SAS2. Thus, both SAS2 and TACS are being 
operated, with TACS mainly used to record direct taxes (PIT, CIT, WHT). 
Although SAS2 and TACS perform similar functions, the two systems are not 
interfaced, often resulting in conflicting information. TACS, for example, has 
more than 67,000 taxpayers, while SAS2 has approximately 32,000 taxpayers.  
3. The Centralised Self-Assessment System-1 (SAS1) was introduced in 2008 and 
is used to record VAT payments. It was intended to replace the Surtax 
Administration Computer System (SACS), which was introduced in 1989. 
However, some stations35 still use SACS regularly, and the LTU uses it as a 
backup system. 
4. SACS: as noted in point three above, SACS was introduced in 1989 to record 
surtax, a tax that was restructured in 2005 and renamed VAT. SACS is not 
officially recognised by the MRA, although some stations still use it.  
5. Electronic Fiscal Device (EFDs): EFDs were introduced by the MRA in 2014 
 
35 There are 28 MRA stations spread across Malawi. All the stations are supposed to use the four 
officially recognised IT systems. However, some stations did not phase out SACS and thus use five IT 
systems.  
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for the management of value added tax (VAT). EFDs record VAT transactions 
in real time, whereas SAS1 and SACS record information from VAT returns.  
All five IT systems operate individually, and are not interfaced. Table 5.1 is a 
summary of the five IT systems currently being used in the MRA, and the period over 
which they have been operating.  
 
Table 5. 1: IT systems used in the administration of domestic taxes and their 
current status  
 System  Primary function   Start 
date  
Proposed 
end date 
Current 
status  
1 SAS2 Generating TINs  
Recording all tax payments from 
tax returns (CIT, PIT, WHT, VAT, 
Excise, etc.)  
2014  Active  
2 EFD Recording VAT transactions in real 
time  
2014  Active 
3 SAS1 Recording VAT returns  2008 2014 Active  
4 TACS Generating TINs   
Recording income tax payments 
(CIT, PIT, WHT) from tax returns 
1989 2014 Active 
5 SACS Recording VAT returns  1989 2008 Active 
(informally)  
Source: Interviews with MRA officers, 12-27 November 2016; TADAT (2015a) 
 
The numerous IT systems being used in the administration of domestic taxes has 
created a number of challenges. The following are some of the main challenges:  
1. Duplication of work. For example, four of the five systems are used to record 
VAT transactions, yet the information in the different systems is often 
conflicting.  
2. It is difficult for the MRA to trace some activities, such as taxpayer payments, 
because the systems are managed by different units. For example, an officer 
dealing with VAT payments using the EFD or SAS1 system would require 
authorisation to access income tax information from SAS2. The process of 
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getting authorisation can sometimes be rigid and complex. Officers therefore 
concentrate only on recording taxes under their mandate and ignore other taxes. 
3. Issuance of multiple TINs. In principle, each taxpayer is supposed to have one 
TIN; yet in practice, it has been found that a taxpayer can have more than one 
TIN. During the survey of business people that I conducted, respondents were 
asked if their business is registered with the MRA, and if the business has one 
registration certificate or multiple certificates. At least three respondents out of 
the 450 taxpayers registered with the MRA indicated that they have more than 
one certificate (and therefore multiple TINs), for their business. The SAS2 is 
programmed to only issue one TIN per taxpayer, but it is possible to override the 
system, thereby allowing some taxpayers to be (illegally) issued multiple TINs.  
There are also instances where temporary TINs are issued outside of SAS2. An 
officer in the audit section of the MRA indicated that some taxpayers use 
different TINs to circumvent payment of tax arrears or penalties when filing a 
return. In some cases, taxpayers use multiple TINs to file more than one tax 
return for the same business, breaking their gross income into smaller amounts 
to avoid being classified as a large taxpayer. Businesses do not want to be 
classified as large taxpayers, since this group is closely monitored.  
All MRA departments use the five IT systems outlined above. However, in 
addition to using these five systems, the LTU uses a sixth system. Noting the challenge 
of conflicting information generated from the various IT systems, the LTU hired 
dedicated officers to record and update taxpayer information and all their tax payments 
in a Microsoft (MS) Excel file.36 This Excel file, developed and updated by LTU 
officers, is the MRA’s most reliable and up-to-date registry for information related to 
taxpayers. All the details relating to a taxpayer, including their current physical address, 
phone numbers, and monthly tax payments by tax type, are stored in this file. However, 
only information and tax payments relating to taxpayers under the management of the 
LTU are recorded in the MS Excel file. While the MS Excel file is thought to be the 
most reliable source of taxpayer information in MRA, this format and process of storing 
taxpayer information is not formally recognised by the MRA because Excel files present 
 
36 There are no dedicated officers for taxpayer data entry in the divisions that manage small and 
medium taxpayers. Each officer enters the information on the tax return that they are handling into 
the IT systems. 
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a security risk, as they can be easily manipulated. 
The MRA is aware of the challenges related to their IT systems. The MRA 
website specifically states that:  
“The functionality of the domestic tax division current transaction computer 
systems is limited to the rudimentary registration and taxpayer accounting for 
assessment and payment. Most of the processes are executed in a manual environment 
and, consequently, the process data generated is also substantially manual. Manual 
processes and data present a myriad of challenges including security of data, access to 
the data, integrity of the data as well as extraction of the data for reporting and 
analysis.”37  
To resolve these problems, the MRA is in the process of procuring another 
system that it claims will replace the five IT systems. The new system, called the 
Integrated Tax Administration System (ITAS), is expected to be operational by April 
2019.  
5.4.2 Tax Audit 
A tax audit occurs when the tax authority decides to closely examine a taxpayer’s 
tax return38 to verify that it is accurate. A tax return is usually chosen for audit when 
something that is entered on the return is out of the ordinary. Tax audits allow the tax 
authority to monitor tax revenue losses from inaccurate filing, to deter non-filing of tax 
returns, and to identify areas of weakness in the tax system (OECD, 2010).  
In terms of auditing, the key challenge for any tax authority is that it is not 
economically viable nor logical to audit each taxpayer. In Malawi, less than 1.5% of 
taxpayers are audited in a year (MRA, 2016). This audit rate is consistent with trends in 
both high-income and low-income countries, where less than 2% of total taxpayers are 
audited in a year (Lemgruber, Masters & Cleary 2015). Large taxpayers in Malawi have 
a higher probability of being audited than small and medium taxpayers. On average, 
between 14% and 33% of large taxpayers are audited in a year, compared to 1% of small 
and medium taxpayers (Table 5.2). Officers in the audit section of the MRA explained 
that they dedicate more resources to the auditing of large taxpayers because 
 
37 See http://www.mra.mw/help-for-taxpayers/integrated-tax-administration-system-itas  
38 A tax return is a form on which a taxpayer makes an annual statement of income and it is used by 
the tax authorities to assess liability for tax. 
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approximately 70% percent of revenue collected by the MRA is collected from large 
taxpayers. During the 2014/15 fiscal year, the MRA handled a total of 252 audit cases. 
The distribution of the audit cases was as follows: 45% comprehensive audits;39 48% 
issue-oriented audits;40 7% refund audits;41 and 0% desk audits.42 Similar proportions 
of audits were conducted in the 2015/16 fiscal year (Table 5.2). 
Table 5. 2: Audit rates and revenues recovered in 2014/15 and 2015/16 by 
classification, based on turnover 
Year  2014/15 2015/16 
Section  Number 
of 
taxpayers 
audited  
Percentage 
of 
taxpayers 
audited  
Revenue 
recovered 
(MK’ 
billion)  
Number 
of 
taxpayers 
audited 
Percentage 
of  
taxpayers 
audited 
Revenue 
recovered 
(MK’ 
billion) 
Large 
taxpayer 
office  
67 33% 14.6 92 14% 22.3 
Medium 
and small 
taxpayer 
office  
185 1% 5.2 354 1% 4.6 
Source: 2015/2016 MRA Annual Report 
  
The MRA faces three challenges with respect to audits. The first is that cases for 
audit are selected randomly. To select a case for audit, the MRA is supposed to use a 
 
39Comprehensive audits are generally employed when significant anomalies are detected through a 
desk or issue-oriented audit, or identified by the risk management system. Usually, cases selected for 
comprehensive audit cover all taxes for one or more tax years.  
40 Issue-oriented audits are generally limited to check particular aspects of the return and cover a 
single tax. For example, in the case of VAT, an issue-oriented audit may deal with all of the activities 
reflected in a tax return, or it may focus on one particular aspect such as turnover, exports, invoicing, 
or excess credit.  
41Refund audit is one form of issue audit. It has been highlighted because of the increase in refund 
fraud where taxpayers overstate the amount to be refunded (when the input VAT is greater than the 
output VAT, MRA refunds the difference). Prior to 2013/14, tax refunds were usually paid without 
audit.  
42 Desk audits include: (1) a check that the returns filed are consistent, (2) a comparative analysis of 
returns for different taxes, (3) a comparative analysis of the main ratios against those for similar 
businesses in the same sector, and (4) a cross-check against information received from other 
government agencies and third parties.  
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risk matrix. The risk matrix is a systematic way of identifying the risk of tax non-
compliance among taxpayers, and is intended to help officers in the audit section target 
their actions to the various identified risk categories, better allocate resources across 
different types of audits (comprehensive, issue-oriented, and desk audit), and improve 
the overall effectiveness of the audit function. However, officers in the audit section of 
the MRA pointed out that the risk matrix is largely ignored. A number of reasons for 
ignoring the risk matrix were raised. An officer in the audit section pointed out that a 
taxpayer can be selected for audit because the audit manager anticipates the recovery of 
a significant amount of money. Audits that do not raise money are seen as a failure by 
MRA management.43 In other instances, the audit matrix is ignored because, when used, 
it will select taxpayers that the audit manager does not want to audit (either under 
instruction from senior officers in the MRA, or because the officer selecting the cases 
has been bribed by the taxpayer so that they are not audited during specific periods).  
The MRA is aware that the audit matrix is largely ignored and the LTU is aware 
of the weaknesses in auditing. To ensure that all risky taxpayers are audited, the LTU 
formulated its own risk matrix. The LTU then submits the additional taxpayers to be 
audited to the audit division, and funds these additional audits using their divisional 
budget.  The small and medium taxpayer units do not have a similar arrangement.  
The second audit challenge is corruption of MRA officers. Often, the MRA 
discovers that audit officers have been colluding with taxpayers to settle audit cases 
outside of the normal channels or to ensure they are not audited in exchange for personal 
gains. To address this problem, one of the measures the MRA has taken is to require 
that auditors (and all senior personnel in all departments) declare their assets annually, 
to monitor the growth of their wealth. MRA employees are also required to declare all 
gifts that they receive from taxpayers. However, the likelihood of these measures 
deterring corrupt practices within the MRA is low, because officers can hide their wealth 
by investing in assets that cannot easily be traced back to them. However, what this 
practice appears to have achieved is to instil, among both taxpayers and some tax 
officials, the perception that tax officers are under surveillance for corrupt practices. 
During the survey of business people in Malawi, some taxpayers specifically pointed 
out that it has become difficult to bribe MRA officers because they are being closely 
 
43 The risk matrix also likely selects cases for audit with high potential of recovering taxes. The 
advantage of using a risk matrix over human intuition is that the process is systematic and unbiased.  
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monitored, such that they often refuse and report those attempting to bribe them to the 
police. These stories, though difficult to verify, suggest that the monitoring of MRA 
officers’ wealth may reduce the likelihood of some taxpayers offering bribes to tax 
officers, or of tax officers accepting bribes.  
The third challenge associated with auditing is that the information obtained 
from audits is not used to inform policy. I noted that auditors identify risks in the field, 
but that these risks are not being collated to inform any review of risk selection criteria 
or compliance improvement plans. Assessment of audit reports mainly focuses on the 
number of audits conducted in a year, and how much money is recovered from audits. 
In addition, no feedback is provided by the legal division to the audit division on the 
outcomes of different court cases that the audit division has handed over. For instance, 
when I asked officers in the audit division about the percentage of court cases that are 
ruled in favour of the MRA in a year, they could not provide any details but referred me 
to the legal division. It is evident that the audit system lacks a feedback mechanism, 
giving rise to this problem.  
5.4.3 Dispute Resolution  
From time to time, disputes arise between taxpayers and the tax administrator. 
Disputes typically emerge as a result of an administrative error on the part of the 
administration or the taxpayer. In addition, the outcome of a tax audit or investigation 
that identifies a discrepancy may be disputed by the taxpayer on the grounds of facts 
(the taxpayer may have material evidence to the contrary) or legal interpretation 
(Lemgruber et al., 2015).  
It is, therefore, important for a tax administration to have a systematic, fair, fast, 
and effective dispute resolution process. An effective tax dispute resolution process can 
be said to be one that is based on a legal framework, is easily accessible, guarantees 
transparent independent decision-making, and resolves disputed matters in a timely 
manner (Okello, 2014). Such processes typically include an independent administrative 
appeals process within the tax administration, and a special tribunal that taxpayers can 
resort to if they are dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative appeals process 
(Okello, 2014). 
Tax dispute resolution processes that are not fair (or not seen to be fair), and/or 
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that take a long time to resolve a dispute, may have the following consequences (UN, 
2017; Gangl et al., 2015):  
1. Affect taxpayers’ trust in the tax administration, and the judicial system.  
2. Lead some taxpayers to challenge the tax authority’s integrity.  
3. Lead to higher costs for taxpayers, potentially making the country unattractive 
for conducting business.  
According to the available TADAT assessment reports, in most low-income 
countries, the dispute resolution process is relatively good. Out of the 14 TADAT 
assessment reports analysed, for the indicator P7-19 (the existence of an independent, 
workable, and graduated dispute resolution process), 75% of the countries scored an A 
or B, meaning that 75% of the countries have a dispute resolution process that is in 
accordance with international best practice.  
Malawi scored a “D” on this indicator. One key limitation in the law on dispute 
resolution in Malawi (which was also noted by TADAT assessors) is the lack of easy 
access to information about appeals procedures. Thus, although the Malawi Taxation 
Act (Section 95–101) states that when a tax dispute arises, a consensual dispute 
resolution process should first be attempted. The taxpayer makes an appeal for their case 
to the Commissioner General (CG). The CG, after consultation with technical staff, 
makes a decision. If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the CG’s decision, they may appeal 
the decision to a special arbitrator (judges selected from the mainstream judicial 
system). Following the arbitrator’s decision, taxpayers may appeal disputes of law to 
the High Court.44 On paper, this dispute resolution process is comprehensive, providing 
recourse to independent arbitrators and the courts, instead of the MRA itself resolving 
all disputes. However, in practice, the tax dispute resolution process in Malawi does not 
follow all the steps outlined in the law. The majority of cases end with the MRA (i.e., 
they are not appealed). One of the contributing factors for MRA to usually remain the 
final judge is that most taxpayers are not aware of the dispute resolution process, 
probably due to the fact that it is difficult to find the dispute resolution procedures in the 
Malawi Taxation Act and that the MRA does not make this information available in 
other documents. Comparing the section dealing with appeals procedure in the Malawi 
 
44 The guiding law on appeals is the Taxation Act, Cap 41:01, Part X, Section 95-101 and Eighth 
schedule. The Malawi Revenue Authority also has a document highlighting the Appeals procedure.  
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tax law with those of Zambia and Uganda shows how the appeals procedure seems to 
be hidden in the Malawi Tax law (Table 5.3) 
 
Table 5. 3: Comparison of appeals procedure as outline in Tax laws of Malawi, 
Zambia and Uganda 
 Malawi  Section 97 of the Malawi Taxation Act states that “A taxpayer who is 
aggrieved…may appeal to the Commissioner against such assessment, 
decision or determination”. Section 98 (1) states that “a taxpayer 
aggrieved by a decision of the Commissioner under section 97 may appeal 
to a Special Arbitrator appointed either generally or specifically for the 
purpose by the President” while section 101 (1) states that “Either party 
to proceedings before a Special Arbitrator under section 98 or a 
Traditional Appeal Court under section 100 may appeal in the prescribed 
manner to the High Court..” 
Zambia  Section 107 sets up Appeal court while Section 108 states that “…within 
thirty days of the date of service of notice of assessment, the person 
assessed may make to the Commissioner-General a written statement of 
objection to the assessment setting out the grounds of objection, and the 
Commissioner-General shall give that person written notice of his 
decision concerning that objection” and Section 109 (1) states that “if a 
person assessed is dissatisfied with the Commissioner-General's decision 
concerning his objection to the assessment, that person may, by written 
notice to the Chairperson, within thirty days of the date of service of the 
written notice of the Commissioner-General's decision, appeal against the 
assessment to the tribunal and shall send a copy of the notice to the 
Commissioner-General” 
Uganda  Section 99 (1) states that “A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with an 
assessment may lodge an objection to the assessment with the 
commissioner within forty-five days after service of the notice of 
assessment”. Section 100 (1) and (2) further states that “(1) A taxpayer 
dissatisfied with an objection decision may, at the election of the 
taxpayer— (a)  appeal the decision to the High Court; or (b)  apply for 
review of the decision to a tax tribunal established by Parliament by law 
for the purpose of settling tax disputes in accordance with article 152(3) 
of the Constitution and (2) An appeal under subsection (1) to the High 
Court shall be made by lodging a notice of appeal with the registrar of the 
High Court within forty-five days after service of notice of the objection 
decision” 
Source: Taxation Act Malawi, Taxation Act Zambia, Taxation Act Uganda 
It will be noted in Table 5.1 that both Zambia and Uganda provide details of 
procedures and timelines on how appeals should be conducted with regard to the main 
clauses of the Act, the Malawi law does not have similar details in the main clauses of 
its particular Act. This information is put in the eighth schedule, which is found towards 
the end of the Malawi Taxation Act. The procedures outlined in the eighth schedule are 
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in line with what is provided in the Zambia and Uganda Taxation Act. However, because 
the referencing to the procedures is not well-made in the main clauses, taxpayers may 
not easily find the information about the appeals procedures and the timelines regarding 
appeal. During the survey that I conducted in Malawi, business officials were asked 
what they (or others in similar businesses) did if they had reservations with the MRA 
ruling on a dispute. In total, 63% answered, “there is nothing a taxpayer can do but 
follow the MRA’s ruling,” 24% answered, “settle the case as proposed by the MRA,” 
7% answered, “take the case to court or the Ministry of Finance,” and 6% declined to 
answer. This finding suggests that the majority of taxpayers do not know that they have 
the option to take tax disputes to court or to a special arbitrator.  It was, therefore, not 
surprising to note that more than 90% of cases that go to court involve large taxpayers, 
because large taxpayers will typically have lawyers and well-qualified accountants who 
understand the law.  
When investigating whether there are publicly available guidelines on the 
dispute resolution process, the MRA referred me to the Taxation Act, as there are no 
brochures or documents that detail the appeals process for the public. Other than what 
is contained in the Acts, there has been just one public notice (published in a newspaper 
in 2015) informing taxpayers that if they are not satisfied with the MRA’s decision, they 
can refer the matter to a special arbitrator and the courts.45 However, the notice did not 
provide any details on how a taxpayer could do that. Internally, the MRA has an appeals 
procedure document, the existence of which is only known by officers in the legal 
department and some auditors. Due to taxpayers’ lack of awareness of the dispute 
resolution process, they often submit appeals to the Ministry of Finance, who usually 
refer the cases back to the MRA. Occasionally, the Ministry of Finance intervenes in 
the dispute resolution process, which adds further confusion to the dispute resolution 
process. Interviews with officers in the Ministry of Finance revealed that at least one 
appeal case on an MRA ruling is sent to them every month.  
An interview with the head of the Society of Accountants in Malawi on the tax 
appeals process in Malawi revealed that the institution has been asking the Ministry of 
Finance to establish a tax tribunal to ensure that the system is fair. In the 2013/14 budget 
statement, the Minister of Finance announced that a tax tribunal would be introduced. 
 
45 The Malawi Revenue Authority Tax Update “Income tax objection” in Daily Times newspaper, 14 
May 2015. 
 
 
 
107 
However, to date, none has been set up, and there are still no public documents that 
provide guidance on the appeals process. Commenting on the appeals process, one 
taxpayer described sending a 75-page appeal letter to the MRA with receipts and other 
documents attached to prove that the MRA’s audit conclusions were not correct. The 
MRA sent a one-line response, stating that, “we maintain our earlier position.” The 
taxpayer was extremely disappointed with the MRA’s response, as no effort was made 
on the MRA’s part to explain why they maintained their position after being provided 
with additional information. Instead of involving the special arbitrator or the court, the 
taxpayer referred the matter to the Ministry of Finance. The taxpayer claimed that he 
did not know that he could refer the case to a special arbitrator, and was not comfortable 
asking the MRA about the process.    
The shortage of information on the dispute resolution process mostly affects 
small and medium taxpayers. Almost all large taxpayers have access to specialised tax 
advice and lawyers who are aware of the dispute resolution process. 
5.4.4 Taxpayer Education  
Taxpayer education refers to programmes that aim to teach taxpayers about: their 
tax rights; responsibilities; legal requirements; the importance of paying tax; and what 
taxpayers should expect of the government, in terms of accountability (Gitaru, 2017; 
Mascagni & Santoro, 2018). To ensure voluntary tax compliance, tax administrations 
are expected to provide tax information and support to taxpayers so that they can meet 
their obligations and claim what they are legally entitled to. Tax education is also 
provided because very few taxpayers use the law itself as a primary source of 
information (Gitaru, 2017). In addition, studies have shown that taxpayers often have 
little understanding of how tax systems work (Kira, 2017; Feldman et al., 2016). Thus, 
advice and assistance from the tax administration plays a crucial role in bridging the 
knowledge gap.  
The MRA disseminates tax information to the public in a number of ways, 
though primarily through brochures, press releases, magazine articles, radio and 
television slots, and content on the MRA website. The MRA also conducts seminars and 
workshops for taxpayers, and awareness programmes in schools. In 2018, it introduced 
walk-in enquiries and phone services (including WhatsApp) to address taxpayer 
questions. In addition, every year, the MRA publishes on its website a list of tax policy 
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changes made by Parliament. The taxpayer education services are expansive and cover 
different types of taxes.    
The primary limitation of the taxpayer education service provided by the MRA 
is that the publicly available resources and activities do not explain, in detail, the 
taxpayer’s technical obligations and rules. The resources and information sessions 
provide basic information rather than full guidance or manuals. For instance, taxpayers 
are told that if they have a problem with how the MRA has handled a dispute, they can 
appeal to a special arbitrator. However, the advice does not contain detailed information 
on how to initiate the appeals process. 
As mentioned previously, to ensure that large taxpayers have all the information 
that they need related to taxation, the LTU assigns a desk officer to each large taxpayer.  
The officer is a source of information on all matters relating to tax. This service is not 
available to small and medium taxpayers – these are many in number, meaning it is not 
feasible to assign officers to each. 
5.5 Discussion   
The assessment of the MRA’s performance is based on four performance 
outcome areas, which are identified in the literature as being among the most important 
activities of a revenue authority, and are among the nine performance outcome areas 
assessed within TADAT. However, unlike in the TADAT assessment, the areas assessed 
were not scored. Rather, I identified strengths and weaknesses in each area based on 
what the MRA intends to achieve when undertaking that activity. To some extent, the 
findings are consistent with the TADAT assessment for Malawi, in that the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the MRA is found to be poor in all four areas assessed. The only 
exception relates to the LTU, within which efficiency and effectiveness was found to be 
good. Furthermore, unlike in the TADAT assessment, where a tax administration is 
evaluated as a whole on its efficiency and effectiveness in undertaking its function, I 
assessed the performance of the MRA by looking at process performance within specific 
departments. In addition, information obtained from documents and tax laws was cross-
checked with actual performance and triangulated with information from taxpayers. 
This provided a comprehensive picture of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
different departments of the MRA in undertaking their functions.  
The first function assessed was the registration and management of taxpayer 
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data. In this area, I found that the MRA has good initiatives that ensure that eligible 
taxpayers are registered. However, the institution uses multiple IT systems to manage 
taxpayer data. This means that officers within the MRA cannot undertake data analysis 
tasks, such as disaggregating revenue performance by income group, occupation, and 
gender, predicting future risks for revenue, or cross-checking tax payments.  Gray et al. 
(2001) suggest that taxpayers who default on direct taxes are more likely to evade 
indirect taxes, and vice versa. The MRA would not be able to make these connections, 
because the use of multiple IT systems has resulted in disaggregated taxpayer 
information. An exception was noted in the LTU, where efforts are made to maintain 
complete and up-to-date taxpayer information using an MS Excel file. While this 
initiative is commendable, keeping taxpayer data in this particular format is vulnerable 
to manipulation, which may compromise the quality and reliability of the data. In 
addition, as the number of taxpayers managed by the LTU grows, there is a need for a 
more advanced system to manage taxpayer data.   
Next, I assessed the audit function. A positive result was that the audit rates and 
distribution of cases for auditing were found to be consistent with international 
standards. In line with other revenue authorities in low-income countries, the MRA has 
an audit plan that covers all core taxes and taxpayer segments. It was also noted that 
large taxpayers have a higher probability of being audited than medium or small 
taxpayers. This is expected of any revenue authority, considering the amounts of money 
involved with large taxpayers. This makes auditing large taxpayers critical to 
safeguarding revenue collection. While it is not necessary to match audit rates between 
large and small taxpayers, it is necessary for the MRA to ensure that it gives the 
impression that even small and medium taxpayers are audited. The fact that some small 
and medium taxpayers connive with tax officials to have multiple TINs suggests that 
small and medium taxpayers are aware that the probability of their being audited is very 
low. The MRA must find ways of addressing this problem. A negative result was that 
the risk matrix used for case selection is largely being ignored. In addition, there is no 
evaluation of the extent to which audits are detecting and deterring inaccurate reporting. 
To improve its audit function, the MRA must ensure that audit officers use the audit 
matrix, and must create clear channels through which information is transmitted (from 
auditors to decision-makers and other departments, then back to auditors).  
Next, I assessed the dispute resolution process. Malawian law provides for a 
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reasonable dispute resolution process. However, the MRA, intentionally or not, does not 
publicise the dispute resolution process. This means the institution, in many cases, is the 
final judge. It seems it is only large taxpayers who make use of the extended dispute 
resolution process, which involves players other than the MRA. For the MRA to position 
itself as a legitimate and fair institution, thereby encouraging tax compliance, it needs 
to ensure that all taxpayers are fully aware of the dispute resolution process and that this 
process operates as intended. One way of achieving this is through publication of a 
detailed document on the dispute resolution process, made available on the MRA 
website. In addition, the creation of a tax tribunal should be facilitated. This would 
create a perception of fairness among taxpayers as the final decision on a tax dispute 
will be taken by the tribunal and not the MRA. This will provide positive incentive for 
tax compliance (Faizal et al., 2017; Smith, 1991).  
Finally, I assessed the taxpayer education services. The MRA undertakes a 
number of initiatives to inform taxpayers and the public about taxation in Malawi. Walk-
in enquiries, phone services, and the use of WhatsApp as ways to respond to questions 
from taxpayers and the general public are some of the positive initiatives that the MRA 
undertakes. However, the information provided should be sufficiently detailed to allow 
taxpayers to make a well-informed decision. This is not currently the case. Assigning 
MRA officers to individual taxpayers is effective in the LTU because the number of 
taxpayers classified as large is small. For the small and medium taxpayers, it is important 
for the MRA to provide sufficient information so that they can make informed decisions 
on their own. This will help to encourage tax compliance and legitimise the institution, 
as taxpayers become aware of their responsibilities and legal rights. 
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to determine the extent to which the tax administration 
processes followed by the Malawi Revenue Authority affect the level of tax revenue 
collection and tax structure in Malawi.  The analysis has shown that the MRA’s process 
performance is mixed, with good performance in the LTU and weak performance in all 
other revenue-collecting departments.  Given that the LTU is responsible for 
approximately 70% of the taxes collected by the MRA, the  good tax revenue collection 
in Malawi, especially between 2005-2011, can largely be attributed to the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the LTU in undertaking its functions.  
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Only four out of the nine areas assessed in TADAT were assessed in this study. 
This may limit the extent to which conclusions can be drawn regarding the impact of 
the MRA’s process performance on revenue collection.  However, the findings for the 
four areas assessed are consistent with TADAT’s assessment of the MRA, except where 
the LTU is concerned, and therefore seem to be a true reflection of the MRA’s process 
performance.  
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Chapter 6: Why is Malawi so Successful in Collecting Direct 
Taxes? 
6.1 Introduction  
Malawi has a high reliance on direct taxes relative to other sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries, and to low-income countries in general. For example, between 1980-
2015, direct taxes in Malawi accounted for 40% of total revenue, while the average for 
SSA countries was 32% (ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2017). Shalizi and Thirsk (1990) argue 
that the share of total revenue accounted for by direct taxes in Malawi is more 
reminiscent of a developed country. Governments of low and middle-income countries 
rely more on indirect taxes than those of high-income countries (Besley & Persson, 
2014; Junquera-Varela et al., 2017). The reason is that direct taxes are administratively 
difficult to collect in low-income countries for several reasons, including weak tax 
administrations and political hurdles relating to taxing the wealthy (Aizenman & 
Jinjarak, 2009; ATAF, 2018).  By contrast, the main reason for high dependence on 
direct taxes in high-income countries is that there are many people in formal 
employment such that there is high revenue from Personal Income Taxes (PIT), notably 
Pay As You Earn (PAYE) (Aizenman & Jinjarak, 2009). 
Malawi is among the 47 least developed countries in the world (UNCTAD, 
2018). It has a tax administration which, when judged by the standard criteria for 
effective tax administration, appears to perform very poorly, even by the standards of 
low-income countries (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, approximately 89% of its working 
population is employed in the informal sector, and hence are not liable to pay income 
taxes (NSO, 2014). It is, therefore, unexpected for Malawi to have higher reliance on 
direct taxes than most SSA countries, and low-income countries in general. 
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to determine how Malawi, a low-income country 
with a tax administration that operates below international standards and a large 
informal sector, has been able to collect greater revenue from direct taxes than most 
other SSA countries. I explore this issue by undertaking research that answers the 
following questions: 
• What are the reasons for Malawi’s current high reliance on direct tax? 
• How far back in history does Malawi’s reliance on direct tax extend? 
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In Section 6.2, I briefly review a number of possible explanations for Malawi’s 
high dependence on direct taxes, and find none of them plausible. Most of this chapter 
is devoted to explaining, reviewing, testing and extending a previous piece of research 
that gives us great insight into my central question: work by Thandika Mkandawire 
(2010) on the structure of the colonial economies of Africa. Mkandawire (2010) 
classifies African countries into three main groups according to the structures of colonial 
economic exploitation: Labour Reserve Economies, Cash Crop Economies, and 
Concessional Companies. For reasons that I explain below, the governments of the 
Labour Reserve Economies were better able and more motivated to raise revenues, and 
to do so by taxing incomes directly. Mkandawira (2010) shows that, for the period 1984-
2004, the governments of the Labour Reserve Economies were better able to raise 
revenue and more reliant on direct taxes. He attributes this to the continuing legacy of 
colonial economic and revenue systems. 
Malawi is classified as a Labour Reserve Economy. It is not a complete outlier 
as a successful generator of direct tax revenues. It is part of a group, consisting largely 
of neighbouring countries (including Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Africa). 
I test and build upon Mkandawira’s research in three main ways:  
• comparative country analysis, with more recent data. This analysis shows that 
the pattern still holds, but generally weakening, but somewhat more persistent 
in Malawi; 
• history of tax in Malawi; and 
• provide plausible explanation for Malawi’s high reliance on direct tax by 
recounting the nature of the post-independence national politico-economic 
system. 
I conclude that the initial question, on why Malawi is highly dependent on direct 
tax,  is in part explained as a legacy of colonial political, economic and revenue 
structures, but that in Malawi’s case, functionally-similar structures were perpetuated 
well into the post-independence era through the decisions of the first President, Dr 
Banda. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a review of the 
drivers of difference in level of tax revenue collection and tax structure in SSA. Then, I 
validate Mkandawire’s (2010) theory by looking deeper into records of revenue raising 
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in Malawi and the other seven countries in SSA for the period 1910-1960. This is 
followed by an updating and testing of Mkandawire’s theory for the period 2000-2015. 
Then, based on the finding that colonial histories may be playing a part in influencing 
current levels of tax collection and tax structure, I review Malawi’s tax collection history 
from 1891 to 2015, with the aim of understating how direct tax collection in Malawi has 
been sustained over the years.  
6.2 Drivers of Differences in Levels of Tax Collection and Tax Structure in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
In most SSA countries, formal taxation was introduced by colonial governments 
(Gardener, 2012). However, levels of tax collection and tax structures vary among 
countries in the region. It has been observed that southern African countries within SSA 
collect a significantly high amount of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP, and have a 
higher reliance on direct taxes, in comparison to other countries in the region 
(Mkandawire, 2010). There are several theories that seek to explain the differences in 
the level of tax-to-GDP ratio and the tax structure across SSA. The commonly cited 
drivers are the influence of the SACU, differences in the size of the mining sector, 
institutional spill-over, and colonial legacy. This section evaluates each of these possible 
explanations, and finds that none of them fully explains the differences in level of tax 
collection and tax structure in SSA. However, the colonial legacy theory goes a long 
way towards explaining these differences.  
6.2.1 Influence of the SACU  
Based on panel data on 43 SSA countries for the period 1990-1995, Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam (1997) found that countries in southern Africa have high tax-to-GDP 
ratios and tax effort indices. They constructed the tax effort index as the ratio of actual 
tax as a share of GDP to predicted (potential) share of tax-to-GDP. They found that the 
tax effort index for most southern African countries, including South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho, and Namibia was above 1, and the ratio in other countries was less than 1. They 
attributed the high tax effort for countries in southern Africa to the influence of the 
SACU.  
Established in 1910, the SACU comprises five countries: Botswana, Lesotho, 
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Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.46 The aim of the SACU is to maintain the free 
interchange of goods between the member countries through a common customs area, a 
common external tariff,47 and a common excise48 tariff. All customs duties and excise 
taxes collected in the common customs area are paid into South Africa’s National 
Revenue Fund (SACU, 2002). The revenue is then shared among member countries in 
accordance with a revenue-sharing formula (SACU, 2002).  
As of 2017, the tax-to-GDP ratio for SACU member countries averaged 25%, 
while the average tax-to-GDP ratio for countries in SSA was 16% (ATAF, 2018). In 
addition, all SACU member states are classified as middle-income countries, whereas 
most SSA countries are classified as low-income (World Bank, 2017). Thus, the high 
tax-to-GDP ratio in SACU countries may also be due to the effect of high income. In 
addition, some of the countries in southern Africa with high tax-to-GDP ratios, such as 
Zimbabwe (where the tax-to-GDP ratio as of  2017 was 26% (ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 
2017)), are not members of the SACU. Thus, the SACU theory only partly explains the 
differences in level of tax collection among SSA countries.  
6.2.2 Size of the Mining Sector  
It has been suggested that countries in southern Africa have a relatively high tax-
to-GDP ratio because they have a large mining sector (Laporte, Céline & Yannick, 
2017). While this explanation seems valid for Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana, where 
the mining sector contributes significantly to tax revenue (Mkandawire, 2010), it does 
not apply to Malawi, which has had a relatively high tax-to-GDP ratio since 2009 despite 
not having a large or flourishing mining sector (Chapter 2). Thus, this theory only partly 
explains the differences in level of tax collection among SSA countries. 
6.2.3 Institutional Spill-over 
The high tax-to-GDP ratio in countries in southern Africa has also been 
attributed to institutional spill-over (Arizala et al., 2018). The institutional spill-over 
theory suggests that the tax administration practices of more advanced countries, in this 
 
46 See http://www.sacu.int/index.php  
47 The same customs duties, import quotas, preferences or other non-trade barriers apply to all goods 
entering the area, regardless of which country within the area they are entering.  
48 Excise is a form of tax that is charged mostly on luxury products, alcohol and tobacco.  
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case South Africa, has influenced neighbouring countries, either through a contagion 
effect where countries directly copy the tax policy and tax administration practices 
followed by South Africa, or through shared tax arrangements, as is the case for SACU 
member states. The spill-over effect may explain the good tax revenue collection 
performances of countries in the SACU. However, the literature does not indicate the 
factors influencing the extent of that spill-over. For instance, it is not clear why the tax-
to-GDP ratio for Angola (which borders Namibia, a SACU member state) is much lower 
compared to that of SACU member countries. Because this theory has not yet been, and 
cannot be easily, tested, it is not possible to conclude the extent to which it has 
influenced the differences in the level of tax collection and tax structure in SSA.  
 6.2.4 Colonial Legacy  
The colonial legacy theory pertains to how different colonial economic 
structures generated different tax levels, and how those colonial differences have 
persisted (Mkandawire, 2010). The theory is based on the observation that the colonial 
culture, forms of colonisation, legal systems, and institutional heritage shaped the initial 
conditions of African economies, and that they continue to have an impact on current 
economic performance in SSA (Grier, 1999; Mkandawire, 2010; Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson, 2001; Austin, 2008; Bolt & Bezemer, 2009; Bowden & Mosley, 2008; 
Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005; Lange, 2004; Moradi, 2008).  
Mkandawire (2010) convincingly describes how colonial history still influences 
tax collection in SSA in the post-colonial era. Mkandawire classified regional economic 
structures (using countries as the unit of analysis, due to data constraints) into three 
groups based on the form of incorporation of countries in certain regions into the 
colonial economic system. The three groups are: Cash Crop Conomies; Concessional 
Companies; and Labour Reserve Economies (LRE)(Table 6.1).  
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Table 6. 1: Forms of colonial incorporation  
Type  Countries  
Labour Reserve Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Cash Crop Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, 
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Mauritania, Niger 
Concessional Companies Congo Kinshasa, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, 
Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi 
Source: Mkandawire (2010) 
 
Mkandawire (2010) described each of the colonial economic systems as follows: 
1. Cash Crop Economies: countries where production was left to peasants. 
Marketing was dominated by metropolitan mercantile houses or, later, by state 
marketing boards that enjoyed monopolistic positions in the economy. Taxation 
in these economies took place largely through marketing channels and hut or 
poll taxes (the hut tax was a type of tax applied on a per hut or per household 
basis. The poll tax was similar to the hut tax but was applied to individuals and 
not households (Massey, 1978)). There were few restrictions on the movement 
of indigenous labour and on informal activities in the urban areas. However, the 
movement of crops was highly regulated. 
2. Concessional Companies: countries where the colonial power gave private 
companies concessions on vast areas of land, for the production of crops on large 
plantations, or for mineral extraction. These economies relied on forced labour, 
and there was virtually no development of peasant commercial farming. 
3. Labour Reserve Economies: countries that were often associated with racial 
segregation (e.g., South Africa), migrant labour (e.g., Malawi), and ubiquitous 
townships or locations (e.g., Zambia). The labour reserve economies were 
sometimes within the national economies, as was the case in Angola, Kenya, 
South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, or alternatively were entire 
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countries, assigned the LRE role through the colonial division of labour, for 
example Botswana (before the discovery of diamonds), Lesotho, and Swaziland. 
Two key features of labour reserve economies were their highly dualistic formal 
labour market and their migrant labour system that tied large numbers of 
peasants to the mining industry or plantation agriculture.  
Using tax data from 1984-2004, Mkandawire (2010) showed that the LRE had a 
high tax-to-GDP ratio (on average, tax-to-GDP ratio averaged 23% during this period), 
and a high proportion of direct tax in total revenue (on average, direct taxes contributed 
36% to total revenues during this period) compared to the non-labour reserve economies  
(NLRE)(cash crop economies and concessional companies), where the tax-to-GDP ratio 
and contribution of direct taxes to total revenues averaged 12% and 23%, respectively 
(Mkandawire, 2010)49.  According to Mkandawire, the reasons for the high tax 
collection and high reliance on direct taxes in LRE were threefold: 
1. The state had the administrative and coercive capacity to impose high taxes. The 
labour reserve economies had a lot of labourers (most of whom were young men) 
who worked in mines or plantations. The labourers usually lived together in 
proletarian living conditions, which created a potential security problem as there 
was a risk of the labourers attacking the settlers (the Europeans who settled in 
the colonies) or even each other. The profitability of mining and plantation 
investment required this threat to be controlled. Accordingly, the state needed to 
have strong police and army security forces, and higher taxes were imposed to 
fund these security programmes.  In exchange for a higher level of protection, 
the settlers were willing to pay high income taxes and to collect taxes from their 
workers on behalf of the government. 
2. There was a low level of informalisation. In labour reserve economies, informal 
businesses were restricted and only the settlers could operate formal businesses. 
This resulted in a low level of informalisation, which made it easy for the state 
to collect taxes from the few formal businesses and the labourers. 
3. There were high levels of inequality, coupled with a lack of redistributive 
expenditure. In labour reserve economies, ownership of land was concentrated 
 
49 Mkandawire aggregated the labour reserve and non-labour reserve economies. No reason is given 
for this. However, this may be due to a greater interest in showing that labour reserve economies have 
a high tax-to-GDP ratio and high reliance on direct tax compared to non-labour reserve economies.  
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to a few individuals who used it for estate farming. When tax was collected from 
either the estate owners or their workers, it was used to fund activities that 
benefited the estate owners (such as their security) and not the whole country. 
Thus, the few wealthy people were more willing to pay taxes (and collected taxes 
from their labourers on behalf of the government) because the benefits from the 
use of the tax revenue accrued directly to them. 
6.3 Validating, Updating, and Testing Mkandawire’s Classification of Economic 
Structure in SSA for the Period 1910-1960 and 2000-2015  
Based on Mkandawira’s (2010) classification of economic structure in SSA and 
statistical evidence regarding the economic structure in SSA for the period 1984-2004, 
it can be concluded that the colonial legacy theory largely explains the differences in 
tax structure and level of tax collection among SSA countries. However, 14 years have 
passed since Mkandawire tested the colonial legacy theory. Thus, although the theory 
seems to hold when tested using tax data for the period 1984-2004, it may not hold when 
more recent tax data is used (e.g., 2000-2015). In addition, Mkandawire only provided 
statistical evidence for the period 1984-2004, which does not include the colonial period 
(generally, 1900-1960 for most countries). Accordingly, this section aims at validating 
the colonial legacy theory with reference to statistical evidence for the period 1910-
1960, and updating and testing the theory for the period 2000-2015.  
6.3.1 Empirical Evidence on Mkandawire’s Classification of Economic Structure 
in SSA for the Period 1910-1960  
Mkandawire (2010) likely used tax data for the period 1984-2004 because, prior 
to 2015, tax data for the colonial period was not readily available. In 2015, the British 
Online Archives (BOA)50 made some colonial documents, including financial 
statements and blue books, available online. These documents contain details about tax 
collection in British colonies. I was not able to locate similar detailed information about 
tax collection during the colonial period for countries that were not colonised by the 
British. Consequently, only British colonies are included in the analysis. Regardless, a 
sufficient number of African countries were colonised by the British to enable a large 
 
50 https://microform.digital/boa/  
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number of countries to be included in the analysis.  
By grouping each tax type into either direct, indirect, or non-tax, the colonial tax 
structure was reconstructed using tax data for the period 1910-1960. Reconstructing the 
colonial tax structure is a challenging work as the names of taxes changed frequently 
during the colonial period, and countries had different names for similar types of tax. 
This required that I carefully check that each category had correct taxes or fees for each 
year. Consequently, for each country covered, approximately 30 financial statements or 
blue books were analysed (at least one financial statement or blue book for every two-
year period covered). As a result, I was only able to reconstruct the colonial tax 
structures for eight countries: Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho (for LRE), and 
Uganda, Tanzania, Gambia, and Ghana (for NLRE). Table 6.2 shows the composition 
of each tax category.  
 
Table 6. 2: Classification of domestic revenue sources in colonial Africa (1910-
1960)  
Classification  Composition 
Direct tax  Poll/hut tax, native tax, corporate income tax, companies tax, 
super tax, income tax, personal tax, officials’ salary tax, alien tax, 
gold premium tax, excess profit tax 
Indirect tax Customs, export tax, import tax, excise, cotton tax, duty on various 
products (e.g., sugar, tea, tobacco), petrol tax, entertainment tax  
Non-taxes  Court fees and fines, rent of government property, mining licence 
and fees, motor vehicle licence fee, railways fees, land sales, 
boarding fees, school fees, hospital fees, post office fees, 
telecommunication fees 
 Source: Author’s Classification 
Table 6.2 shows that taxes classified under direct tax included poll tax, company 
taxes, gold premium tax, and excess profit tax. The taxes included under indirect taxes 
were customs duties, import taxes, and petrol tax. Non-taxes included court fees, rent of 
government properties, land sales, and other user fees and fines.  
Considering that even during the colonial period countries were at different 
levels of development, and hence the amount of taxes collected, in absolute terms, 
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differed markedly, the taxes and non-taxes were expressed as a percentage of the total 
revenue in each country. This ensured that only the proportion of direct tax, indirect tax, 
and non-taxes in total revenues were compared among the countries and not the actual 
amount of revenues collected. Another alternative would have been to express the total 
for each tax category as a share of GDP However, GDP figures for African countries 
are highly unreliable, even more so for the colonial period – if indeed they can be found 
(Jerven, 2013).   
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show the proportions of direct tax, indirect tax, and 
non-taxes in total central government revenues in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and 
Lesotho (LREs), and in Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, and Gambia (NLREs) for the period 
1910-1960, respectively. 
Figure 6. 1: Proportion of direct tax, indirect tax, and non-taxes in total central 
government revenues in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho (LRE) during 
the colonial period (1910-1960) 
 
Source: British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2015), Author’s calculations  
            Figure 6.1 shows that, between 1910-1950 in LREs, direct taxes either 
contributed as much revenue as indirect taxes (as was the case in Malawi and 
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Zimbabwe) or were the main source of revenue (as was the case in Lesotho and Zambia 
(after 1935)). After 1950, the proportion of direct taxes in all LREs was much higher 
than either the proportion of indirect tax or non-taxes. For Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, the increase in the contribution of direct taxes to total central government 
domestic revenue was influenced by the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in 1953 (Rosberg Jr, 1956). At this time, some of the taxes categorised as 
indirect taxes became sources of revenue for the federal government (Gulati, 1960). 
Consequently, direct taxes became the main source of revenue. The proportion of direct 
taxes in total revenue in Lesotho was always higher than that of indirect tax or non-taxes 
during the colonial period. The main reason for this was that income was heavily taxed 
in Lesotho, and the British relied on the king to enforce the tax law. Because the king 
was very powerful, the citizens were very tax-compliant (British Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, 2015b) 
Figure 6. 2: Proportion of direct tax, indirect tax, and non-taxes in total central 
government revenues in Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, and Gambia (NLRE) during 
the colonial period 
 
 
Source: British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2015), Author’s calculations 
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            Figure 6.2 shows that, during the colonial period, the proportion of indirect taxes 
in total revenues was always higher than direct taxes or non-taxes in Ghana and Gambia, 
while in Tanzania (Tanganyika) indirect taxes did not contribute much to total revenues 
until 1936. The construction of a railway line in the country, which promoted trade, was 
the main driver for the increase in the collection of indirect taxes after 1936 (British 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2015d).  In Uganda, the proportion of indirect taxes 
began to outweigh that of direct tax or non-taxes after 1949. The main driver for this 
increase was the greater demand for cash crops, such as cotton, coffee, and hides and 
skin. The export tax earned on these products increased by more than 800 times from 
£3,684 in 1948 to £2,967,986 in 1949, and the increase was sustained thereafter (British 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2015e). In Ghana, direct taxes were introduced in 
1944, while indirect taxes and user fees were being collected prior to this (British 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2015a). However, the significance of direct taxes 
remained low, as the country was more reliant on indirect taxes, especially trade taxes.  
To get a fuller picture of the tax structure in LREs and NLREs, I calculated the 
average proportion of direct taxes, indirect tax, and non-taxes for LREs and NLREs for 
the period 1911-1960. It should be noted that the proportion of a revenue category in 
total revenues might increase or decrease not because of a change in the amount of 
revenue collected from that revenue category, but rather because of a change in the other 
categories. For instance, in 1913, indirect taxes in Malawi amounted to MK13,000 
(£13), accounting for 10% of total central government domestic revenues. In 1914, 
indirect taxes amounted to MK14,000 (£14) but accounted for only 7% of total central 
government domestic revenues. The decrease in the proportion of indirect taxes in total 
revenues was due to the fact that, in 2014, direct taxes had increased much faster than 
the growth in indirect taxes. Thus, the decline in the proportion of indirect tax in total 
revenue was due to the increases in the other revenue categories and not because the 
amount of revenue collected from indirect tax category declined. Regardless, this does 
not pose a problem for this study, as the focus here is on determining which of the 
different revenue categories (direct, indirect, and non-taxes) countries in SSA relied 
more on. Table 6.3 shows the 10-year averages for the proportion of direct tax, indirect 
tax, and non-taxes in total central government revenues during the colonial period in 
both LREs and NLREs.  
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Table 6. 3: Contribution of direct tax, indirect tax and non-taxes to total revenues 
(percentage) in LREs and NLREs for the period 1911-1960 (10-year averages) 
  
Direct Tax/Total 
Revenues (%) 
Indirect Tax/Total 
Revenues (%) 
Non-Tax/Total 
Revenues (%) 
 Year LRE NLRE LRE NLRE LRE NLRE 
1911-20 45  40  15  
1921-30 40 37 38 32 22 31 
1931-40 39 38 38 37 23 25 
1941-50 53 28 29 46 17 25 
1951-60 52 18 31 60 17 22 
Source: British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2015) 
Table 6.3 shows that, throughout the period under review, LREs were collecting 
more domestic revenue from direct taxes than indirect taxes or non-taxes. The LREs had 
been more reliant on direct taxes than NLREs, especially after 1941. The contribution 
of direct tax to total revenues in the LREs averaged 41% between 1911-1940, then 
increased to 53% between 1941-1960. By contrast, direct taxes in NLREs averaged 38% 
between 1921-1940, then reduced to an average of 23% between 1941-1960.    
In general, during the colonial period, and especially after 1945, LREs relied 
more on direct taxes than indirect taxes or non-taxes, while NLREs relied more on 
indirect taxes than direct taxes or non-taxes. Thus, at independence, LREs inherited a 
tax system that was more reliant on direct taxes than indirect taxes. By contrast, NLREs 
inherited a tax system that was more reliant on indirect taxes than direct taxes.  
The empirical evidence on the colonial tax structure as presented in Table 6.3 is 
consistent with the colonial legacy theory put forward by Mkandawire (2010) for this 
period, although Mkandawire presented no empirical evidence. 
6.3.2 Empirical Evidence on Mkandawire’s Classification of Economic Structure 
in SSA for the Period 2000-2015 
 To show that the colonial legacy continues to have an impact on current levels 
of tax collection and tax structure in Africa, Mkandawire (2010) used tax data from 
1984-2004. Given the findings of the present study on the colonial tax structure in LREs 
and NLREs during the colonial period, and the analysis by Mkandawire for the period 
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1984-2004, it can be said that there is good evidence to suggest that the colonial legacy 
theory is valid for the colonial period and the earlier post-colonial period (1984-2004). 
However, this study seeks to determine how far the theory can explain the level of tax 
collection and tax structure in SSA in more recent years (2000-2015). To this end, I 
analysed tax data for LREs and NLREs (based on the country-level data presented in 
Table 6.1) using the ICTD/UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset (2017). Of the 
countries listed in Table 6.1, only those that had fewer than four years of consecutive 
missing data and not more than eight years of missing data during this period were 
included in the analysis. Consequently, Angola and Zambia were not included for LREs, 
and Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Mauritania were not included 
for NLREs. This means a total of 25 countries were included in this analysis. Table 6.4 
shows the comparison of the average tax structures for LREs, NRLEs, and Malawi for 
the period 1984-2004 (the period used by Mkandawire), and 2000-2015 (the period not 
covered by Mkandawire).  
Table 6. 4: Average revenue structure in labour reserve economies, non-labour 
reserve economies, and in Malawi for the periods 1984-2004, and 2000-2015 
Classification  Total 
Revenue / 
GDP (%) 
Tax 
Revenue 
/ GDP 
(%) 
Direct 
Tax/ 
GDP 
(%) 
Indirect 
Tax/ 
GDP 
(%) 
Non-
taxes/ 
GDP 
(%) 
Direct/ 
Tax 
Revenue 
(%) 
Labour reserve (1984-2004) 23.38 16.63 5.70 10.93 6.95 34 
Labour reserve (2000-2015) 25.29 18.61 6.21 12.40 6.68 33 
Non-labour reserve (1984-
2004) 
13.88 10.05 2.51 7.54 3.83 25 
Non-labour reserve (2000-
2015) 
15.79 11.48 3.50 7.98 4.31 30 
Malawi (1984-2004) 9.43 8.18 3.31 4.87 1.25 40 
Malawi (2000-2015) 13.54 12.35 5.46 6.89 1.19 44 
Source: ICTD/UN-WIDER Government revenue dataset, (2017) 
 
Comparing tax collection and tax structure for 1984-2004 with 2000-2015 for 
LREs and NLREs as shown in Table 6.4 reveals that the proportion of revenue obtained 
from direct taxes increased much more in NLREs between the two periods, from 2.5% 
of GDP to 3.5% of GDP (an increase of 39%), than in LREs, where the increase was 
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only 9% (from 5.7% of GDP to 6.2% of GDP).  This increase can also be seen in Table 
6.4 (last column on the left), where the proportion of direct taxes in total revenues 
slightly declined, from 34% to 33%, in LREs between the two periods, while it increased 
from 25% to 30% in NLREs. Thus, although the statistical predictions from the colonial 
legacy theory still hold when more recent tax data is used, the extent of that influence is 
declining with each passing year.  
  In Malawi (bottom two rows in Table 6.4), the overall tax pattern in terms of tax 
structure is that of an LRE, where the reliance is on direct taxes. The average share of 
direct tax in total revenues in Malawi between 1984-2004 was 40%; this increased to 
44% between 2000-2015 (see last column on the right in Table 6.4).  
These findings show that Mkandawire’s (2010) pattern of tax structure for LREs 
and NLREs holds, but is generally weakening. However, it holds more strongly for 
Malawi.  
6.4 Review of Tax Collection History in Malawi Since Introduction of Formal 
Taxes in 1891 
This section traces Malawi’s tax structure from the time formal taxes were 
introduced in 1891 until 2015. The aim is to understand the mechanism through which 
the high reliance on direct tax in Malawi was sustained throughout this period.   
6.4.1 Taxation During the Colonial Period (1891-1963) 
Formal taxation was introduced in Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) by the 
British. Malawi became a British protectorate on 11 June 1891 and received 
independence on 6 July 1964 (Baker, 1975). During the colonial period, each colony 
was encouraged to find ways of funding their local expenses without assistance from 
the British Treasury (Gardener, 2012). The two main sources of revenue for the colonial 
governments were the trade tax and hut tax (Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2014). In 
Malawi, trade taxes did not contribute significantly to revenue, especially during the 
earlier years of the administration. This is attributed mainly to the following three 
factors:  
1. Malawi is a landlocked country, which made transport of goods from inland to 
the coast slow and difficult, due to the poor road and rail infrastructure 
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(Nyasaland Financial Statement, 1911). This restricted the flow of trade and, 
hence, reduced collection of taxes from trade.  
2. Malawi did not trade in any goods or mineral resources other than ivory, which 
was not taxable (Nyasaland Financial Statement, 2011).  
3. During the early years of the colonial administration, the indigenous population 
was hostile to the white settlers in resistance to colonisation. One way in which 
they demonstrated this hostility was by blocking roads and rivers, thereby 
making it even more difficult to trade (Nyasaland Financial Statement, 1911; 
Morris, 2015).  
The colonial administration thus concentrated on taxing the indigenous people 
through hut tax or poll tax. In addition to raising revenue, the hut/poll tax was used to 
stimulate the flow of wage labour (Massey, 1978). Individuals who could not afford to 
pay the poll tax were forced to work in farms for a specified period of time (usually one 
month) in a system commonly known as Thangata51 (unpaid work) (Prowse, 2013). This 
system worked to the advantage of the settlers because commercial farming was limited 
to the small community of white settlers,52 as the indigenous people were prohibited 
from owning farms or starting formal businesses. Throughout the colonial period, the 
hut/poll tax was the main source of revenue for the colonial government, contributing 
as much as 55% of tax revenue between 1911-1920 (Table 6.6).  
The hut tax was first introduced in 1891. It applied to the indigenous population 
only, and was increased almost every year between 1891-1920 (Baker, 1975). In 1922, 
the colonial administration introduced corporate income tax (CIT), which applied to 
white businesses only (Nyasaland Protectorate, 1923). Between 1922-1930, CIT did not 
generate much revenue because there were few companies, which were also not very 
profitable53 (Nyasaland Protectorate, 1930). However, the contribution of CIT to total 
 
51 Thangata was an arrangement between the (European) estate owners and the indigenous people, 
where the estate owners would give the indigenous people a small piece of land to settle on and for 
subsistence farming in exchange for at least one month’s estate labour and an additional month’s 
protectorate hut tax.   
52 The white population in Malawi has never been large. There were a total of 314 white settlers in 
1901, 1,486 in 1921, 1,975 in 1931, and 1948 in 1945. The small community of white settlers was 
divided occupationally between farmers, those in trade and commerce, and government officials and 
missionaries (Palmer, 1985). 
53 Thomas (1975) reported that in 1952 there were only 11 companies in Malawi; one cigarette 
factory, one oil expression plant, two cloth factories, two blanket factories, one cement mill, two 
sweet factories, one soap factory, and one vehicle assembly plant.  
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domestic revenue increased at the onset of the Second World War in 1939. This was a 
result of increased demand for, and thus prices of, cotton and tea, which at that time 
were Malawi’s primary agricultural products (Nyasaland Protectorate, 1941) 
In 1953, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and 
Nyasaland (Malawi) were merged to form the Central African Federation (Rosberg Jr, 
1956). To finance the running of the federal government, over 95% of the trade taxes 
and some non-taxes (e.g., postal fees) were re-assigned to the federal government 
(Nyasaland Protectorate, 1955). Consequently, between 1953-1963 (the period the 
federation existed), income taxes accounted for over 60% of domestic revenue in 
Malawi (Nyasaland Protectorate, 1961) (Table 6.6).  
6.4.2 Taxation During Dr Banda’s Presidency (1964-1994) 
At independence, Dr Kamuzu Banda was elected president, a position he 
retained until 1994. During the colonial period, Malawians did not hold prominent 
positions in government and were not permitted to own commercial farms or formal 
businesses (Kydd 1988). Thus, to a large extent, Malawians did not have the technical 
and professional skills to run the government (Kaunda, 1995). To ensure a smooth 
transition from British rule to self-rule, Dr Banda retained a number of white settlers 
who had previously held senior positions in government, to enable skills transfer (Kydd, 
1988; Kaunda, 1995). 
As occurred during the colonial era, during Dr Banda’s term of office, there was 
no promotion of smallholder farming. Instead, Dr Banda promoted commercial farming 
and gave many advantages to close allies, allowing them to own and run commercial 
farms and other large-scale businesses (Kaunda, 1995). To acquire the financial 
resources needed for the development of commercial farming, the marketing board, the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), extracted resources 
from smallholders (especially those growing tobacco, cotton, and tea) both through 
controlled low prices and through formal commodity taxes (Kadyampakeni, 1988). 
Similar to the poll tax, the low prices offered to smallholder farmers rendered 
smallholder farming non-profitable, such that smallholder farmers were forced to seek 
work on commercial farms. Thus, the government practised a new variant of the colonial 
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practice of using taxes (and in this case, producer price controls) to force smallholder 
farmers to provide labour to the commercial sector at low cost. In addition, the profits 
made by ADMARC were invested in estate farming, not smallholder agriculture 
(Kadyampakeni, 1988). As a result, during Dr Banda’s tenure, only a few large 
businesses emerged. Dr Banda specifically promoted three entities: Press Holdings 
Limited, the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC), and ADMARC (Kaunda, 
1995). By the early 1970s, Press Holding Limited, a company wholly owned by Dr 
Banda, was the biggest contributor to GDP. At its peak, Press Holdings Limited 
accounted for one-third (33%) of Malawi’s GDP, employed 10% of the wage-earning 
workforce, and paid more than 30% of the taxes collected by the government (Meredith, 
2011; Cammack & Kelsall, 2011). 
Dr Banda’s policies on industrialisation were comparable to those of Mikhailov 
(the governor of Pskov Oblast, a region in north-western Russia) in the 1990s  
(Gehlbach, 2008). Mikhailov deliberately promoted a small number of large enterprises 
(vodka producers) to dominate the economy, as this sector was easy to tax and therefore 
would contribute more to the development of the region (Gehlbach, 2008). Pskov Oblast 
experienced significant economic growth as a result of this policy. Similarly, the 
promotion of a few big companies in Malawi allowed for greater operational control by 
Dr Banda (such as designating objectives and giving authoritative direction), since the 
large-scale commercial farms and big businesses were partly or wholly owned by Dr 
Banda, his close allies, or the government. Dr Banda also ensured that all companies in 
Malawi were tax-compliant (Van Donge, 2002); he encouraged tax compliance in his 
businesses, and those of his allies, as he wanted to serve as a role model for other 
entrepreneurs (Cammack & Kelsall, 2011). It is also reasonable to assume that Dr Banda 
encouraged tax compliance because he was the head of government. Thus, he needed 
funds for the running of the country.  
It should be noted that the key factors that explain the continued reliance on 
direct tax during Dr Banda’s tenure were two-fold. First was the economic structure, 
which was similar to that of the colonial period. As in the colonial period, economic 
activities were concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and companies. This made 
it easy for the tax-collecting agency to monitor the tax payments of these companies. 
Second was Dr Banda’s determination to ensure that companies and organisations paid 
taxes. The support that Dr Banda gave to the tax-collecting department was key to the 
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success of the Malawi Government in collecting taxes.  
6.4.3 Taxation in More Recent Years (1994-2015)  
Malawi changed from a one-party state under Dr Banda, to a multiparty 
democracy in 1994. However, as noted in Chapter 2, this change did not have a 
significant impact on the modus operandi of the government. The biggest impact on the 
economy emerged four years before Dr Banda’s rule of Malawi came to an end in 1990, 
with the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The SAPs 
involved changing most of the policies that Dr Banda had followed, such as removing 
the fixed price at which smallholder farmers could sell their products; liberalisation of 
agricultural marketing, thereby allowing more players to enter the system; and 
privatisation (either wholly or partially) of public holding companies, such as 
ADMARC. In addition, the privately-owned Press Holdings Limited was broken down 
to create small independent entities (Chipeta, 1998; Kalua et al., 1992; Kydd, 1988), 
thereby increasing the number of companies in the country. 
These developments in the 1990s had an impact on the economic structure of 
Malawi, as the size of some companies was reduced, thereby, in theory, creating a more 
competitive environment. In addition, price and marketing liberalisation was, in 
principle, intended to ensure that smallholder farmers could flourish and create a more 
diversified economy (Chirwa, 2004). The change from Dr Banda’s economic structure 
and the change from one-party to multiparty rule may have had a negative impact on 
direct tax collection in Malawi in two ways. First, the tax administration had to collect 
direct taxes from a significantly greater number of companies, making it more difficult 
monitor all businesses. Second, the support that the tax administration had received from 
Dr Banda, who encouraged tax compliance, was lacking after his presidency ended.  
Table 6.6 shows that direct taxes as a share of total revenue was slightly higher 
than indirect tax during the early Banda period (1964-80), averaging 45%, and then 
declined to 33% during the later Banda tenure and early post-Banda period (1980 to 
1995). The decline in direct tax collection (and total tax revenue collection in general) 
between 1980-1995 reflects the political (change from a one-party to a multiparty 
system, a volatile period) and policy instability (SAPs) during this period (Chapter 2). 
The share of total revenue accounted for by direct tax increased to an average of 41% 
between 1995-2015. Given that Dr Banda was no longer president, and hence the 
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pressure that businesses were under from Dr Banda to be tax-compliant reduced, and 
the fact that most of the major SAPs were implemented in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the question arises of what explains the continued reliance on direct tax in 
Malawi in the more recent period (1995-2015). 
There are three likely explanations for this continued reliance after 1994: the 
introduction of VAT in 2005 (discussed in Chapter 2), the structure of the Malawian 
economy, and close surveillance of large businesses. The latter two factors are discussed 
in this section.  
Structure of the Malawian Economy  
As has been confirmed in Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, the economic 
structure, practices, and mindsets that led to the high collection of direct taxes during 
the colonial period and during Dr Banda’s presidency persist in present-day Malawi. 
The administrative practices that prevailed during Banda’s tenure have continued 
because minimal operational changes occurred during the transition from a one-party 
state (Banda’s tenure) to a multiparty democracy (from 1994, with Dr Bakili Muluzi as 
the president). Cammack (2004) described the change from a one-party state to a 
multiparty democracy as “transition without transformation,” as many systems and 
personalities did not change. Cammack (2004) further argued that the economic strategy 
articulated by the new United Democratic Front (UDF) government and President 
Muluzi conformed to that of the previous government. Thus, tax collectors continue to 
believe that they can collect a significant amount of revenue from direct tax, and this 
focus has not changed. In addition, the de-merging of companies such as Press Holdings 
Limited did not significantly impact the structure of the economy, since income is still 
concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and businesses. As noted in Chapter 5, 
less than 2% of businesses in Malawi are classified as “large”, yet they contribute over 
70% of the tax revenues.  
Close Surveillance of Large Businesses  
One of the major changes made to tax administration between 2000 and 2015 
was the creation of the semi-autonomous revenue authority, the MRA. According to the 
former Deputy Commissioner General (DCG) of the Malawi Revenue Authority, the 
creation of the MRA boosted tax collector morale such that tax collectors worked hard 
 
 
 
132 
to ensure that more taxes were collected. Specifically, the former DCG pointed out that: 
When the MRA was created and staff who worked in the tax departments in the 
Ministry of Finance in Lilongwe were moved to the Malawi Revenue Authority 
offices in Blantyre, salaries were more than tripled, training opportunities were 
available for almost everyone, equipment such as computers were made 
available, bonuses were introduced for beating the tax collection target, and 
better working conditions in general were offered. This greatly motivated the 
staff to work hard. (Interview with Mr C.C. Kulemeka, 13 December 2016) 
Due to increased motivation, MRA staff believed they could collect more tax 
from big businesses, as they used to during the Dr Banda era, by re-establishing close 
surveillance of larger companies. This belief further led to the reorganisation of MRA 
functions, which resulted in the creation of the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) in 2007. 
Unlike other departments in the MRA, the operations of the LTU are highly efficient 
and effective (see Chapter 5). Table 6.5 shows the amount of taxes collected from large 
taxpayers by the LTU.  
Table 6. 5: Average contribution of various taxes to total tax revenue in Malawi 
between 2000-2015 
Tax Type 
Tax Type/Total 
Revenues (%) 
Direct Taxes 47 
  PAYE 28 
       o/w LTU  20 
  Corporate income tax  11 
       o/w LTU 10 
  Withholding tax  8 
       o/w LTU 6 
Indirect Taxes  53 
  Customs duties (import duty, import excise, 
import VAT) 
O 
32 
  Other taxes (VAT, excise, etc.)  21 
       o/w LTU 16 
Total Tax Revenue 100 
Source: Malawi Revenue Authority, 2016 
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Note: LTU = Large Taxpayer Unit; VAT = value added tax 
Table 6.5 shows that direct tax as a share of total revenue averaged 47% between 
2000-2015. PAYE accounts for 60% (28y47) of direct taxes, while corporate income 
tax accounts for 23% (11y47) of direct taxes. Of the total direct taxes, 77% 
((20+10+8)y47) is collected by the LTU from large taxpayers. During the 2014/15 fiscal 
year, 32,000 taxpayers were registered and had made at least one tax payment to the 
MRA in the previous three years. Of the registered taxpayers, 451 were classified by the 
MRA as large taxpayers. Thus, 77% of direct taxes in Malawi is collected from less than 
2% (451y32,000=1.4) of the registered taxpayers.   
I interviewed six officers working in the LTU to discover why they were more 
successful in collecting direct taxes than the small and medium taxpayer units.  All the 
officers interviewed attributed the success to the close surveillance that the LTU 
maintains on large taxpayers. One officer in LTU explained that:   
I do not blame the small and medium taxpayer units for failing to collect a 
significant amount of income taxes from their taxpayers. They manage too many 
taxpayers, such that closely following each taxpayer would not make sense. The 
result is that many taxpayers are either not paying income taxes or they are 
grossly under paying. By contrast, officers in the LTU manage few taxpayers 
and follow up with each taxpayer. For instance, one of the taxpayers that was 
giving us problems in paying PAYE was the Government. What we did was 
assign an officer whose main job it is to ensure that the government has made 
PAYE payments. On a monthly basis, when PAYE is due, this officer makes 
phone calls to remind officers in the Accountant General Department (AGD) to 
make the PAYE payment. Sometimes, the officer has to physically visit the AGD 
offices several times before the cheque for PAYE is written and given to us. We 
can afford to have this kind of follow-up with taxpayers because we manage few 
taxpayers. It would be too expensive for small or medium taxpayer units to 
implement similar close follow-ups. (Interview with an officer from LTU, MRA, 
15th November 2016) 
Aside from the collection of direct taxes, the LTU also collects indirect taxes, 
such as VAT and excise tax. Table 6.5 shows that 80% (16y20) of the other domestic 
taxes (VAT, excise etc.) are collected from large taxpayers.  
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In general, taxes collected from large taxpayers in Malawi account for 
approximately 70% of the revenue collected by MRA (MRA, 2017). It is this high 
contribution of tax revenue from large taxpayers that forces the MRA to closely monitor 
the operations and tax payments of large businesses.  
Table 6.6 shows the five-year average share of direct tax, indirect tax, and non-
taxes in GDP in Malawi between 1911-2015. The table shows that tax collection 
declined during the later years of Banda’s presidency and the early years of the 
multiparty era (1980-1995). Thereafter, tax collection began to increase. However, the 
increase in tax collection between 1995-2005 was a recovery of the slump of 1990-95. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and the present chapter, the increase in tax collection between 
2005-2015 was  due to a combination of three factors: the introduction of VAT in 2005; 
the structure of the economy in Malawi, where income is concentrated in the hands of a 
few individuals and businesses, thereby making it tax administration easier; and the 
close surveillance of large taxpayers by the LTU.  
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Table 6. 6: Proportion of direct taxes, indirect taxes, and non-taxes in total 
central government revenues in Malawi (1911-2015) (five-year averages)  
Year Direct Tax/total 
Revenue (%) 
Indirect Tax/Total 
Revenue (%) 
Non-Tax/Total 
Revenue (%) 
 1911-1915  55 34 11 
 1916-1920  49 39 12 
 1920-1925  44 40 16 
 1926-1930  40 44 16 
 1931-1935  37 44 19 
 1936-1940  35 39 26 
 1941-1945  52 31 17 
 1946-1950  42 43 15 
 1951-1955  37 35 28 
 1956-1960  59 31 10 
 1961-1963  52 33 15 
1966-1970 48 49 3 
1971-1975 42 57 1 
1976-1980 46 53 1 
 1980-1985 33 51 16 
 1986-1990 34 52 14 
 1991-1995 33 53 14 
 1996-2000 39 51 10 
 2001-2005 39 49 12 
 2006-2010 42 50 8 
 2011-2015 44 49 7 
Sources: (Nyasaland Financial Reports and Statements, 1909; Nyasaland Protectorate,1912; Nyasaland 
Protectorate, 1920; Nyasaland Protectorate, 1940;1953;196154; Chipeta, 1998 (1970-1980); ICTD/ 
UNC WIDER Government Revenue Database, 2017).  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter aimed at identifying the reasons why Malawi is so successful in collecting 
direct taxes. The high reliance on direct tax for a low-income country like Malawi is 
 
54 The Financial Reports and Statements can be found on the British Online Archives website: 
http://microform.digital/boa/collections/23/volumes/390/finance-1911-1966  
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unusual given that empirical evidence shows that low-income countries with a weak tax 
administration and a big informal sector typically have a higher reliance on indirect 
taxes than direct taxes.  In exploring this anomaly, I have assessed, tested, and updated 
an influential paper on the influence of colonial legacy on tax collection in SSA by 
Mkandawire (2010).    
The analyses showed that, during the early years of colonisation, the only 
available source of revenue for the colonial government was taxation of the local people 
through the hut/poll tax. Throughout the colonial period, there were no policies to 
encourage entrepreneurship or industrialisation by the indigenous people, as the system 
was deliberately skewed to benefit large settler enterprises, mainly plantations. This 
resulted in the creation of few large, formal, labour-intensive businesses. The efforts of 
the government to tax individuals and the few formal businesses led to the high reliance 
on direct tax. Direct tax collection remained high in Malawi even after the country 
gained independence in 1964, and up to 1994, as its policy and economic structures 
remained broadly similar to those of the colonial period. In other words, the collection 
of direct tax by the tax administration was made easier due to the combination of 
concentration of income in the hands of a few individuals and businesses, and state 
determination and ability to tax large enterprises.  The late 1980s and early 1990s 
brought a number of changes to the economic structure and administration in Malawi, 
including the implementation of SAPs, which resulted in the de-merging of large 
companies, such as Press Holdings Limited. Reliance on direct tax in Malawi initially 
declined between 1990-1994 but has since remained high compared to other SSA 
countries. This is attributed to income being generated by only a few individuals and 
companies, the introduction of VAT in 2005, and the close surveillance of large 
taxpayers.  
Thus, in general, Malawi’s history and its economic structure significantly 
contribute to explaining the high ratio of direct tax to total revenues.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it provides a review 
of the history of tax collection in Malawi since the introduction of formal taxes in 1891, 
until 2015. Second, it adds to the limited empirical evidence on how colonial history 
shaped, and continues to shape, the level of tax collection and tax structure in SSA, 
including in Malawi, by updating the most influential paper on the colonial legacy, 
authored by Mkandawire (2010). Third, it challenges the commonly held view that low-
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income countries, which usually have weak tax administration and a large informal 
sector, are better placed to rely more on indirect taxes, as these are easier to collect than 
direct taxes. The evidence in this chapter points to the fact that these low-income 
countries can still collect significant revenue from direct taxes if the government is 
committed and able to tax the sectors with the greatest potential for revenue generation, 
typically large businesses, individuals with a high income, and the extractive industry.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction  
           Although the number of studies on tax revenue mobilisation in Malawi has 
increased over the years (Chamley et al., 1985; Chipeta, 1998; Chiumya, 2008; 
Chafuwa, Kenani & Kaunda, 2017) these studies have generally focused on tax policy 
changes and trends in tax revenue collection. To the best of my knowledge, no study 
has been undertaken to understand why tax revenue performance in Malawi, in terms of 
tax effort and tax-to-GDP ratio, has been better than in most SSA countries since 2009, 
or why there has been a high reliance on direct tax in Malawi compared to most SSA 
countries since the inception of formal taxes in 1891. This thesis is the first attempt to 
comprehensively address these issues; in doing so, it has provided some plausible 
answers to the following questions:  
• Why did the ratio of tax-to-GDP in Malawi increase significantly between 2005-
2011, from 10% to 17.5% of GDP?  
• Why, in recent years (since 2009), has the tax-to-GDP ratio been significantly 
higher in Malawi than in comparable SSA countries? 
• Why and how, since 1964, have the Malawian tax authorities been able to raise 
an unusually high proportion of total tax revenue (and total revenue) from direct 
taxes, i.e., taxes on income. These figures are high for Malawi compared to most 
SSA countries, and indeed to low-income countries generally. 
Based on the understanding that level of tax revenue collection mainly depends 
on, among other things: tax policy; the actions of taxpayers; the actions of tax collectors; 
and the structure of the economy, the following four hypotheses were explored:  
• The introduction of value added tax (VAT) in 2005 led to increases in the 
collection of both direct and indirect taxes.   
• Malawians are exceptionally good and willing taxpayers (i.e., tax morale is high) 
relative to the populations in other SSA countries. 
• Malawi has an effective tax administration.  
• Malawi’s colonial history has steered the country towards a relatively higher tax 
revenue performance.  
In the next section, I reflect on the findings from the investigation of these 
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hypotheses. I then present the main conclusion of this thesis and its contribution to 
literature. Next, I discuss the implications of my findings for policy and practice, and 
what I have learned from carrying out this research. I conclude with a discussion of 
future possible research directions.  
7.2 Reflection on Empirical Findings 
7.2.1 Impact of the Introduction of Value Added Tax on Revenue Collection  
In Chapter 2, I found that, after VAT was introduced in Malawi in 2005, the tax-to-GDP 
ratio began to increase, driven mainly by the increase in both VAT collection and other 
taxes. VAT started to be introduced in many low-income countries in the 1990s (Gbato, 
2017). Based on a sample of 32 countries in SSA, Gbato (2017) found that, following 
the introduction of VAT in these countries, the share of indirect revenues rose from 27% 
in 1990 to 43% of total tax revenues in 2010. Gbato (2017) attributes this to the ease of 
implementation and the low economic cost of VAT as the main drivers of the 
mobilisation of significant revenue. Considering that the trend is largely similar in most 
countries in SSA, where the introduction of VAT leads to increased revenue collection, 
it is reasonable to attribute the significant increase in tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi, 
especially between 2005-2011, to the introduction of VAT.  
Indeed, aside from the role of VAT, I did not find any other explanation for why 
tax collection increased rapidly in Malawi between 2005-2011 and then plateaued. The 
political and economic stressors of 2011-2013 may have contributed to the plateauing 
of VAT collection and the tax-to-GDP ratio in general. However, both the political and 
economic environment improved after 2014 and yet VAT collection, and the tax-to-
GDP ratio generally, has not changed. Investigating why the tax-to-GPP ratio plateaued 
in Malawi post-2011 is beyond the scope of this thesis, but represents an interesting 
avenue for future research.  
7.2.2 Malawians are Willing Taxpayers 
The second hypothesis I explored (Chapters 3 and 4) was that Malawians are 
good and willing taxpayers relative to the populations in other SSA countries. This 
hypothesis addresses the question of why the tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi is unusually 
high compared to the average for SSA countries since 2009.  
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The cross-country analysis of tax morale in Malawi and other SSA countries 
showed that tax morale in Malawi does not significantly differ from the average tax 
morale in other SSA countries. In other words, Malawians are no more or less willing 
to pay taxes than the populations in other SSA countries. However, an analysis of tax 
morale among business people in Malawi showed that: large businesses have high tax 
morale compared to small or medium businesses; businesses operating in Blantyre have 
higher tax morale than those operating in Lilongwe; and businesses in the construction 
sector have lower tax morale compared to businesses operating in other sectors. 
 It has been shown in Chapter 6 that revenue collected by the LTU in Malawi 
accounts for approximately 70% of revenue collected by the MRA since 2000. Thus, 
although tax morale in Malawi is not significantly different from the average tax morale 
for SSA countries, the fact that large businesses and businesses operating in Blantyre 
have high tax morale may be contributing to the overall good tax revenue performance 
in Malawi. However, I did not conduct any statistical analysis to determine whether 
large taxpayers and taxpayers in Blantyre do indeed have higher tax compliance than 
small/medium taxpayers and taxpayers in Lilongwe, respectively. Thus, arguing that 
large business and businesses in Blantyre may be contributing to the high tax collection 
in Malawi because they have higher tax morale than other business groups is in no way 
arguing that high tax morale (which relates to attitudes towards taxes) automatically 
translates to high tax compliance (which relates to the behaviour of taxpayers).  
7.2.3 The Effective Tax Administration in Malawi 
The third hypothesis explored in this thesis relates to the effectiveness of the tax 
administration (Chapter 5). I conducted a detailed analysis of the efficiency and 
effectiveness (process performance) of the revenue collecting units in the MRA in four 
areas: taxpayer registration and data management, dispute resolution, tax audit, and 
taxpayer education.  The overall performance was found to be mixed. Only one of the 
revenue collecting units, the LTU, was found to be efficient and effective in carrying 
out all the functions assessed; the small and medium taxpayer units were found to be 
ineffective and inefficient.  
Although the results were mixed, they highlight an important feature of tax 
collection in Malawi. It was noted that the LTU was introduced in 2007 and has since 
become the key tax revenue-collecting unit, collecting as much as 70% of tax revenue. 
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It is therefore reasonable to attribute both the significant increase in tax-to-GDP ratio 
between 2005-2011 and the good tax revenue performance in Malawi relative to other 
SSA countries since 2009 in large part to the efficiency and effectiveness of the LTU. I 
recognise that most low-income countries have introduced an LTU within their tax 
administration (Tennant & Tracey, 2018). In general, the LTUs manage a small number 
of taxpayers but account for the highest share of tax revenue collected by tax 
administrations (Tennant & Tracey, 2018). Thus, the fact that the LTU in Malawi 
collects a significant amount of revenue is not on its own a sufficient reason to explain 
the good tax revenue performance in the country. However, when we consider the 
colonial and post-colonial political and economic history of Malawi (discussed in 
Chapter 6) and  the importance of the close surveillance of large businesses promoted 
by Dr Banda between 1964-1994, the importance of the LTU becomes significant and 
can be noted to be the crucial factor influencing tax revenue collection in Malawi since 
2007.  
 7.2.4 Colonial Legacy  
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 it was noted that, at independence, Malawi inherited 
a tax system that was highly reliant on direct tax, a situation which has persisted to date. 
This suggests that there is something inherent to the history of taxation and/or the 
framework of Malawi’s economy that has driven the country towards being more reliant 
on direct tax and generating higher tax revenue.  Indeed, a well-renowned scholar from 
Malawi, Thandika Mkandawire, investigated the relationship between level of tax 
collection and tax structure in SSA and the region’s colonial legacy (Mkandawire, 
2010).  
Mkandawire (2010) classifies countries of Africa according to structures of 
colonial economic exploitation (labour reserve economies, cash crop economies, and 
concessional companies). Malawi is classified as a labour reserve economy, and 
Mkandawire argues that these are better able to raise revenue and more reliant on direct 
taxes. This argument was based on statistical analysis for the period 1984-2004. I have 
expanded Mkandawire’s theory in two ways.  First, I looked deeper (1910-1960) into 
records of revenue-raising in Malawi and seven other countries in SSA and found that 
Mkandawire’s argument holds. Second, I looked at comparative revenue performance 
for 25 countries in Africa for a more recent period (2000-2015) and again found that 
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Mkandawire’s pattern holds, but is generally weakening. However, it holds more 
strongly for Malawi. Why has the colonial legacy had such a strong impact in Malawi? 
The likely answer to this question reveals the importance of and linkage between the 
colonial legacy and the close surveillance of large taxpayers in Malawi through the LTU.  
Since colonial period, Malawi has had an unusual pattern of ownership of major 
economic assets, where most assets are owned by a few individuals. It is, therefore, 
critical that those with high income and wealth are closely monitored by the revenue 
authority.  
7.3 Main Conclusions and Contribution of the Thesis to Literature   
It was difficult to reach clear answers to the three main research questions. The 
conclusions of the study are as follows: 
1. The drastic increase in tax-to-GDP ratio between 2005-2011 in Malawi is 
partially explained by the introduction of value added tax (VAT) in 2005 
(Chapter 2), which resulted in improvements in the collection of both direct and 
indirect taxes. It must be noted that, apart from the role of VAT, I did not find 
any other explanation for why tax collection increased rapidly between 2005-
2011 and then plateaued.  
2. The higher tax-to-GDP ratio in Malawi compared to other sub-Saharan African 
countries since 2009 is partially explained by the combination of the introduction 
of VAT in 2005 and the ability of the Malawi Revenue Authority to collect 
significant revenues from large companies and their employees, despite the use 
of tax collection methods that appear to be lagging behind technological 
frontiers. 
3. The ability of the Malawi Revenue Authority (and previous tax administrations, 
even during the colonial period) to collect significant revenue from large 
companies and their employees explains the high reliance on direct tax in 
Malawi. This ability is facilitated by Malawi’s economic structure, where 
income is concentrated into the hands of just a few businesses and individuals; 
this has been the case during both the colonial and the post-colonial eras. 
Overall, the thesis makes two major contributions to the existing literature, in 
regard to both theoretical and empirical knowledge: 
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1. It contributes to the debate on tax revenue mobilisation in SSA by providing 
comprehensive evidence from Malawi on how a low-income country with a 
pattern of tax administration that appears to be ineffective by normal measures, 
is effective in practice.  
2. It contributes to the limited evidence on the colonial legacy theory, which 
suggests that the current tax structure and level of tax collection in SSA stems 
from its colonial history. Due to data scarcity prior to 2015, no comprehensive 
empirical evidence on the tax structure and level of tax collection during the 
colonial era (prior to 1960) and more recent years (2004-2015) has been 
produced. This thesis has provided evidence related to this topic.  
7.4 Implications for Policy and Practice 
Having presented the main findings of this study in the previous section, it is important 
to illustrate how these findings could contribute to future policy formulation. If tax 
revenue collection in Malawi is to be enhanced, or at least sustained at existing levels, 
it is critical for policymakers to have a broad understanding of the dynamics of tax 
revenue mobilisation. Significantly, the results suggest that, as well as implementing 
policies that would lead to increased tax revenue collection, it is also important for the 
government to ensure that success is safeguarded and sustained. There are four key 
policy implications emanating from this study: 1) the need to improve tax morale among 
small and medium taxpayers, taxpayers in Lilongwe, and taxpayers in the construction 
sector; 2) the need to improve tax administration, especially for the small and medium 
taxpayer units; 3) the need to support the LTU to sustain the good tax revenue collection; 
and 4) the need to improve the efficiency of VAT.   
1) Improving tax morale among small and medium taxpayers and businesses 
in various sectors. Tax morale has been found to be one of the key determining 
factors of tax compliance (Alm & Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; Torgler, 2007). The 
empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4 shows that tax morale is low among 
business people in Lilongwe compared to those in Blantyre, small and medium 
taxpayers compared to large taxpayers, and business people in the construction 
sector compared to those in other sectors. As one of the key determining factors 
of tax compliance, it is important that measures be employed to improve the tax 
morale of taxpayers in these categories. 
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2) Improving tax administration, especially in data management, dispute 
resolution, and taxpayer education. It was established in Chapter 5 that tax 
administration in Malawi is weak. Although the LTU is efficient and effective 
in fulfilling its functions, in many instances, it does so only by using 
unconventional measures that are less reliable, such as using MS Excel to store 
and update taxpayer data. Improving tax administration in Malawi may lead to 
an increase in tax collection; more importantly, it will also ensure that the good 
tax revenue performance is sustained. There are at least two interventions that 
the MRA could initiate to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all the 
revenue collecting units. First, is improvement in taxpayer data management. 
The procurement of ITAS, a system aimed at improving taxpayer data 
management, should be supported and facilitated. Second, there is a clear need 
for the Malawian Government to introduce a taxpayer tribunal to deal with the 
bottlenecks in the dispute resolution process. A tax tribunal is an independent 
body that ensures that taxpayers’ arguments are heard, and objective decisions 
are made. Having an independent body responsible for taxpayer disputes will 
improve taxpayers’ trust in the tax authority. However, in the short term, the 
MRA should immediately produce a detailed information sheet about the dispute 
resolution process and make it available to all taxpayers, especially small and 
medium ones.  
3) Supporting the LTU. It was noted in Chapters 5 and 6 that the good tax revenue 
performance in Malawi is partly due to the combined effect of the economic 
structure, where income is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and 
businesses, and close surveillance of large businesses is carried out by the LTU. 
Thus, any weaknesses in the operation of the LTU will clearly have a significant 
impact on tax collection in Malawi. The MRA should therefore continue 
investing in the LTU to ensure that it fulfils its functions and operates effectively. 
Currently, the LTU utilises unreliable measures to address weaknesses in the tax 
administration. As the number of taxpayers administered in the LTU increases, 
it will become more difficult for the LTU to continue its reliance on these less 
dependable means. The biggest challenge with the LTU is data management, 
followed by weaknesses in audit case selection. Thus, supporting the operations 
of the LTU will involve improving the operations of other departments, such as 
the audit department.  
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4) Improving the efficiency of VAT. The introduction of VAT in Malawi has been 
key to the dramatic increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio between 2005-2011. 
However, the growth in VAT has stalled since 2011. There is, therefore, a need 
for the MRA to invest more in measures that will increase VAT collection.  
5) Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the small and medium 
taxpayer units. The bulk of tax revenue in Malawi is collected by the LTU. The 
MRA has therefore placed much emphasis on improving the operation of the 
LTU. However, there has been comparatively little focus on improving the 
operations of the small and medium taxpayer units. Improving these operations 
will achieve two things. First, more tax revenue would be collected, thus 
improving tax revenue mobilisation in Malawi. It has been noted that over 95% 
of taxpayers in Malawi are small and medium taxpayers; the importance of 
ensuring that as many as possible of these taxpayers make their tax payments 
cannot be overstated. The greatest potential for Malawi to increase the tax-to-
GDP ratio lies in these categories of taxpayers, as they are currently not 
effectively or efficiently managed. The reluctance to put too much emphasis on 
the operations of the small and medium taxpayer units by the MRA is likely due 
to the high administrative costs associated with administration of this category 
of taxpayers (Evans et al., 2013; Coolidge, 2012). However, considering the 
advancements in information technology (IT), the MRA should explore the use 
of IT systems in the administration of small and medium taxpayers. Second, it 
will improve the tax compliance culture among small and medium taxpayers, 
thereby ensuring that they are more compliant if and when they graduate to 
become large taxpayers. 
7.5 What I Learned From This Research  
Over the past three and half years that I have been working on this thesis, I have learned 
various valuable lessons. In this section, I will highlight only two.  
First, to be wary of standardised approaches. Assessment of tax administration 
performance in low-income counties is being carried out under TADAT. TADAT 
provides useful information based upon which countries can improve their 
administration. However, what I have learned from this research is that what is 
considered to be an ‘international standard’ with regard to process performance in 
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TADAT, does not necessarily translate to high tax revenue performance, as is the case 
for Malawi. There is a need to go beyond the standardised approaches such as TADAT 
and consider country nuances to better understand tax administration performance in 
low-income countries, such as Malawi, a country with a pattern of tax administration 
that, by normal measures, appears to be ineffective but is effective in practice.  
Second, to be wary of cross-sectional data. Cross-sectional data provides information 
such as people’s views and attitudes about an issue at a particular time.  However, 
people’s views and attitudes may change based on place and time. Accordingly, this 
means that the findings of any research that is based on cross-sectional data applies only 
to the time the survey was conducted. For example, using Afrobarometer data collected 
in 2011/2012 (R5) and in 2013/14 (R6) to analyse tax morale in Malawi yielded 
conflicting results. Therefore, the interpretation of the results of tax morale studies based 
on cross-sectional survey data should consider the prevailing political and economic 
environment at the time of data collection, and any other factors that may affect people’s 
attitudes and behaviour.  
7.6 Future Research Direction 
This thesis has identified many opportunities for future research and for refining 
the analysis in this thesis. Below are some of those I hope to pursue further.  
First, the analysis of tax morale conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 can be augmented 
through studies that consider the behaviour of taxpayers and not just their attitudes 
towards taxation. The analysis in this thesis has shown that, while tax morale studies 
provide insight into taxpayer attitudes, people’s attitudes change with time; the 
significant variation between people’s attitudes in R5 and R6 in Malawi is evidence of 
this. Accordingly, augmenting tax morale studies with studies that closely look at 
taxpayer behaviour, such as field experiments, would provide a more comprehensive 
picture of the drivers of tax compliance in a country. 
Second, Chapter 4 has indicated that going beyond TADAT assessment to 
closely evaluate tax administration performance in the same areas assessed under 
TADAT can provide a better understanding of a tax administration’s performance. I was 
only able to assess the MRA on four of the nine areas assessed under TADAT. It would 
be useful to assess the MRA on all nine areas for a more comprehensive understanding 
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of the challenges and weaknesses of the institution. Clearly, this would require gaining 
access to disaggregated taxpayer data, which was the key limitation preventing me from 
assessing all nine areas for this study. Convincing the MRA of the usefulness of 
undertaking such an assessment of the tax administration, as well as providing them 
with alternative suggestions for how the disaggregated taxpayer data can be accessed 
without compromising confidentiality, may lead to researchers being provided access to 
this data in the future.    
Finally, although much has been written about the colonial legacy theory, due to 
data limitations, prior to this work, the tax structure and level of tax collection in the 
colonial period had only been assumed. I was only able to provide empirical evidence 
of the tax structure in both labour reserve and non-labour reserve economies based on 
eight countries, four labour reserve and four non-labour reserve. According to 
Mkandawire’s (2010) classification of countries based on the nature of their 
incorporation into the colonial system, there are 11 countries classified as labour reserve 
and 22 countries classified as either cash crop or concessional companies. Accordingly, 
including more countries in the analysis of the colonial legacy theory and tracing the 
mechanism through which the colonial legacy has persisted in the post-colonial era to 
affect the level of tax collection and tax structure in different countries would provide 
greater insights into this theory and enhance the current understanding of tax revenue 
mobilisation in SSA.   
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Appendix 2.1:  MRA organogram  
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Appendix 4.2: Descriptive statistics: Afrobarometer data (merged for R5 and R6) 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev Min  Max 
Tax Morale  60,692 0.592 0.491 0 1 
Deterrence 52,160 3.235 0.874 0 4 
Fiscal  61,198 2.507 0.895 1 4 
Unequal 
Treatment  
61,565 1.686 1.077 1 4 
Trust  58,904 1.543 1.056 1 4 
Corruption  55,271 1.469 0.877 1 4 
Democracy  58,112 2.346 1.079 0 4 
Tax 
Knowledge  
55,165 2.102 0.958 1 4 
Female  63,585 0.503 0.499 0 1 
Education  63,445 3.434 2.212 0 9 
Age  63,290 27.986 14.007 18 105 
Urban  62,985 0.389 0.487 0 1 
Employment  59,777 0.246 0.431 0 1 
Malawi  63,586 0.378 0.191 0 1 
    * Significant at .10 level. 
  ** Significant at .05 level. 
*** Significant at .01 level. 
Appendix 4.3: Wald Test model 1 (R5 data) 
Wald Chi2 677.10 
Number of observations  27,139 
Prob>chi2 0.00 
 
Appendix 4.4: Wald Test, model 2 (R6 Data) 
Wald Chi2 872.67 
Number of observations   33,086 
Prob>chi2 0.00 
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Appendix 4.5: Wald Test, Model 3 (merged data-R5 and R6) 
Chi2 913.43 
Number of observations   43,578 
Prob>chi2 0.00 
 
Appendix 4.6: Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test: Model 1  
Number of observations  27,139 
Pearson chi2 26,973 
Hosner_Lemeshow Chi2 () 11.98 
Prob > chi2  0.2159 
 
 
Appendix 4.7: Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test: Model 2  
Number of observations  33,086 
Number of covariate patterns 32,595 
Pearson Chi2  (32613.07) 
Prob > chi2  0.4351 
 
 
Appendix 4.8: Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test: Model 3  
Number of observations  42,145 
Number of covariate patterns 40,344 
Pearson Chi2  40,133 
Prob > chi2  0.3159 
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Appendix 4.9: Ordered Logit Regression, Equation 1, merged data 
Variable  
Not wrong at all 
Wrong but 
understandable 
Wrong and 
punishable 
Deterrence  -0.04 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)** 0.05 (0.02)** 
Fiscal  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01(0.00) 0.02 (0.01) 
Tax Knowledge  0.08 (0.02)** 0.02 (0.01)** -0.05 (0.02)** 
Corruption  0.01 (0.01)* 0.00 (0.00)* -0.1 (0.01)* 
Business size -0.08(0.05)** -0.04 (0.03)** 0.12 (0.08)** 
Lilongwe 0.12 (0.03)*** -0.05 (0.02)*** -0.17 (0.04)*** 
Registration status   -0.03 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02) 0.04 (0.06) 
Female  -0.03 (0.03)* -0.01 (0.01)* 0.04 (0.05)* 
Retail   0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.05) 
Manufacturing  -0.04 (0.07) -0.02 (0.03) 0.07 (0.11) 
Accommodation   -0.03 (0.06) -0.01 (0.03) 0.05 (0.09) 
Construction  0.13 (0.08)* 0.06 (0.04)* -0.19 (0.12)* 
Transport  0.05 (0.07) 0.02 (0.03) -0.07 (0.11) 
    * Significant at .10 level. 
  ** Significant at .05 level. 
*** Significant at .01 level. 
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Appendix 4.10: Survey Questionnaire  
QUESTIONNAIRE : TAX COMPLIANCE IN MALAWI 
Questionnaire number_____ 
Interviewer_______________       
Interviewer: When you arrive at the interview location please introduce yourself using 
the following script. You must learn this introduction so that you can say it exactly as it 
is written below.  
Good morning/afternoon. My name is ____________. I am conducting a survey on behalf 
of Mr. Waziona Ligomeka. Mr. Ligomeka is a PhD student at the University of Sussex in 
the United Kingdom. As part of his studies, he is conducting a survey on the experiences 
and views of business people in Malawi on the Malawi tax system. As a business 
person/company operating in Malawi, we would like to request your participation in this 
survey. Your participation will assist Mr. Ligomeka in completing his PhD and also in 
making recommendations to the Malawi Government on how to improve the tax system. 
Participating businesses in the survey have been selected from Lilongwe and Blantyre and 
your business has been chosen at random. Your participation is voluntary and the 
information that you provide will NOT be shared with any institution including 
government agencies. The interview will take approximately 30 minutes and there is no 
penalty for refusing to participate. If you agree to participate, you can skip any question 
that you do not want to answer or terminate the interview at any time during the interview. 
I would like to know now if you have any questions and if you would like to proceed with 
the interview.  
 (Interviewer: Proceed with interview only when any concerns have been addressed and 
the respondent agrees to proceed. Before proceeding ask: “We can do this interview in 
English or Chichewa. Please, tell me which language you would like to use?”)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 
Begin interview 
The questions that I will ask you will mainly relate to the 2016 (or 2015/16) tax year.  
A. Respondent and businesses profile  
Q1a. What is your position in the business? 
Owner /Partner  1 
Chief Executive Officer  2 
Accounts personnel  3 
Other: Specify……………….. 4 
Q1b. How old are you?..............................  
Q1c.How long have you been working in this business? 
        …………years and …….months 
Q1d. Are you involved in accounting or book-keeping in this business?  
Yes  1 
No  2 
Q2a Is this business registered with the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA)?  
Yes  1 
No (skip Q2b) 2 
Don’t know (Skip Q2b) 0 
Q2b Which year did you register with the MRA and  receive your Tax Payer Identification 
Number (TPIN)………………………… 
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Q2c. Has this business filed (submitted) a tax return to the MRA in the last five years?  
Yes 1 
No  2 
Don’t know 0 
Q3. Including yourself and family members, how many: 
a- Full-time workers are employed by this business (A worker is considered to be 
working full time if they work 40 hours a week or more, regardless of whether paid 
or not)? ___________ 
b- Part-time/ seasonal workers are employed by this business (A worker is 
considered to be working part time if they work less than 40 hours a week, regardless 
of whether paid or not)? ___________ 
Q4. What is the current legal status of this business? (Interviewer: Accept 
  only one answer.) 
Sole Proprietorship 1 
Partnership 2 
Limited Liability Company 3 
Closed Stock Company 4 
Public Company 5 
Other (specify): _____________________ 99 
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(Interviewer: for question 5a, 5b and 5c, use table below for the responses)  
Q5a. What would you say is the main activity of your business?  
Q5b. What would you say is the second main activity of your business?  
Q5c. What would you say is the third main activity of your business? 
 Q5 Q6 Q7 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 1 1 
Mining and quarrying  2 2 2 
Manufacturing  3 3 3 
Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply 4 4 4 
Water supply, sewage, waste management and 
remediation activities 5 
5 5 
Construction  6 6 6 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles  7 
7 7 
Transportation and storage 8 8 8 
Accommodation and food services  9 9 9 
Information and communication  10 10 10 
Financial and insurance services  11 11 11 
Real estate activities  12 12 12 
Professional scientific and technical activities 13 13 13 
Administrative and support services  14 14 14 
Education  15 15 15 
Human health and social work  16 16 16 
Arts and entertainment and recreation  17 17 17 
 
B. General tax compliance and taxpayer experience  
Q6. Who prepares the books of accounts and tax returns?  
Self /owner (skip Q6b) 1 
Part time accountant (skip Q6b) 2 
Full time accountant (Skip Q6b) 3 
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None  0 
 
Q6b What is the reason for not doing any type of book-keeping?  
It is too expensive for our business 1 
I do not know how to do it 2 
Why should I? Nobody is forcing me  3 
I do not want to keep books because of the risk of books 
falling into the tax authority’s hands 
4 
Other (specify)………………….. 5 
N/A 0 
 
Q7. I would now like to read out some statements about record-keeping in your business. 
Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is “Not at all” and 5 is “All the time,” to what extent 
does your business . . .  
 
  
N
ot
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A Keep all physical receipts in an organised manner 
(such as sales slips, invoices receipts etc) 
1 2 3 4 5 
B Practice manual book-keeping to record revenue 
and expenses in an organised manner 
1 2 3 4 5 
C Record income and expenses in an organised 
manner using a computer 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q8a. How many times in the past 12 months has the business been visited by tax  
officials (Interviewer: Explain difference between Tax Authority officials and 
other officials that might visit a business such as Ministry of Finance Officers, 
Local Council, etc.)? ______ 
Q8b. Out of all the times the business has been visited in the past 12 months, how many 
times was the business  audited by tax officials (Interviewer: clarify that you are not 
referring to informal checks conducted by MRA officers but actual audits)?______ 
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Q8c. Has this business been fined by the Tax Authority 
Yes  1 
No  2 
Don’t know 0 
 
Q8d. Apart from a fine, has this business suffered any other negative consequences after 
a visit by a tax official?  
Yes 1 
No 2 
Q8e. Can you provide us an example of what the fine was in connection with, or the 
negative consequence that you suffered?  
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
_______________  
Q9a. Have you appealed against any of the fines or negative consequences suffered?  
Yes 1 
No (skip Q10)  2 
N/A (skip Q10) 0 
Q10a. On a scale of 1 to 5, where one is “Not satisfied at all” and 5 is “very satisfied” 
how satisfied were you with the MRA’s appeal process?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not satisfied at all 1 
Not satisfied 2 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 3 
Satisfied 4 
Very satisfied 5 
N/A 0 
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Q10b. What do you (or others in similar business) do if you (or they) are not satisfied 
with the MRA’s ruling on your appeal? (if they have never been in this situation or they 
don’t know anyone who has been in this situation, ask them what they think they would 
do if they were in this situation) (do not prompt)  
Settle the case as proposed by MRA 1 
There is nothing I can do, I just follow 
MRA ruling 
2 
Write to Ministry of Finance  3 
Take the case to court 4 
Other……………..(specify)  5 
Declined to answer   6 
 
Q11a. Do you think business like yours are sometimes asked by tax officials to pay them  
money so that their cases are closed without using formal channels?  
 
 
 
 
Q11b. If so, how often?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Interviewer: for Questions 12a, 12b and 12c use table below. Do not prompt)  
Q12a. What do you think are the main reasons businesses like yours give gifts or bribes 
to tax officers?   
Q12b. How about the second most important reason?  
Q12c. How about the third most important reason?  
Yes 1 
No  (skip Q11b) 2 
Don’t know (skip Q11b)  0 
Never  1 
Rarely 2 
Sometimes  3 
Most of the time 4 
All the time 5 
Don’t know  0 
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Q12d. How frequently do you think taxpayers evade taxes?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q12e. Please tell me what you think about people who do not pay taxes that they owe the 
MRA. Is that behaviour wrong, wrong but understandable or wrong and punishable?  
Not wrong at all  1 
Wrong but understandable 2 
Wrong and punishable  3 
Don’t know  0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Q12a Q12b Q12c 
To prevent excessive tax payment 1 1 1 
To avoid penalties 2 2 2 
To reduce the amount of tax they should pay 3 3 3 
To stop Tax Authority officers’ harassment 4 4 4 
To reduce time and money spent on various tax-
compliance tasks 5 5 5 
None of the above. The tax officer was nice and fair, and 
generally they are underpaid 6 6 6 
Other (please specify)…………….. 99 99 99 
None  0 0 0 
Very frequently 1 
Frequently 2 
Not often 3 
Sometimes  4 
Never   5 
Don’t know  0 
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Q13. Please rate your agreement with the following statements using a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 is “Completely disagree” and 5 is “Completely agree.”  
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A I am satisfied with the level of 
goods (e.g roads and bridges) and 
services (e.g education and 
security) that I receive from the 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
B There is a culture of tax evasion in 
Malawi  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
C If the tax rates were lower, 
businesses would be more willing 
to pay all taxes due  
1 2 3 4 5 
0 
 
D The risk of getting caught evading 
tax is very low in Malawi  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
E The potential consequences (e.g. 
fines and penalties, public naming, 
prosecution) of getting caught are 
serious enough to stop people from 
avoiding paying their taxes 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
F The Malawi Revenue Authority is 
trustworthy in its operations  1 2 3 4 5 0 
G I have access to reliable information 
on the tax rates, laws, and 
regulations relevant to my business   
1 2 3 4 5 0 
H Business would be willing to pay 
more tax if corruption was not 
prevalent  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
E Most tax officials are not corrupt  1 2 3 4 5 0 
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14. Apart from taxes, what other fees and charges do you pay to government  
Annual business licence 1 
Market fee 2 
TEVETA levy 3 
Tourism levy  4 
MBS 5 
ODPP 6 
Other 
(specify)………………….. 
7 
 
C. More on VAT 
I will now ask a few more questions about Value Added Tax (VAT). 
Q15.  Are you registered for VAT?  
Yes (skip Q16) 1 
No  2 
 
Q16. What, if anything, would encourage you to register for VAT? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q17. Do you use Electronic Fiscal Device (EFD) machines? 
Yes (skip Q18) 1 
No (skip Q19, Q20, Q21, Q22, Q23) 2 
 
 
When I reach the VAT registration threshold 1 
If I start dealing in exempt supplies   2 
To deal with other VAT registered businesses  3 
If tax compliance procedures were less 
complicated 
4 
If there were no frequent inspections by the MRA 5 
If there was no harassment by MRA officers 6 
Other (specify)…………. 99 
NA 0 
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Q18. What is the reason for not using EFD Machines? (Interviewer: do not prompt) 
Not registered for VAT 1 
Cost of buying machine is too high 2 
Electricity/internet interruptions 3 
High maintenance cost  4 
Difficult to use other options when it is not working  5 
Require training workers 6 
Limited maintenance service providers  7 
Bigger tax burden  8 
Other(specify)………….. 9 
N/A 0 
 
Q19. What are the advantages of using EFD machines?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q20. Have you ever applied for a VAT refund in a relevant situation? 
Never 1 
sometimes 2 
All the time 3 
I don’t know  0 
 
 
 
Updated and easily available information  1 
Easy to comply with tax requirements 2 
Better sales and inventory control  3 
Saves time 4 
Improves business reputation  5 
Able to get VAT credit (refund) 6 
Less opportunity for theft by employees 8 
Other (specify)…………….. 9 
 
 
 
192 
Q21. If you have never applied or only apply sometimes, what is the typical reason for 
not applying for a VAT refund? 
 
It was not worth it because the refund was too small 1 
We would not get the refund anyway 2 
The refund takes too long to come  3 
It may induce a tax audit  of the business 4 
Complicated formalities for refund  5 
Other (specify)……………… 0 
 
Q22. How long does it take for you to get a VAT refund? (Interviewer: do not prompt) 
Less than 3 months 1 
Between 3 and 6 months 2 
Between 6 and 12 months 3 
Between 1 and 3 years 4 
More than 3 years 5 
 
Q23. If you compare businesses registered for VAT to businesses not registered for VAT, 
would you say that registered businesses are, overall (Interviewer: Read out and 
circle appropriate response.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Access to Information 
Q24a. In the past, have you used any of the following services to contact MRA?  
Phone 1 
Sent an email enquiry  2 
Sent a letter or fax  3 
In a much worse position 1 
In a worse position 2 
In the same position 3 
In a better position 4 
In a much better position 5 
N/A 0 
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Visited in person  4 
Other (specify)…………….. 5 
Never contacted the MRA (skip 
Q24b) 
0 
 
Q24b: What kind of information did you seek from the taxpayer services office of the 
MRA?  
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
__________ 
 
Q24c. In the past, has the MRA contacted you?  
Yes  1 
No (skip Q 24d) 2 
 
Q24d. How did the MRA contact you?  
Phone 1 
Sent an email quarry  2 
Sent a letter or fax  3 
In person visit 4 
Other (specify)…………….. 5 
N/A 0 
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Q25. Please rate your agreement with the following statements using a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 is “Completely disagree” and 5 is  “Completely agree.” 
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A I am treated the by MRA 
staff with respect and 
dignity   
1 2 3 4 5 0 
B The MRA staff are fair in 
thier dealings  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
C The MRA staff are 
cooperative  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
D I am satisfied with the time 
the MRA take to respond to 
my queries and problems  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
E The MRA takes appropriate 
measures to ensure access 
to and availability of tax 
officers  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
 
(Interviewer: For Q26a, Q26b, Q26c, use table below) 
Q26a. We would like to know a little bit about the channels of communication through 
which you find out about tax laws, regulations, and practical tax information and 
advice. What channels do you access information through? 
Q26b. What would be the most important one? 
Q26c. And what would be your most preferred channel through which you would like to 
access information about government laws and regulations? 
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 Q26a 
All channels 
Q26b Most 
important 
Q26c Preferred 
Television  1 1 1 
Radio 2 2 2 
Newspapers and magazines 3 3 3 
Internet 4 4 4 
Friends and family 5 5 5 
Talking to other people in my 
community 
6 6 6 
Billboards 7 7 7 
Trainings and seminars 8 8 8 
Official Gazette 9 9 9 
Our lawyer 10 10 10 
Email 11 11 11 
SMS 12 12 12 
Telephone 13 13 13 
Specialist tax consultants/ accountants/ 
bookkeepers 
14 14 14 
Taxpayer Services Office in the Tax 
Authority 
15 15 15 
Other (please specify): 
_______________ 
16 16 16 
None 0 0 0 
 
E. Knowledge of taxpayer rights 
Q27. Please rate your agreement with the following statements using a  
         scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is “Completely disagree” and 5 is  
         “Completely agree.” 
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A I am aware of my rights 
against unlawful search and 
seizure by the tax authority  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
B It is my right to claim tax 
refund (if any)  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
C It is my right to know the 
basis for the assessment of 
my tax liability  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
D I am aware that I have certain 
rights if I have a problem with 
the tax office  
1 2 3 4 5 0 
 
Q28. What was the approximate sales profit of this business in 2016?  
Below MK100,000 1 
Between MK100,000 and MK500,000 2 
Between MK500,000 and MK1 million  3 
Between MK1million and MK5 Million  4 
Between MK5 million and 10 million  5 
Between MK10million and MK50 million  6 
Between MK50 million and MK200 million  7 
Between Mk200 million and MK500 million  8 
Between MK500 million and MK1 billion  9 
Above MK1 billion  10 
Made a loss 11 
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Q29. Apart from provisional tax, have you ever been asked by the MRA to make an 
advance payment on your taxes? 
Yes 1 
No (skip Q 30  2 
 
Q30. How often does the MRA make a request for non-provisional advance payment of 
taxes in a year? ______________________ 
 
Q31. Lastly, do you have any recommendations for how the Malawi tax system can be 
improved?   
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
END 
Thank you for your time. 
 
(Interviewer: after the interview, complete these two additional questions) 
 
Q32. Respondent gender: 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
Q33. District where the business is located… 
Lilongwe 1 
Blantyre 2 
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Appendix 4.11: Sampling method and data management for the survey in Malawi   
1. Registered businesses (Formal)  
To sample registered businesses, data from the tax administration, the Malawi Revenue 
Authority (MRA), was used. The MRA data shows that, in 2015, a total of 32,342 active55 
businesses were registered with the institution. Of the active registered businesses, 11,443 
operated (have their headquarters) from Blantyre, while 12,601 businesses operated from 
Lilongwe, and 2,345 operated from Mzuzu. Thus, over 80% of all active businesses 
registered in Malawi in 2015 had their headquarters in the three districts of Lilongwe, 
Blantyre, and Mzuzu, with Lilongwe and Blantyre accounting for approximately 75% of 
the businesses. In total, there are 28 districts in Malawi. To classify business size for 
sampling purposes, the study partly followed the MRA classification of businesses56 
(large, medium, and small). In 2015, there were 434 large businesses in Blantyre, and 225 
large businesses in Lilongwe.  A total of 217 businesses participated in the survey in 
Blantyre, comprising 41 large businesses and 176 small and medium businesses. In 
Lilongwe, a total of 37 large businesses and 188 small and medium businesses 
participated. The MRA provided a telephone number, email address, and physical address 
for each business. Using an Excel function (RAND), business were randomly selected to 
participate in the survey. A dedicated individual then made calls to the sampled 
businesses to arrange the interviews. In other instances, I physically visited the business 
premises to arrange an interview date and time. Table 1 shows the distribution of the 
sample.    
 
 
 
55 Those that had filed a tax return in the past three years.  
56 The MRA groups businesses into large, medium and small. To qualify as a large taxpayer, one of the 
following conditions have to be met: a) have an annual turnover of at least MK750 million (£750,000); b) 
be paying cumulative taxes (excise tax, PAYE, corporate tax, VAT etc.) of over MK450 million (£450,000) 
or above per annum; c) be importing goods valued at MK750 million or above per annum; d) be 
operating in a financial or mining sector; e) be an operator of excise tax; f) be an associated or related 
company whose parent company is a large taxpayer. Medium taxpayers are businesses whose annual 
turnover is between MK150 million (£150,000) and MK750 million, while small taxpayers are those 
whose annual turnover is less than MK150 million. However, the study grouped medium and small 
business together after noting that although the MRA has a “medium” taxpayer classification, there is 
no division dedicated to this group, as is the case with large taxpayers, such that the medium and small 
business are treated the same.  
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Table 1: Sample size for formal businesses based on location and size 
District  Blantyre  Lilongwe  Total  
Number of businesses 11,443 12,601 24,044 
   of which are large 
businesses 
434 225 659 
Sample size  219 237 456 
  of which are large 
business 
43 37 81 
Source: The MRA, my own calculations  
2. Unregistered businesses (informal)  
In respect of informal businesses, the sampling technique adopted was a clustered, multi-
stage random sampling method. In the two districts where the survey was conducted, the 
sample was taken from the urban areas. This done deliberately to ensure that both the 
registered and non-registered businesses came from within the same area, and thereby 
were likely to be subjected to a similar environment and hence have comparable 
experiences. The urban area subdivisions (or clusters) were listed in accordance with the 
city assembly town plans in each district. Some of the areas in Lilongwe include Area 1, 
2, 3, 4, Kawale, etc. In Blantyre, the areas include Zingwangwa, Mkolokosa, Limbe, etc.  
The areas were listed and five areas in each district were chosen at random (using the 
Excel random function). In Lilongwe, the following areas were chosen: Chinsapo, Area 
3, Kawale, City Centre, and Old Town. In Blantyre, the study was conducted in 
Zingwangwa, Limbe, Blantyre, Mkolokosa, and Angelogoveya. The sample size for each 
district was proportional to the population size. The estimated population size for 
Blantyre and Lilongwe as per the most recent available Malawi Integrated Household 
Survey (IHS3) 2010/1157 conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO) is 900,000 
and 1,100,000, respectively. Representatives of a total of 267 informal businesses were 
interviewed; 123 unregistered businesses were sampled from Blantyre, and 144 were 
sampled from Lilongwe. The non-registered businesses included hawkers, motor vehicle 
 
57 It is noted that population figures from the Population and Household Survey conducted by NSO 
would have been more appropriate to use in this survey. However, the most recent Population and 
Housing Census was conducted in 2008, and hence would not provide a true picture of the current 
population size in these districts.  
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mechanics, tailors, carpenters, welders, small cross-border traders, bus/minibus owners, 
taxi and car hire operators. The interviews were restricted to non-registered businesses 
that had some kind of “permanent establishment” such as shop, house, or shack from 
which they conducted their businesses. This meant that street vendors, vegetable sellers, 
and other micro businesses were not included in the survey. Approximately 20 interviews 
were conducted in each area.  
3. Data management  
Once collected, survey data was encoded by using ‘Microsoft Excel’ spreadsheets 
prepared with data fields and codes. After entry, I worked with a research assistant who, 
using the questionnaire, read aloud the questions and responses while I confirmed the 
correctness of the responses on the spreadsheet. Changes were made as appropriate. Next, 
the data was analysed using STATA 15.1 to identify responses outside of expected ranges, 
including potential inconsistencies across variables. At each stage, copies of the data were 
maintained. The actual questionnaires with the responses are stored and will be available 
at least until the completion of the thesis.  
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Appendix 4.12: Descriptive statistics: My survey data  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Tax Morale 0.606 0.489 0 1 
Deterrence  3.891 1.670 0 5 
Fiscal  3.915 1.567 1 5 
Tax knowledge  -0.00 1.00 -1.8 0.62 
Corruption  4.2 1.29 1 5 
Business size 1.083 0.333 1 3 
Lilongwe  0.47 0.499 0 1 
Registration status  0.645 0.479 0 1 
Female  0.703 0.457 0 1 
Retail   0.454 0.498 0 1 
Manufacturing  0.046 0.211 0 1 
Accommodation  0.078 0.268 0 1 
Construction  0.025 0.158 0 1 
Transport  0.038 0.192 0 1 
Source: Business survey, My calculations  
 
Appendix 4.13: Wald Test, equation 2 (my survey data) 
Wald Chi2 677.10 
Number of observations  703 
Prob>chi2 0.00 
 
Appendix 4.14: Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test: equation 2 
Number of observations  703 
Number of covariate patterns 619 
Pearson Chi2 (603) 630.03 
Prob > chi2  0.2159 
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Appendix 4.15: Ordered Logit Regression, Equation 2 (my survey data)  
Variable  Not wrong at 
all 
Wrong but 
understandable 
Wrong and 
punishable 
Deterrence  -0.04 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)** 0.05 (0.02)** 
Fiscal  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01(0.00) 0.02 (0.01) 
Tax Knowledge  0.08 (0.02)** 0.02 (0.01)** -0.05 (0.02)** 
Corruption  0.01 (0.01)* 0.00 (0.00)* -0.1 (0.01)* 
Business size -0.08(0.05)** -0.04 (0.03)** 0.12 (0.08)** 
Lilongwe 
0.12 (0.03)*** 
-0.05 
(0.02)*** -0.17 (0.04)*** 
Registration 
status   -0.03 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02) 0.04 (0.06) 
Female  -0.03 (0.03)* -0.01 (0.01)* 0.04 (0.05)* 
Retail   0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.05) 
Manufacturing  -0.04 (0.07) -0.02 (0.03) 0.07 (0.11) 
Accommodation   -0.03 (0.06) -0.01 (0.03) 0.05 (0.09) 
Construction  0.13 (0.08)* 0.06 (0.04)* -0.19 (0.12)* 
Transport  0.05 (0.07) 0.02 (0.03) -0.07 (0.11) 
    * Significant at .10 level 
  ** Significant at .05 level 
*** Significant at .01 level
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A
ppendix 5.1: T
A
D
A
T
 Perform
ance O
utcom
e A
reas (PO
A
), Indicators, and D
im
ensions 
PO
A
 
Indicator  
D
im
ension  
PO
A
 1: Integrity of the 
R
egistered 
Taxpayer 
B
ase  
P1-1 
A
ccurate 
and 
reliable 
taxpayer 
inform
ation  
1) 
The adequacy of inform
ation held in respect of 
registered taxpayers and the extent to w
hich the 
registration database supports effective interactions 
w
ith taxpayers and tax interm
ediaries 
2) 
The accuracy of inform
ation held in the registration 
database 
P1-2 K
now
ledge of the potential taxpayer base  
3) 
The extent of initiatives to detect businesses and 
individuals w
ho are required to register but fail to do 
so 
PO
A
 2: Effective R
isk 
M
anagem
ent  
P2-3 Identification, assessm
ent, ranking, and 
quantification of com
pliance risks  
4) 
 The extent of intelligence gathering and research to 
identify com
pliance risks in respect of the m
ain tax 
obligations 
5) 
The process used to assess, rank, and quantify 
taxpayer com
pliance risks 
P2-4 M
itigation of risks through a com
pliance 
im
provem
ent plan  
6) 
The degree to w
hich the tax adm
inistration m
itigates 
assessed risks to the tax system
 through a com
pliance 
im
provem
ent plan  
P2-5 M
onitoring and evaluation of com
pliance 
risk m
itigation activities  
7) 
The process used to m
onitor and evaluate the im
pact 
of com
pliance risk m
itigation activities  
P2-6 
Identification, 
assessm
ent, 
and 
m
itigation of institutional risks  
8) 
The process used to identify, assess, and m
itigate 
institutional risks  
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PO
A
 
Indicator  
D
im
ension  
PO
A
 
3: 
Supporting 
V
oluntary C
om
pliance  
P3-7 Scope, currency, and accessibility of 
inform
ation  
9) 
The range of inform
ation available to taxpayers to 
explain, in clear term
s, w
hat their obligations and 
entitlem
ents are in respect of each core tax 
10) The degree to w
hich inform
ation is current in term
s 
of the law
 and adm
inistrative policy 
11) The ease w
ith w
hich taxpayers obtain inform
ation 
from
 the tax adm
inistration 
12) The 
tim
e 
taken 
to 
respond 
to 
taxpayer 
and 
interm
ediary requests for inform
ation 
P3-8 Scope of initiatives to reduce taxpayer 
com
pliance costs  
13) The 
extent 
of 
initiatives 
to 
reduce 
taxpayer 
com
pliance costs  
P3-9 O
btaining taxpayer feedback on products 
and services  
14)  The 
use 
and 
frequency 
of 
m
ethods 
to 
obtain 
feedback from
 taxpayers on the standard of services 
provided 
15) The extent to w
hich taxpayer input is taken into 
account in the design of adm
inistrative processes and 
products 
PO
A
 
4:Tim
ely 
Filing 
ofTax D
eclarations  
P4-10 O
n-tim
e filing rate  
16) The num
ber of C
IT declarations filed by the statutory 
due 
date 
as 
a 
percentage 
of 
the 
num
ber 
of 
declarations expected from
 registered C
IT taxpayers 
17)  The 
num
ber 
of 
PIT 
declarations 
filed 
by 
the 
statutory due date as a percentage of the num
ber of 
declarations expected from
 registered PIT taxpayers 
18) The 
num
ber 
of 
V
A
T 
declarations 
filed 
by 
the 
statutory due date as a percentage of the num
ber of 
declarations 
expected 
from
 
registered 
V
A
T 
taxpayers 
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PO
A
 
Indicator  
D
im
ension  
19) The num
ber of PA
Y
E w
ithholding declarations filed 
by 
em
ployers 
by 
the 
statutory 
due 
date 
as 
a 
percentage of the num
ber of PA
Y
E declarations 
expected from
 registered em
ployers  
P4-11 U
se of electronic filing facilities  
20)  The extent to w
hich tax declarations are filed 
electronically 
PO
A
 5:Tim
ely Paym
ent 
ofTaxes  
P5-12 U
se of electronic paym
ent m
ethods  
21) The extent to w
hich core taxes are paid electronically 
P5-13 U
se of efficient collection system
s  
22)  The extent to w
hich w
ithholding at source and 
advance paym
ent system
s are used 
P5-14 Tim
eliness of paym
ents  
23)  The num
ber of V
A
T paym
ents m
ade by the statutory 
due 
date 
as 
a 
percentage 
the 
total 
num
ber 
of 
paym
ents due 
24) The value of V
A
T paym
ents m
ade by the statutory 
due date in percent of the total value of V
A
T 
paym
ents due 
P5-15 Stock and flow
 of tax arrears  
25)  The value of total core tax arrears at fiscal year-end 
as a percentage of total core tax revenue collections 
for the fiscal year 
26) The value of collectible core tax arrears at fiscal year-
end as a percentage 
of total 
core 
tax revenue 
collections for the fiscal year 
27) T
he value of core tax arrears m
ore than 12 m
onths’ 
old as a percentage of the value of all core tax arrears 
PO
A
 
6: 
A
ccurate 
R
eporting 
in 
D
eclarations  
P6-16 Scope of verification actions taken to 
detect and deter inaccurate reporting  
28)  The nature and scope of the tax audit program
m
e in 
place to detect and deter inaccurate reporting 
29) The extent of large-scale autom
ated crosschecking to 
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PO
A
 
Indicator  
D
im
ension  
verify inform
ation reported in tax declarations 
P6-17 
Extent 
of 
proactive 
initiatives 
to 
encourage accurate reporting  
30)  The 
nature 
and 
scope 
of 
proactive 
initiatives 
undertaken to encourage accurate reporting  
P6-18 M
onitoring the extent of inaccurate 
reporting  
31)  The soundness of the m
ethod/s used by the tax 
adm
inistration to m
onitor the extent of inaccurate 
reporting 
PO
A
 7: Effective Tax 
D
ispute R
esolution  
P7-19 Existence of an independent, w
orkable, 
and graduated dispute resolution process  
32)  The extent to w
hich an appropriately graduated 
m
echanism
 of adm
inistrative and judicial review
 is 
available to, and used by, taxpayers 
33) W
hether the adm
inistrative review
 m
echanism
 is 
independent of the audit process 
34) W
hether 
inform
ation 
on 
the 
dispute 
process 
is 
published, and w
hether taxpayers are explicitly m
ade 
aw
are of it 
P7-20 Tim
e taken to resolve disputes  
35)  The tim
e taken to com
plete adm
inistrative review
s 
P7-21 D
egree to w
hich dispute outcom
es are 
acted upon  
36) The extent to w
hich the tax adm
inistration responds 
to dispute outcom
es 
PO
A
 
8: 
Efficient 
R
evenue M
anagem
ent  
P8-22 C
ontribution to governm
ent tax revenue 
forecast- ing process  
37)  The extent of tax adm
inistration input to governm
ent 
tax revenue forecasting and estim
ating 
P8-23 A
dequacy of the tax revenue accounting 
system
  
38)  A
dequacy of the tax adm
inistration’s tax revenue 
accounting system
 
P8-24 A
dequacy of tax refund processing  
39)  A
dequacy of the V
A
T refund system
 
40)  The tim
e taken to pay (or offset) V
A
T refunds 
PO
A
 9: A
ccountability 
and Transparency  
P9-25 Internal assurance m
echanism
s  
41) A
ssurance provided by internal audit  
42) Staff integrity assurance m
echanism
s 
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PO
A
 
Indicator  
D
im
ension  
P9-26 
External 
oversight 
of 
the 
tax 
adm
inistration  
43) The extent of independent external oversight of the 
tax 
adm
inistration’s 
operations 
and 
financial 
perform
ance 
44) The investigation process for suspected w
rongdoing 
and m
aladm
inistration 
P9-27 Public perception of integrity  
45) The m
echanism
 for m
onitoring public confidence in 
the tax adm
inistration 
P9-28 Publication of activities, results, and 
plans  
46)  The extent to w
hich the financial and operational 
perform
ance of the tax adm
inistration is m
ade public, 
and the tim
eliness of publication 
47) T
he extent to w
hich the tax adm
inistration’s future 
directions 
and 
plans 
are 
m
ade 
public, 
and 
the 
tim
eliness of publication 
Source: TA
D
A
T Field G
uild (2015) 
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A
ppendix 5.2: Sum
m
ary of T
A
D
A
T
 assessm
ent reports 
Indicator 
Jordan  
Liberia  
Georgia  
Zambia 
Armenia  
Kyrgyz 
Peru 
Alagoas  
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Guatemala 
Burkina 
Faso  
Malawi  
Ukraine  
Rio De 
Janeiro 
P-1 Integrity of the registered taxpayer base  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P1-1 
A
ccurate 
and 
reliable 
taxpayer 
inform
ation 
C
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
B
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
P1-2 K
now
ledge of the potential taxpayer 
base 
B
 
C
 
C
 
C
 
B
 
C
 
A
 
C
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
C
 
P2- Effective risk m
anagem
ent  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P2-3 Identification, assessm
ent, ranking, and 
quantification of com
pliance risks 
D
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
C
 
C
 
A
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
P2-4 m
itigation of risk through com
pliance 
im
provem
ent plan  
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
C
 
D
 
C
 
A
 
D
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
P2-5. 
M
onitoring 
and 
evaluation 
of 
com
pliance risk m
itigation activities  
D
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
D
 
C
 
B
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
N
/
A
 
C
 
D
 
P2-6. 
Identification, 
assessm
ent, 
and 
m
itigation of institutional risks  
A
 
D
 
D
 
A
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
D
 
P-3 Supporting voluntary com
pliance  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P3-7. Scope, currency, and accessibility of 
inform
ation  
C
 
D
 
B
 
C
 
A
  
B
 
A
 
C
 
D
 
B
 
D
 
C
 
B
 
B
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Indicator 
Jordan  
Liberia  
Georgia  
Zambia 
Armenia  
Kyrgyz 
Peru 
Alagoas  
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Guatemala 
Burkina 
Faso  
Malawi  
Ukraine  
Rio De 
Janeiro 
P3-8. Scope of initiatives to reduce taxpayer 
com
pliance costs  
B
 
D
 
B
 
B
 
B
 
C
 
A
 
B
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
B
 
C
 
P3-9. 
O
btaining 
taxpayer 
feedback 
on 
products and services  
A
 
C
 
C
 
B
 
B
 
B
 
A
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
C
 
D
 
B
 
D
 
P4 Tim
ely filing of tax declaration  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P4-10. O
n-tim
e filing rate  
B
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
C
 
B+ 
C
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
B
+ 
D
 
 
P4-11. U
se of electronic filing facilities  
D
 
D
 
A
 
B
 
D
 
A
 
A
  
D
 
A
 
D
 
B
 
C
 
A
 
 
P5- Tim
ely paym
ent of taxes  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P5-12. U
se of electronic paym
ent m
ethods  
C
 
C
 
A
 
C
 
A
  
A
 
A
 
A
  
C
 
A
 
C
 
D
 
A
 
A
 
P5-13. U
se of efficient collection system
s  
C
 
A
 
B
 
A
 
A
  
A
 
A
 
A
  
A
 
A
 
A
 
C
 
A
 
A
 
P5-14 Tim
elines of paym
ents  
C
 
D
 
B
 
B
 
D
 
A
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
A
 
C
 
P5-15. Stock and flow
 of tax arrears  
D
+ 
D
 
D+ 
D
+ 
D
+ 
B+ 
D
 
D
 
D
 
D
+ 
D
+ 
D
 
B
 
D
 
P6 accurate reporting in declaration  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P6-16. Scope of verification actions taken to 
detect and deter inaccurate reporting  
C
+ 
D
 
C
 
C
 
C
 
C
 
C
+ 
D
 
D
+ 
D
+ 
D
+ 
D
 
D
+ 
D
+ 
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Indicator 
Jordan  
Liberia  
Georgia  
Zambia 
Armenia  
Kyrgyz 
Peru 
Alagoas  
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Guatemala 
Burkina 
Faso  
Malawi  
Ukraine  
Rio De 
Janeiro 
P6-17. 
Extent 
of 
proactive 
initiatives 
to 
encourage accurate reporting  
D
 
D
 
B
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
B
  
B
 
D
  
D
  
D
  
D
 
B
 
B
 
P6-18. M
onitoring the extent of inaccurate 
reporting  
C
 
D
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
D
 
A
 
D
 
D
  
C
 
C
 
D
 
D
 
D
 
P7 effective tax dispute resolution  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P7-19. 
Existence 
of 
an 
independent, 
w
orkable, and graduated dispute resolution 
process  
B
+ 
A
 
A
 
B
 
B
 
B+ 
B
  
A
  
A
 
B
+ 
C
+ 
C
 
A
 
A
 
P7-20. Tim
e taken to resolve disputes  
B
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
A
  
C
 
D
 
D
 
D
  
D
  
D
  
D
 
B
 
D
 
P7-21. D
egree to w
hich dispute outcom
es are 
acted upon  
D
 
C
 
C
 
B
 
C
 
B
  
A
 
C
 
B
 
C
 
C
  
D
 
A
 
C
 
P8- Effective R
evenue M
anagem
ent  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P8-22. 
C
ontribution 
to 
governm
ent 
tax 
revenue forecasting process  
B
 
B
 
C
 
B
 
C
 
C
 
A
 
C
 
C
  
C
 
C
  
D
 
B
 
A
 
P8-23. 
A
dequacy 
of 
the 
tax 
revenue 
accounting system
  
A
 
D
 
C
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
C
  
D
 
D
  
C
 
D
  
C
 
C
 
C
 
P8-24. A
dequacy of tax refund processing  
C
 
N/A
 
D
 
C
 
C
 
D
 
C
+ 
D
 
D
  
D
  
D
   
C
 
C
 
D
 
P9- A
ccountability and transparancy  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
P9-25. Internal assurance m
echanism
s  
B
 
D
 
D
B
+ 
C
 
C
A
 
C
+ 
D
  
B
+ 
C
  
B
 
B
 
C
+ 
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Indicator 
Jordan  
Liberia  
Georgia  
Zambia 
Armenia  
Kyrgyz 
Peru 
Alagoas  
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Guatemala 
Burkina 
Faso  
Malawi  
Ukraine  
Rio De 
Janeiro 
+ 
+ 
P9-26. 
External 
oversight 
of 
the 
tax 
adm
inistration  
C
 
D
 
C
 
C
+ 
D
+ 
C
  
B
  
B
 
C
  
C
 
D
   
D
 
B
 
A
 
P9-27. Public perception of integrity  
A
 
D
 
C
 
C
  
B
 
C
  
A
 
D
 
D
  
D
  
C
  
N
/
A
 
C
 
D
 
P9-28. Publication of activities, results, and 
plan  
A
 
D+ 
D+ 
B
  
C
+ 
C+ 
A
 
C
+ 
C
  
A
 
D
   
N
/
A
 
A
 
D
 
 
